Shochet: Difference between revisions

Latest revision as of 19:44, 28 July 2024

The Mishna (73a) lists ‘shocheit’ (slaughtering) as one of the 39 avot melachot on Shabbos. It is clear in the gemara and rishonim that the av melacha is not limited to ritual slaughtering per se, but actually is more broadly defined as "taking life".^[1]

Killing Harmful Creatures

Categories
1. Whether or not one may kill a creature on shabbat depends on how harmful it is:
  1. If there's a chance it will kill you, then you can kill it even if it is not chasing you.^[2]
  2. If it is damaging but can't kill^[3], then you can kill it if it's chasing you,^[4] but otherwise not (although there is a special leniency that one may kill it while walking).^[5]
  3. If it is painful but not damaging, then you can never kill it.^[6]
Practical Examples
1. Mosquito, fly, gnat, ant, spider, etc. - may never be killed on shabbat^[7]
2. Bee, wasp, hornet, etc. - some poskim treat these like gnats (and so may never be killed, even if stinging you),^[8] while others treat them like snakes (so may be killed if chasing you).^[9]

Killing Lice

The gemara defines the type of creature that one may not kill on shabbat to be one which procreates via sexual reproduction.^[10] It therefore excludes killing lice from the melacha of shocheit.^[11]
Nowadays
1. Today, lice seemingly do not spontaneously generate but rather sexually reproduce. Are we still entitled to rely upon the leniency codified in the gemara and Shulchan Aruch?
2. Some poskim say that one may still rely upon this leniency^[12], while others are strict.^[13]

Chovel (lit: wounding)

Background
1. The Mishna (107a) teaches that one who is chovel (causes a wound) in a person or animal has violated a melacha on Shabbat.
2. Which av melacha is it?^[14]
  1. The Rambam^[15] writes that one who is chovel has violated dosh (threshing).^[16]
  2. Tosafot^[17] writes that one is liable for shocheit.^[18]
  3. Rashi^[19] cites an opinion that one who hits an animal and causes it to bruise is considered to have dyed the hide, thereby violating the melacha of tzoveah.^[20]
3. What's the Nafka Minah (practical ramification)?
  1. How much blood needs to be removed to be chayav?^[21]
  2. Is it possible to violate chovel on a dead creature?^[22]
  3. What about removing unwanted blood?^[23]
4. The Shulchan Aruch (316:8) does not take a firm stance on whether to rule in accordance with the Rambam or Tosafos.^[24]
  1. However, the commentaries on Shulchan Aruch appear to hold like Tosafot.^[25]
Practical Example
1. Blood test
  1. One who draws blood for a blood test wants the blood that they are removing (in contrast to bloodletting discussed above), and this certainly would violate chovel if performed by a Jew, except in cases of pikuach nefesh
  2. There is more room to be lenient to have the blood test administered by a non-Jew for a Jew who is sick (choleh she'ein bo sakana), since we generally permit amira l'akum for such a person.^[26]
2. Injection
  1. If a needle must enter a person’s skin but no blood actually needs to be removed for the procedure to be effective, then there may be more room to be lenient to administer such a procedure for a choleh shein bo skana.^[27]
  2. It is certainly still preferable to have the injection administered by a non-Jew.^[28]
3. All doctors should consult their respective rabbanim for guidance on how to deal with these and similar questions that relate to their field of work.

Sources

↑ Rambam (hilchot shabbat 11:1) states that not only is slaughtering part of this melacha, but actually any taking of a life (e.g. beating, stabbing, etc.) of an animal, bird, fish, or insect, is included in this melacha. However, he then remarks that strangling a living creature until it dies is only a toldah of the melacha, but not the av melacha itself. This is somewhat surprising, as one would have assumed that if the definition of the melacha is "taking life" then strangling would have been part of the av itself, and not merely a toldah. Perhaps strangling is different because it is merely preventing the creature from breathing and is thus a less direct form of killing, and is seen as a sort of grama. The Mirkevet Hamishna suggets that perhaps strangling is different because really the definition of the melacha is "removing blood", and strangling does not involve any removal of blood. Regardless, it is clear that the melacha is much more expansive than simply "slaughtering".
↑
Generallly speaking, we know that pikuach nefesh is a prime value in Judaism, and that it pushes off most mitzvot, including shabbat. Thus one may violate shabbat in order to save a life, or even if it's only a safek whether it will save a life (see gemara in Yoma 85b). The gemara in shabbat essentially applies this principle to the prohibition of killing creatures on shabbat, as we shall see.
- The gemara 121b cites Rebbe Yehoshua Ben Levi as holding that all מזיקין (lit: damagers) may be killed on shabbat. The gemara raises an objection to this from a beraita which states that only 5 particularly harmful creatures may be killed on shabbat. There is a machlokes rishonim how the gemara answers this question. Rashi thinks that the beraita is talking about when the creature is not chasing you, and the beraita holds like the position of rebbe shimon, that a melacha not done for its intended purpose (e.g. killing an animal just because you don't want it to harm you, but not because you want the hide) is only rabbinically prohibited. Thus one may kill these creatures even if they aren't chasing you, since anyways killing them is only an isur drabanan, and chazal weren't gozer in a case when it might cause harm. Rebbe Yehoshua Ben Levi is talking about when a harmful creature is chasing you, and so it's permitted to kill it because of pikuach nefesh. Thus, according to Rashi, when one is being chased by a creature that might kill, it is certainly permitted to kill it. And according to Rebbe Shimon (who most rishonim pasken like), it will be permitted to kill one of the five harmful creatures even if it is not chasing you. The Rambam (hilchot shabbat 11:4) seems to understand that this list of 5 was not exhaustive, but rather just were examples of creatures that could kill.
- Tosfot disagrees, and thinks that the beraita can even accord with the position of rebbe yehudah - that a melacha not done for its intended purpose is still biblically forbidden - but it's talking about when the animal is chasing you. Since the animal is chasing you, and it's one of the five very harmful creatures, it is pikuach nefesh and you can kill it. Rebbe Yehoshua Ben Levi is talking about when the animal is not chasing you, but nonetheless it is permitted to kill it because he's holding like rebbe shimon (with respect to a melacha not done for its intended purpose). Thus, according to tosfot too, it will come out that when an animal that can kill is chasing you, you may kill it, and even if it is not chasing you, you can kill it according to Rebbe Shimon.
- Shulchan Aruch 316:10 states that any animal that has the potential to kill may be killed on shabbat even if it is not chasing you. It is unclear whether he reads the gemara like Rashi or like Tosfot, as this halacha can fit with either position. The Be'er Hagola says that he holds like Tosfot, and thus this is the statement of Rebbe Yehoshua Ben Levi. The Biur Hagra 316:25 thinks he learns like Rashi (and like the Rambam that the list of 5 was not exhaustive), in which case this is the statement of the beraita.
↑ Examples of these creatures that the Shulchan Aruch 316:10 gives include snakes and scorpions. Presumably, he is referring to snakes and scorpions with non-deadly stings or bites.
↑ Shulchan Aruch 316:10. The Mishna Brurah 316:46 explains that since we pasken like Rebbe Shimon (that melacha she'eina tzricha l'gufa is patur), killing a harmful creature to prevent it from damaging you is only an isur drabanan. Here, since there's a good chance it will damage you (since it's chasing you), chazal did not impose their gezeira and so we are lenient with this isur drabanan, and allow one to kill the creature. [as an aside, the Rambam seems to cite this halacha as well, despite the fact that he paskens like Rebbe Yehudah regarding melacha she'eina tzricha l'gufa. How can this be? Why would we allow an isur deorayta if there is no concern of pikuach nefesh?! The Mishna Brurah 316:46 explains that when the Rambam uses the phrase "שאר מזיקין" (lit: other damagers), he is still referring to creatures which have the potential to kill, just less so. Thus the reason for the leniency to kill them according to him is because of pikuach nefesh. However, we who hold like Rebbe Shimon will permit killing damaging creatures even if we know that they can't kill].
↑ The gemara shabbat 121b states that one may kill a snake in their normal course of walking (דורסו לפי תומו). Rashi s.v. dilma seems to understand that this leniency is only if one doesn't have intention to kill it. However, most rishonim (see Ran) disagree and hold that even if one has intention to kill the snake, one may do so, since killing it is only an isur drabanan (according to Rebbe Shimon that a melacha not done for its intended purpose is only rabbinically forbidden), and here to the onlooker it appears like an accident. The Shulchan Aruch 316:10 paskens like these rishonim, and allows one to step on damaging creatures while walking even with intention to kill them.
↑ The Tur 316 states that if one is being bitten by a פרעוש (mosquito) one may trap it to prevent it from continuing to bite, but one may not kill it. The Beit Yosef explains that the Tur understood the gemara in shabbat 107b (which states that one may not kill a par'ush) to be referring to even when being bitten. Thus, when the gemara shabbat 121b states that one may kill "מזיקין" (damaging creatures) when being chased (and certainly when they are actually biting you), this was only referring to creatures that are very damaging (but just not lethal). The Shulchan Aruch 316:9 paskens that one may not kill a par'ush even if it is in the act of biting you. The Mishna Brurah 316:46 assumes that any small insect will have the same din as a par'ush, and will be asur to kill even if it is biting you (since there is not so much pain). Rather, must simply shoo them away.
↑ Mishna Brurah 316:46
↑ The Dirshu Mishna Brurah (siman 316 footnote 82) cites from Rav Shlomo Zalmen that a wasp is treated like a gnat. Dirshu (siman 316 footnote 64) cites this from the Alter Rebbe as well.
↑ Dirshu (siman 316 footnote 64) cites from Rav Nissim Karelitz that he viewed even bees (which are less painful than wasps) as being akin to snakes / scorpions, and thus you would be allowed to kill it if being chased.
↑ The gemara shabbat 107b cites a beraita in which rebbe eliezer holds that one who kills a "כינה" (lit: louse) on shabbat is considered as if he killed a camel (i.e. it is prohibited). However, the gemara continues that the rabanan disagree and hold that one may kill a louse on shabbat. The gemara explains that the root of this debate is how to define the type of creature which we are commanded not to kill on shabbat. Everyone agrees that we learn from what was done in the preparations of the mishkan; in the mishkan they used to kill the "אילים" (lit: rams) for the purpose of using the hides. Rebbe Eliezer says that the key feature of these rams was simply that they were alive, and so the melacha should be applicable to any live creature. The rabanan argue that the key feature of these rams was that they reproduced via sexual reproduction (פרו ורבו), and so the melacha should only be applicable to those creatures which do likewise. [as an aside, it is interesting to consider why this feature is deemed important by the rabanan. Presumably they think that part of the definition of life is the ability to procreate and pass on life to the next generation, and as such, only creatures with this capability can truly be defined as "alive"].
↑ Shulchan Aruch 316:9 paskens that it is permitted to kill a כינה (louse) on shabbat.
↑ Dirshu Mishna Brurah (316:38 footnote 72) cites from Rav Dessler (Michtav M'eliyahu V4 pg 355 ft 4) that even though the מציאות (lit: realia) that we perceive differs from that which chazal understood when they established the halacha, this doesn't change anything. We may still rely upon the halacha as they defined it. Perhaps chazal also knew that lice really did sexually procreate, but since this is invisible to the naked eye, chazal treated them as if they do not (thus chazal were not wrong in their assessment of the situation, but were merely saying something different than their words might imply).
↑ The Pachad Yitzchak (Tzeida pg 21b), a work written by the late-17th-century Italian sage Yitzchak Lampronti, suggests that actually nowadays one should be strict and refrain from killing lice on shabbat, given that we observe that they do sexually procreate. The halacha as defined by chazal is that one may not kill creatures which sexually procreate, and therefore these creatures are included. There was never a special leniency for lice per se, but rather they just fit into a category of leniency. The Dirshu footnote cites Rav Elyashiv (orchot shabbat V1 Ch14 footnote 47) as also being strict.
↑ In hilchot shabbat we distinguish between an "av melacha" (lit: parent melacha) and a "toldah" (lit: offspring) of a melacha. There are 39 categories of forbidden melacha, and each category can contain many offshoots that are similar to the parent (similar enough to be considered a toldah but different enough to not be considered the av itself). The toldah, while conceptually distinct from the av, is still prohibited biblically. See Rambam hilchot shabbat 7:1-6 for a clear explanation of the difference between an av melacha and a toldah. For example, the av melacha of tochein (lit: grinding) refers to grinding up wheat into flour. A toldah of tochein is chopping up vegetables into small pieces. This is distinct from the av in its GOAL (making flour vs. having smaller veggies to make eating them easier), but similar to the av in its ACTION (in both cases you take a big item and turn it into many small items).
↑ Hilchot Shabbat 8:7
↑ This is because when a wound is caused, blood is removed from a person’s capillaries, which is similar to the threshing process (in which the kernel is removed from the husk). One interesting question on this shita is that the Rambam himself paskens that אין דישה אלא בגדולי קרקע (the melacha of threshing is only applicable on that which grows from the ground). Seemingly then, there should be no problem of dosh when causing a wound on an animal, because animals don't grow in the ground! Kesef Mishna (hilchot shabbat 8:7) cites this question from the Ramach, and doesn't give an answer. The Maggid Mishna answers that perhaps the Rambam thinks that animals are in fact considered to "grow in the ground" since they are sustained from plants which grow in the ground. Rav Avraham ben Harambam (birkat avraham hilchot shabbat 8:7) answers that there is a difference between the av melacha and the tolda. The requirement of gidulei karka is only for the av melacha. But a tolda is merely an offshoot of the melacha, and not the melacha itself, and hence it isn't subject to the standards of the av melacha. The fact that it is different from the av means that it is entitled to be different. Hence, choveil, despite being a tolda of dosh, is applicable even to that which does not grow in the ground.
↑ Shabbat 75a s.v. ki
↑ Tosfot explains that the pasuk (devarim 12:23) states “ki hadam hu hanefesh” (lit: the blood is the soul), and so it follows that one who causes a wound and removes blood in essence removes a bit of the soul, which is equivalent to the melacha of shocheit.
↑ Shabbat 107a s.v. v'hachoveil
↑ See Tosfot ketubot 5b s.v. dam, who asks many questions on Rashi. He cites many examples of cases in which seemingly one is chayav for choveil despite not causing any dyeing, but rather just removing blood. Pri megadim (mishbetzot zahav 316:5) suggests that perhaps Rashi is just coming to explain why causing a black-and-blue (without causing bleeding) is choveil, but that Rashi agrees to Tosfot that if one causes bleeding then one has violated the melacha of shocheit.
↑ Rambam (hilchot shabbat 8:7) writes that since choveil is a toldah of dosh, it has the same "shiur" (minimum amount) as dosh, which is a grogeres (lit: fig). The Maggid Mishna there suggests that according to Tosfot (choveil is a toldah of shocheit) it should follow that there's no minimum shiur to violate it, since shocheit has no minimum shiur. The Mishna Brurah 316:29 (and shaar hatziyon 316:43) accepts this reasoning.
↑ Biur Halacha (316:8 s.v. v'hachoveil) suggests that if you hold like the Rambam that choveil is a toldah of dosh, then it should be relevant even when removing the blood of a dead creature, since at the end of the day you are still removing blood. However, if you hold like Tosfot that choveil is a toldah of shocheit, then once the animal is dead it cannot be killed again, and thus removing the blood should be permitted.
↑ Biur Halacha (316:8 s.v. v'hachoveil) discusses a case of bloodletting for health purposes, in which one removes the blood but then the blood goes to waste. If choveil is a toldah of shocheit, then the fact that the blood goes to waste is irrelevant, as one has still removed some of the life, and thereby violated choveil. However, if choveil is a toldah of dosh then it follows that it is only considered "צריכה לגופה" (done for the purpose of the melacha) if you remove the blood because you want the blood, just like one who threshes removes the kernel from the husk because they want the kernel (and not because they want an empty husk). Thus, according to the Rambam, bloodletting would be considered a melacha that is not done for the purpose of the melacha [it happens to be that the Rambam paskens like Rebbe Yehudah that a melacha not done for its intended purpose is still biblically forbidden, so he would still hold that bloodletting is biblically forbidden despite its being eina tzricha l'gufa].
↑ It seems unanimous amongst the poskim to reject Rashi, since most of the time one isn't interested in dying the hide and so would not be chayav for tzoveah. However, if indeed one was interested in dying the hide, and dyed the requisite amount to violate the melacha of tzove'ah, then they would be chayav for this melacha (see Biur Halacha 316:8 s.v. v'hachoveil).
↑ Magen Avraham 316:8 and Mishna Brurah 316:29. Beit Yosef 316:8 also appears to side with Tosafot.
↑ Shulchan Aruch 328:17. Mishna Brurah 328:47 explains that a non-Jew may even perform biblical melacha on behalf of a Jew who is sick (but not in danger of dying).
↑ Here there is no issue of shocheit, because blood may not come out, and even if blood certainly will come out, one is not interested in that blood at all and so this would be a psik reisha d'lo nicha lei (which is rabbinically prohibited according to most poskim). There is also a rabbinic issue of creating a hole (Ketubot 5b, Shabbos 107a, Rambam Shabbos 23:1). For a choleh shein bo sakana, these two issues may perhaps be permitted (S”A 328:17).
↑ Shulchan Aruch 328:17 paskens explicitly that we permit amira l'akum for a choleh she'ein bo sakana.

Category	Topic
Mitzvot of Shabbat	Kiddush Levana - Enjoying Shabbat - Fourth meal of Shabbat - Havdalah - Having a meal on Friday - In the Spirit of Shabbat - Kiddush - Lighting Shabbat Candles - Making Early Shabbat - Making one hundred Brachot on Shabbat - Preparing foods on Shabbat - Preparing for Shabbat - Shenayim Mikrah - Kavod Shabbat - Shabbos Davening - Seudat Shabbat - Seudat Shelishit - Lechem Mishneh - Motzei Shabbat - When Does Shabbat Start?
Restrictions of Shabbat	Allowing Carrying Using an Eruv Chatzerot - Animals on Shabbat - Asking a Jew to work on Shabbat - Asking a non-Jew to work on Shabbat (Amirah LeNochri) - Benefiting from a Violation of Shabbat (Maaseh Shabbat) - Books, notebooks, and papers - Brushing Teeth on Shabbat - Building a structure on Shabbat (Boneh) - Carrying on Shabbat - Cleaning the dishes - Cleaning and Folding Garments on Shabbat - Clearing the table - Cooking (Ofeh and Bishul) - Cosmetics on Shabbat - Dancing and clapping on Shabbat - Electricity on Shabbat - Eruv Chatzerot - Eruvin - Games on Shabbat - Getting dressed on Shabbat - Giving birth on Shabbat - Grinding (Tochen) - Handling objects on Shabbat (Muktzeh) - Infants on Shabbat - Introduction to the Modern Eruv - Kneading (Lash) - Mail on Shabbat - Medicine on Shabbat (Refuah on Shabbat) - Melacha That Begins Before Shabbat - Opening bottles and containers (Boneh) - Plants on Shabbat (Zoreah) - Preparing for after Shabbat (Hachana) - Reading on Shabbat (Daber Davar) - Recreation on Shabbat - Sechirut Reshut - Separating mixtures (Borer) - Squeezing fruits (Sechita) - Speaking on Shabbat (Daber Davar) - Taking a cruise over Shabbat - Taking measurements on Shabbat - Techum - Transactions on Shabbat - Transportation on Shabbat - Going to and Staying in the Hospital on Shabbat - Wages on Shabbat (Sachar Shabbat) - Washing one’s body on Shabbat
Melachos	Introduction to Melechet Machshevet - Marbeh Bshiurim - Plowing - Planting - Harvesting - Gathering - Threshing - Winnowing - Separating - Grinding - Sifting - Kneading - Baking and Cooking - Shearing - Laundering - Combing - Dyeing - Spinning - Mounting warp threads - Making two loops - Weaving - Unraveling fabric - Tying - Untying - Gluing, taping, or stapling - Ripping - Trapping - Slaughtering - Skinning - Tanning - Smoothing - Scoring - Cutting precisely - Writing - Erasing - Building - Demolishing - Completing a vessel - Extinguishing a flame - Kindling a fire - Carrying

[1] Rambam (hilchot shabbat 11:1) states that not only is slaughtering part of this melacha, but actually any taking of a life (e.g. beating, stabbing, etc.) of an animal, bird, fish, or insect, is included in this melacha. However, he then remarks that strangling a living creature until it dies is only a toldah of the melacha, but not the av melacha itself. This is somewhat surprising, as one would have assumed that if the definition of the melacha is "taking life" then strangling would have been part of the av itself, and not merely a toldah. Perhaps strangling is different because it is merely preventing the creature from breathing and is thus a less direct form of killing, and is seen as a sort of grama. The Mirkevet Hamishna suggets that perhaps strangling is different because really the definition of the melacha is "removing blood", and strangling does not involve any removal of blood. Regardless, it is clear that the melacha is much more expansive than simply "slaughtering".

[2] Generallly speaking, we know that pikuach nefesh is a prime value in Judaism, and that it pushes off most mitzvot, including shabbat. Thus one may violate shabbat in order to save a life, or even if it's only a safek whether it will save a life (see gemara in Yoma 85b). The gemara in shabbat essentially applies this principle to the prohibition of killing creatures on shabbat, as we shall see.
The gemara 121b cites Rebbe Yehoshua Ben Levi as holding that all מזיקין (lit: damagers) may be killed on shabbat. The gemara raises an objection to this from a beraita which states that only 5 particularly harmful creatures may be killed on shabbat. There is a machlokes rishonim how the gemara answers this question. Rashi thinks that the beraita is talking about when the creature is not chasing you, and the beraita holds like the position of rebbe shimon, that a melacha not done for its intended purpose (e.g. killing an animal just because you don't want it to harm you, but not because you want the hide) is only rabbinically prohibited. Thus one may kill these creatures even if they aren't chasing you, since anyways killing them is only an isur drabanan, and chazal weren't gozer in a case when it might cause harm. Rebbe Yehoshua Ben Levi is talking about when a harmful creature is chasing you, and so it's permitted to kill it because of pikuach nefesh. Thus, according to Rashi, when one is being chased by a creature that might kill, it is certainly permitted to kill it. And according to Rebbe Shimon (who most rishonim pasken like), it will be permitted to kill one of the five harmful creatures even if it is not chasing you. The Rambam (hilchot shabbat 11:4) seems to understand that this list of 5 was not exhaustive, but rather just were examples of creatures that could kill.

Tosfot disagrees, and thinks that the beraita can even accord with the position of rebbe yehudah - that a melacha not done for its intended purpose is still biblically forbidden - but it's talking about when the animal is chasing you. Since the animal is chasing you, and it's one of the five very harmful creatures, it is pikuach nefesh and you can kill it. Rebbe Yehoshua Ben Levi is talking about when the animal is not chasing you, but nonetheless it is permitted to kill it because he's holding like rebbe shimon (with respect to a melacha not done for its intended purpose). Thus, according to tosfot too, it will come out that when an animal that can kill is chasing you, you may kill it, and even if it is not chasing you, you can kill it according to Rebbe Shimon.

Shulchan Aruch 316:10 states that any animal that has the potential to kill may be killed on shabbat even if it is not chasing you. It is unclear whether he reads the gemara like Rashi or like Tosfot, as this halacha can fit with either position. The Be'er Hagola says that he holds like Tosfot, and thus this is the statement of Rebbe Yehoshua Ben Levi. The Biur Hagra 316:25 thinks he learns like Rashi (and like the Rambam that the list of 5 was not exhaustive), in which case this is the statement of the beraita.

[3] The gemara 121b cites Rebbe Yehoshua Ben Levi as holding that all מזיקין (lit: damagers) may be killed on shabbat. The gemara raises an objection to this from a beraita which states that only 5 particularly harmful creatures may be killed on shabbat. There is a machlokes rishonim how the gemara answers this question. Rashi thinks that the beraita is talking about when the creature is not chasing you, and the beraita holds like the position of rebbe shimon, that a melacha not done for its intended purpose (e.g. killing an animal just because you don't want it to harm you, but not because you want the hide) is only rabbinically prohibited. Thus one may kill these creatures even if they aren't chasing you, since anyways killing them is only an isur drabanan, and chazal weren't gozer in a case when it might cause harm. Rebbe Yehoshua Ben Levi is talking about when a harmful creature is chasing you, and so it's permitted to kill it because of pikuach nefesh. Thus, according to Rashi, when one is being chased by a creature that might kill, it is certainly permitted to kill it. And according to Rebbe Shimon (who most rishonim pasken like), it will be permitted to kill one of the five harmful creatures even if it is not chasing you. The Rambam (hilchot shabbat 11:4) seems to understand that this list of 5 was not exhaustive, but rather just were examples of creatures that could kill.

[4] Tosfot disagrees, and thinks that the beraita can even accord with the position of rebbe yehudah - that a melacha not done for its intended purpose is still biblically forbidden - but it's talking about when the animal is chasing you. Since the animal is chasing you, and it's one of the five very harmful creatures, it is pikuach nefesh and you can kill it. Rebbe Yehoshua Ben Levi is talking about when the animal is not chasing you, but nonetheless it is permitted to kill it because he's holding like rebbe shimon (with respect to a melacha not done for its intended purpose). Thus, according to tosfot too, it will come out that when an animal that can kill is chasing you, you may kill it, and even if it is not chasing you, you can kill it according to Rebbe Shimon.

[5] Shulchan Aruch 316:10 states that any animal that has the potential to kill may be killed on shabbat even if it is not chasing you. It is unclear whether he reads the gemara like Rashi or like Tosfot, as this halacha can fit with either position. The Be'er Hagola says that he holds like Tosfot, and thus this is the statement of Rebbe Yehoshua Ben Levi. The Biur Hagra 316:25 thinks he learns like Rashi (and like the Rambam that the list of 5 was not exhaustive), in which case this is the statement of the beraita.

[3] Examples of these creatures that the Shulchan Aruch 316:10 gives include snakes and scorpions. Presumably, he is referring to snakes and scorpions with non-deadly stings or bites.

[4] Shulchan Aruch 316:10. The Mishna Brurah 316:46 explains that since we pasken like Rebbe Shimon (that melacha she'eina tzricha l'gufa is patur), killing a harmful creature to prevent it from damaging you is only an isur drabanan. Here, since there's a good chance it will damage you (since it's chasing you), chazal did not impose their gezeira and so we are lenient with this isur drabanan, and allow one to kill the creature. [as an aside, the Rambam seems to cite this halacha as well, despite the fact that he paskens like Rebbe Yehudah regarding melacha she'eina tzricha l'gufa. How can this be? Why would we allow an isur deorayta if there is no concern of pikuach nefesh?! The Mishna Brurah 316:46 explains that when the Rambam uses the phrase "שאר מזיקין" (lit: other damagers), he is still referring to creatures which have the potential to kill, just less so. Thus the reason for the leniency to kill them according to him is because of pikuach nefesh. However, we who hold like Rebbe Shimon will permit killing damaging creatures even if we know that they can't kill].

[5] The gemara shabbat 121b states that one may kill a snake in their normal course of walking (דורסו לפי תומו). Rashi s.v. dilma seems to understand that this leniency is only if one doesn't have intention to kill it. However, most rishonim (see Ran) disagree and hold that even if one has intention to kill the snake, one may do so, since killing it is only an isur drabanan (according to Rebbe Shimon that a melacha not done for its intended purpose is only rabbinically forbidden), and here to the onlooker it appears like an accident. The Shulchan Aruch 316:10 paskens like these rishonim, and allows one to step on damaging creatures while walking even with intention to kill them.

[6] The Tur 316 states that if one is being bitten by a פרעוש (mosquito) one may trap it to prevent it from continuing to bite, but one may not kill it. The Beit Yosef explains that the Tur understood the gemara in shabbat 107b (which states that one may not kill a par'ush) to be referring to even when being bitten. Thus, when the gemara shabbat 121b states that one may kill "מזיקין" (damaging creatures) when being chased (and certainly when they are actually biting you), this was only referring to creatures that are very damaging (but just not lethal). The Shulchan Aruch 316:9 paskens that one may not kill a par'ush even if it is in the act of biting you. The Mishna Brurah 316:46 assumes that any small insect will have the same din as a par'ush, and will be asur to kill even if it is biting you (since there is not so much pain). Rather, must simply shoo them away.

[7] Mishna Brurah 316:46

[8] The Dirshu Mishna Brurah (siman 316 footnote 82) cites from Rav Shlomo Zalmen that a wasp is treated like a gnat. Dirshu (siman 316 footnote 64) cites this from the Alter Rebbe as well.

[9] Dirshu (siman 316 footnote 64) cites from Rav Nissim Karelitz that he viewed even bees (which are less painful than wasps) as being akin to snakes / scorpions, and thus you would be allowed to kill it if being chased.

[10] The gemara shabbat 107b cites a beraita in which rebbe eliezer holds that one who kills a "כינה" (lit: louse) on shabbat is considered as if he killed a camel (i.e. it is prohibited). However, the gemara continues that the rabanan disagree and hold that one may kill a louse on shabbat. The gemara explains that the root of this debate is how to define the type of creature which we are commanded not to kill on shabbat. Everyone agrees that we learn from what was done in the preparations of the mishkan; in the mishkan they used to kill the "אילים" (lit: rams) for the purpose of using the hides. Rebbe Eliezer says that the key feature of these rams was simply that they were alive, and so the melacha should be applicable to any live creature. The rabanan argue that the key feature of these rams was that they reproduced via sexual reproduction (פרו ורבו), and so the melacha should only be applicable to those creatures which do likewise. [as an aside, it is interesting to consider why this feature is deemed important by the rabanan. Presumably they think that part of the definition of life is the ability to procreate and pass on life to the next generation, and as such, only creatures with this capability can truly be defined as "alive"].

[11] Shulchan Aruch 316:9 paskens that it is permitted to kill a כינה (louse) on shabbat.

[12] Dirshu Mishna Brurah (316:38 footnote 72) cites from Rav Dessler (Michtav M'eliyahu V4 pg 355 ft 4) that even though the מציאות (lit: realia) that we perceive differs from that which chazal understood when they established the halacha, this doesn't change anything. We may still rely upon the halacha as they defined it. Perhaps chazal also knew that lice really did sexually procreate, but since this is invisible to the naked eye, chazal treated them as if they do not (thus chazal were not wrong in their assessment of the situation, but were merely saying something different than their words might imply).

[13] The Pachad Yitzchak (Tzeida pg 21b), a work written by the late-17th-century Italian sage Yitzchak Lampronti, suggests that actually nowadays one should be strict and refrain from killing lice on shabbat, given that we observe that they do sexually procreate. The halacha as defined by chazal is that one may not kill creatures which sexually procreate, and therefore these creatures are included. There was never a special leniency for lice per se, but rather they just fit into a category of leniency. The Dirshu footnote cites Rav Elyashiv (orchot shabbat V1 Ch14 footnote 47) as also being strict.

[14] In hilchot shabbat we distinguish between an "av melacha" (lit: parent melacha) and a "toldah" (lit: offspring) of a melacha. There are 39 categories of forbidden melacha, and each category can contain many offshoots that are similar to the parent (similar enough to be considered a toldah but different enough to not be considered the av itself). The toldah, while conceptually distinct from the av, is still prohibited biblically. See Rambam hilchot shabbat 7:1-6 for a clear explanation of the difference between an av melacha and a toldah. For example, the av melacha of tochein (lit: grinding) refers to grinding up wheat into flour. A toldah of tochein is chopping up vegetables into small pieces. This is distinct from the av in its GOAL (making flour vs. having smaller veggies to make eating them easier), but similar to the av in its ACTION (in both cases you take a big item and turn it into many small items).

[15] Hilchot Shabbat 8:7

[16] This is because when a wound is caused, blood is removed from a person’s capillaries, which is similar to the threshing process (in which the kernel is removed from the husk). One interesting question on this shita is that the Rambam himself paskens that אין דישה אלא בגדולי קרקע (the melacha of threshing is only applicable on that which grows from the ground). Seemingly then, there should be no problem of dosh when causing a wound on an animal, because animals don't grow in the ground! Kesef Mishna (hilchot shabbat 8:7) cites this question from the Ramach, and doesn't give an answer. The Maggid Mishna answers that perhaps the Rambam thinks that animals are in fact considered to "grow in the ground" since they are sustained from plants which grow in the ground. Rav Avraham ben Harambam (birkat avraham hilchot shabbat 8:7) answers that there is a difference between the av melacha and the tolda. The requirement of gidulei karka is only for the av melacha. But a tolda is merely an offshoot of the melacha, and not the melacha itself, and hence it isn't subject to the standards of the av melacha. The fact that it is different from the av means that it is entitled to be different. Hence, choveil, despite being a tolda of dosh, is applicable even to that which does not grow in the ground.

[17] Shabbat 75a s.v. ki

[18] Tosfot explains that the pasuk (devarim 12:23) states “ki hadam hu hanefesh” (lit: the blood is the soul), and so it follows that one who causes a wound and removes blood in essence removes a bit of the soul, which is equivalent to the melacha of shocheit.

[19] Shabbat 107a s.v. v'hachoveil

[20] See Tosfot ketubot 5b s.v. dam, who asks many questions on Rashi. He cites many examples of cases in which seemingly one is chayav for choveil despite not causing any dyeing, but rather just removing blood. Pri megadim (mishbetzot zahav 316:5) suggests that perhaps Rashi is just coming to explain why causing a black-and-blue (without causing bleeding) is choveil, but that Rashi agrees to Tosfot that if one causes bleeding then one has violated the melacha of shocheit.

[21] Rambam (hilchot shabbat 8:7) writes that since choveil is a toldah of dosh, it has the same "shiur" (minimum amount) as dosh, which is a grogeres (lit: fig). The Maggid Mishna there suggests that according to Tosfot (choveil is a toldah of shocheit) it should follow that there's no minimum shiur to violate it, since shocheit has no minimum shiur. The Mishna Brurah 316:29 (and shaar hatziyon 316:43) accepts this reasoning.

[22] Biur Halacha (316:8 s.v. v'hachoveil) suggests that if you hold like the Rambam that choveil is a toldah of dosh, then it should be relevant even when removing the blood of a dead creature, since at the end of the day you are still removing blood. However, if you hold like Tosfot that choveil is a toldah of shocheit, then once the animal is dead it cannot be killed again, and thus removing the blood should be permitted.

[23] Biur Halacha (316:8 s.v. v'hachoveil) discusses a case of bloodletting for health purposes, in which one removes the blood but then the blood goes to waste. If choveil is a toldah of shocheit, then the fact that the blood goes to waste is irrelevant, as one has still removed some of the life, and thereby violated choveil. However, if choveil is a toldah of dosh then it follows that it is only considered "צריכה לגופה" (done for the purpose of the melacha) if you remove the blood because you want the blood, just like one who threshes removes the kernel from the husk because they want the kernel (and not because they want an empty husk). Thus, according to the Rambam, bloodletting would be considered a melacha that is not done for the purpose of the melacha [it happens to be that the Rambam paskens like Rebbe Yehudah that a melacha not done for its intended purpose is still biblically forbidden, so he would still hold that bloodletting is biblically forbidden despite its being eina tzricha l'gufa].

[24] It seems unanimous amongst the poskim to reject Rashi, since most of the time one isn't interested in dying the hide and so would not be chayav for tzoveah. However, if indeed one was interested in dying the hide, and dyed the requisite amount to violate the melacha of tzove'ah, then they would be chayav for this melacha (see Biur Halacha 316:8 s.v. v'hachoveil).

[25] Magen Avraham 316:8 and Mishna Brurah 316:29. Beit Yosef 316:8 also appears to side with Tosafot.

[26] Shulchan Aruch 328:17. Mishna Brurah 328:47 explains that a non-Jew may even perform biblical melacha on behalf of a Jew who is sick (but not in danger of dying).

[ftn186-27] Here there is no issue of shocheit, because blood may not come out, and even if blood certainly will come out, one is not interested in that blood at all and so this would be a psik reisha d'lo nicha lei (which is rabbinically prohibited according to most poskim). There is also a rabbinic issue of creating a hole (Ketubot 5b, Shabbos 107a, Rambam Shabbos 23:1). For a choleh shein bo sakana, these two issues may perhaps be permitted (S”A 328:17).

[28] Shulchan Aruch 328:17 paskens explicitly that we permit amira l'akum for a choleh she'ein bo sakana.

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 {{Okay}}
-The Mishna (73a) lists ‘shocheit’ (slaughtering) as one of the 39 avot melachot on Shabbos. It is clear in the gemara and rishonim that the av melacha is not limited to ritual slaughtering per se, but actually includes killing more broadly.<ref>Rambam (hilchot shabbat 11:1) states that not only is slaughtering part of this melacha, but actually any taking of a life (e.g. beating, stabbing, etc.) of an animal, bird, fish, or insect, is included in this melacha. However, he then remarks that strangling a living creature until it dies is only a toldah of the melacha, but not the av melacha itself. This is somewhat surprising, as one would have assumed that if the definition of the melacha is "taking life" then strangling would have been part of the av itself, and not merely a toldah. Perhaps strangling is different because it is merely preventing the creature from breathing and is thus a less direct form of killing, and is seen as a sort of grama. The Mirkevet Hamishna suggets that perhaps strangling is different because really the definition of the melacha is "removing blood", and strangling does not involve any removal of blood. Regardless, it is clear that the melacha is much more expansive than simply "slaughtering". </ref>
+[[File:Download.png|thumb]]
+The Mishna (73a) lists ‘shocheit’ (slaughtering) as one of the 39 avot melachot on Shabbos. It is clear in the gemara and rishonim that the av melacha is not limited to ritual slaughtering per se, but actually is more broadly defined as "taking life".<ref>Rambam (hilchot shabbat 11:1) states that not only is slaughtering part of this melacha, but actually any taking of a life (e.g. beating, stabbing, etc.) of an animal, bird, fish, or insect, is included in this melacha. However, he then remarks that strangling a living creature until it dies is only a toldah of the melacha, but not the av melacha itself. This is somewhat surprising, as one would have assumed that if the definition of the melacha is "taking life" then strangling would have been part of the av itself, and not merely a toldah. Perhaps strangling is different because it is merely preventing the creature from breathing and is thus a less direct form of killing, and is seen as a sort of grama. The Mirkevet Hamishna suggets that perhaps strangling is different because really the definition of the melacha is "removing blood", and strangling does not involve any removal of blood. Regardless, it is clear that the melacha is much more expansive than simply "slaughtering". </ref>
 == Killing Harmful Creatures ==
-# Conceptual Categories
+# Categories
 ## Whether or not one may kill a creature on shabbat depends on how harmful it is:
 ### If there's a chance it will kill you, then you can kill it even if it is not chasing you.<ref>Generallly speaking, we know that pikuach nefesh is a prime value in Judaism, and that it pushes off most mitzvot, including shabbat. Thus one may violate shabbat in order to save a life, or even if it's only a safek whether it will save a life (see gemara in Yoma 85b). The gemara in shabbat essentially applies this principle to the prohibition of killing creatures on shabbat, as we shall see.
@@ Line 30: / Line 31: @@
 # Background
 ## The Mishna (107a) teaches that one who is chovel (causes a wound) in a person or animal has violated a melacha on Shabbat.
-## What av melacha does one violate when doing chovel?
+## Which av melacha is it?<ref>In hilchot shabbat we distinguish between an "av melacha" (lit: parent melacha) and a "toldah" (lit: offspring) of a melacha. There are 39 categories of forbidden melacha, and each category can contain many offshoots that are similar to the parent (similar enough to be considered a toldah but different enough to not be considered the av itself). The toldah, while conceptually distinct from the av, is still prohibited biblically. See Rambam hilchot shabbat 7:1-6 for a clear explanation of the difference between an av melacha and a toldah. For example, the av melacha of tochein (lit: grinding) refers to grinding up wheat into flour. A toldah of tochein is chopping up vegetables into small pieces. This is distinct from the av in its GOAL (making flour vs. having smaller veggies to make eating them easier), but similar to the av in its ACTION (in both cases you take a big item and turn it into many small items).</ref>
-### The Rambam (Hilchot Shabbat 8:7) writes that one who is chovel has violated [[dosh]] (threshing), because when a wound is caused, blood is removed from a person’s capillaries, which is similar to the threshing process.
+### The Rambam<ref>Hilchot Shabbat 8:7</ref> writes that one who is chovel has violated [[dosh]] (threshing).<ref>This is because when a wound is caused, blood is removed from a person’s capillaries, which is similar to the threshing process (in which the kernel is removed from the husk). One interesting question on this shita is that the Rambam himself paskens that אין דישה אלא בגדולי קרקע (the melacha of threshing is only applicable on that which grows from the ground). Seemingly then, there should be no problem of dosh when causing a wound on an animal, because animals don't grow in the ground! Kesef Mishna (hilchot shabbat 8:7) cites this question from the Ramach, and doesn't give an answer. The Maggid Mishna answers that perhaps the Rambam thinks that animals are in fact considered to "grow in the ground" since they are sustained from plants which grow in the ground. Rav Avraham ben Harambam (birkat avraham hilchot shabbat 8:7) answers that there is a difference between the av melacha and the tolda. The requirement of gidulei karka is only for the av melacha. But a tolda is merely an offshoot of the melacha, and not the melacha itself, and hence it isn't subject to the standards of the av melacha. The fact that it is different from the av means that it is entitled to be different. Hence, choveil, despite being a tolda of dosh, is applicable even to that which does not grow in the ground.</ref>
-### Tosafot (shabbat 75a s.v. ki) writes that one is liable for [[shocheit]]. Tosafot explains that the pasuk states “ki hadam hu hanefesh” (lit: the blood is the soul), and one who causes a person to have a wound removes a bit of the soul, which is equivalent to the melacha of shocheit.
+### Tosafot<ref>Shabbat 75a s.v. ki</ref> writes that one is liable for [[shocheit]].<ref>Tosfot explains that the pasuk (devarim 12:23) states “ki hadam hu hanefesh” (lit: the blood is the soul), and so it follows that one who causes a wound and removes blood in essence removes a bit of the soul, which is equivalent to the melacha of shocheit. </ref>
-### Rashi (shabbat 107a s.v. v'hachoveil) cites an opinion that one who hits an animal and causes it to bruise is considered to have "dyed" the hide, thereby violating the melacha of [[tzoveah]].
+### Rashi<ref>Shabbat 107a s.v. v'hachoveil</ref> cites an opinion that one who hits an animal and causes it to bruise is considered to have dyed the hide, thereby violating the melacha of [[tzoveah]].<ref>See Tosfot ketubot 5b s.v. dam, who asks many questions on Rashi. He cites many examples of cases in which seemingly one is chayav for choveil despite not causing any dyeing, but rather just removing blood. Pri megadim (mishbetzot zahav 316:5) suggests that perhaps Rashi is just coming to explain why causing a black-and-blue (without causing bleeding) is choveil, but that Rashi agrees to Tosfot that if one causes bleeding then one has violated the melacha of shocheit. </ref>
 ## What's the Nafka Minah (practical ramification)?
-### Shiur
+### How much blood needs to be removed to be chayav?<ref>Rambam (hilchot shabbat 8:7) writes that since choveil is a toldah of dosh, it has the same "shiur" (minimum amount) as dosh, which is a grogeres (lit: fig). The Maggid Mishna there suggests that according to Tosfot (choveil is a toldah of shocheit) it should follow that there's no minimum shiur to violate it, since shocheit has no minimum shiur. The Mishna Brurah 316:29 (and shaar hatziyon 316:43) accepts this reasoning. </ref>
-### After death
+### Is it possible to violate chovel on a dead creature?<ref>Biur Halacha (316:8 s.v. v'hachoveil) suggests that if you hold like the Rambam that choveil is a toldah of dosh, then it should be relevant even when removing the blood of a dead creature, since at the end of the day you are still removing blood. However, if you hold like Tosfot that choveil is a toldah of shocheit, then once the animal is dead it cannot be killed again, and thus removing the blood should be permitted.  </ref>
-### Removing blood that is unwanted
+### What about removing unwanted blood?<ref>Biur Halacha (316:8 s.v. v'hachoveil) discusses a case of bloodletting for health purposes, in which one removes the blood but then the blood goes to waste. If choveil is a toldah of shocheit, then the fact that the blood goes to waste is irrelevant, as one has still removed some of the life, and thereby violated choveil. However, if choveil is a toldah of dosh then it follows that it is only considered "צריכה לגופה" (done for the purpose of the melacha) if you remove the blood because you want the blood, just like one who threshes removes the kernel from the husk because they want the kernel (and not because they want an empty husk). Thus, according to the Rambam, bloodletting would be considered a melacha that is not done for the purpose of the melacha [it happens to be that the Rambam paskens like Rebbe Yehudah that a melacha not done for its intended purpose is still biblically forbidden, so he would still hold that bloodletting is biblically forbidden despite its being eina tzricha l'gufa].</ref>
 ## The Shulchan Aruch (316:8) does not take a firm stance on whether to rule in accordance with the Rambam or Tosafos.<ref>It seems unanimous amongst the poskim to reject Rashi, since most of the time one isn't interested in dying the hide and so would not be chayav for tzoveah. However, if indeed one was interested in dying the hide, and dyed the requisite amount to violate the melacha of tzove'ah, then they would be chayav for this melacha (see Biur Halacha 316:8 s.v. v'hachoveil). </ref>
 ### However, the commentaries on Shulchan Aruch appear to hold like Tosafot.<ref>Magen Avraham 316:8 and Mishna Brurah 316:29. Beit Yosef 316:8 also appears to side with Tosafot.</ref>
 # Practical Example
-## Doctor drawing blood
+## Blood test
-### In situations where the blood is part of the general circulation (and is needed by the doctor to perform a blood test or the like), then this may violate shocheit, and would prohibited except in cases of pikuach nefesh.
+### One who draws blood for a blood test wants the blood that they are removing (in contrast to bloodletting discussed above), and this certainly would violate chovel if performed by a Jew, except in cases of pikuach nefesh
-### In contrast, if either the blood or fluid needed is not part of the general circulation<ref name="ftn185"> The Gemara Ketubot 5b states that there is no issue of Shocheit if the blood is mifkad pakid. Rashi s.v. mifkad explains that blood that is mifkad pakid stays collected in a certain valve and isn’t absorbed into the flesh. The language of “not part of the general circulation” is borrowed from Rav Schachter’s translation of mifkad pakid regarding Tosfos Shabbos 75a s.v. ki.</ref>, or if a needle must enter a person’s skin but no blood actually needs to be removed for the procedure to be effective, then there may be more room to be lenient to administer such a procedure for a choleh shein bo skana since shocheit wouldn’t apply to such blood<ref name="ftn186"> Even though there is no issue of Shocheit, nonetheless, there is a rabbinic issue of creating a hole (Ketubot 5b, Shabbos 107a, Rambam Shabbos 23:1). For a choleh shein bo sakana, it may be permitted (S”A 328:17).</ref>.
+### There is more room to be lenient to have the blood test administered by a non-Jew for a Jew who is sick (choleh she'ein bo sakana), since we generally permit amira l'akum for such a person.<ref>Shulchan Aruch 328:17. Mishna Brurah 328:47 explains that a non-Jew may even perform biblical melacha on behalf of a Jew who is sick (but not in danger of dying).</ref>
-### All doctors should consult their respective rabbanim for guidance on how to deal with these and similar questions that relate to their field of work.
+## Injection
+### If a needle must enter a person’s skin but no blood actually needs to be removed for the procedure to be effective, then there may be more room to be lenient to administer such a procedure for a choleh shein bo skana.<ref name="ftn186"> Here there is no issue of shocheit, because blood may not come out, and even if blood certainly will come out, one is not interested in that blood at all and so this would be a psik reisha d'lo nicha lei (which is rabbinically prohibited according to most poskim). There is also a rabbinic issue of creating a hole (Ketubot 5b, Shabbos 107a, Rambam Shabbos 23:1). For a choleh shein bo sakana, these two issues may perhaps be permitted (S”A 328:17).</ref>
+### It is certainly still preferable to have the injection administered by a non-Jew.<ref>Shulchan Aruch 328:17 paskens explicitly that we permit amira l'akum for a choleh she'ein bo sakana.</ref>
+## All doctors should consult their respective rabbanim for guidance on how to deal with these and similar questions that relate to their field of work.
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