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Medical Ethics: Difference between revisions
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→Giving up one's life to save others
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== Endangering Yourself == | == Endangering Yourself == | ||
# | #It is forbidden to engage in dangerous activities.<ref>Shulchan Aruch C.M. 427:10</ref> | ||
== Endangering Yourself for a Mitzvah == | == Endangering Yourself for a Mitzvah == | ||
# It is forbidden to endanger yourself to fulfill a mitzvah. | # It is forbidden to endanger yourself into a situation of danger to fulfill a mitzvah.<ref>Pitchei Teshuva YD 157:3 quoting Tiferet Yisrael (Brachot 1:3)</ref> Some define the level of danger as the same level that a person would violate Shabbat for, such as 1 in a 1000.<ref>[https://www.torahweb.org/torah/docs/rtwe_covid_17av.pdf Rabbi Mayer Twersky] writes that the level of sakana necessary to forbid endangering oneself to do a mitzvah is the same level as pikuach nefesh for Shabbos. Based on Maggid Mishna he writes that a danger of 1 in a 1000 mortality rate is considered pikuach nefesh.</ref> | ||
#* Endangering Oneself to Learn Torah: Ketubot 77b records and praises the practice of Reish Lakish to teach Torah to those ill with tzarat, some translate as leprosy, even though it is contagious. The gemara explained that he did so out of his love for Torah. Daf Al Hadaf cites Mishnat Pikuach Nefesh 69:7 who asks how Reish Lakish could endanger himself and rely on a miracle. He answers that the disease he was concerned with was only dangerous to health but not life threatening. | #* Endangering Oneself to Learn Torah: Ketubot 77b records and praises the practice of Reish Lakish to teach Torah to those ill with tzarat, some translate as leprosy, even though it is contagious. The gemara explained that he did so out of his love for Torah. Daf Al Hadaf cites Mishnat Pikuach Nefesh 69:7 who asks how Reish Lakish could endanger himself and rely on a miracle. He answers that the disease he was concerned with was only dangerous to health but not life threatening. | ||
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# This principle is known as "''shomer petayim Hashem''," (lit. "Hashem protects the fools"; heb. שומר פתאים ה') which permits a person to act simple and rely on Hashem to be protected. | # This principle is known as "''shomer petayim Hashem''," (lit. "Hashem protects the fools"; heb. שומר פתאים ה') which permits a person to act simple and rely on Hashem to be protected. | ||
# This principle is the reason that women may become pregnant and give birth, even though that inevitably involves some risk (especially earlier in history).<ref>Igros Moshe EH 1:63:1. Binyan Tzion 137 agrees that this is the reason for allowing childbirth but he applies it even if the danger to the mother is greater than a regular birth.</ref> | # This principle is the reason that women may become pregnant and give birth, even though that inevitably involves some risk (especially earlier in history).<ref>Igros Moshe EH 1:63:1. Binyan Tzion 137 agrees that this is the reason for allowing childbirth but he applies it even if the danger to the mother is greater than a regular birth.</ref> | ||
# Some poskim hold that this concept only permits activities that objectively don't have a risk factor of more than 1/1000. Otherwise, it is considered objectively too risky and forbidden, even if other people do it without concern.<ref>[https://www.torahweb.org/torah/docs/rtwe_shomer2.pdf Rabbi Mayer Twersky] infers from Maggid Mishna that if the danger is 1/1000 or greater it is considered too dangerous even to rely upon ''shomer petayim Hashem''. | # Some poskim hold that this concept only permits activities that objectively don't have a risk factor of more than 1/1000. Otherwise, it is considered objectively too risky and forbidden, even if other people do it without concern.<ref>[https://www.torahweb.org/torah/docs/rtwe_shomer2.pdf Rabbi Mayer Twersky] infers from Maggid Mishna (cited by Magen Avraham 330:3) that if the danger is 1/1000 or greater it is considered too dangerous even to rely upon ''shomer petayim Hashem''. Rabbi Twersky's main point is that there's an objective standard of what is called sakana and then below that threshold shomer petayim could apply if people aren't concerned. If, however, there is no known information of what is considered dangerous then shomer petayim is applicable if people aren't concerned. His proofs for this concept include Rav Elyashiv (Kovetz Teshuvot 1:219), Shemiras Shabbos Kehilchasa (ch. 32 fnt. 2). | ||
Igrot Moshe CM 2:76 permits smoking because of shomer petayim Hashem but just writes that it is a danger for only a miyuta d'miyuta of people.</ref> | * Igrot Moshe CM 2:76 permits smoking because of shomer petayim Hashem but just writes that it is a danger for only a miyuta d'miyuta of people.</ref> | ||
# Some say that ''shomer petayim Hashem'' is only relevant if it is a risk or danger that applies equally to everyone. However, if there's a risk that only applies to a specific person or group, such as if they're sick, ''shomer petayim'' is inapplicable.<ref>Igros Moshe EH 1:63:1-2, 4:73:1</ref> | # Some say that ''shomer petayim Hashem'' is only relevant if it is a risk or danger that applies equally to everyone. However, if there's a risk that only applies to a specific person or group, such as if they're sick, ''shomer petayim'' is inapplicable.<ref>Igros Moshe EH 1:63:1-2, 4:73:1</ref> | ||
# Some poskim use the concept of shomer petayim Hashem to explain why it is permissible to travel through the desert or take a boat.<ref>Binyan Tzion 137. Rabbi Twersky quotes Shem Aryeh 27 who holds that shomer petayim allows traveling through the desert or in a boat only if there's a parnasa need or another real need.</ref> | # Some poskim use the concept of shomer petayim Hashem to explain why it is permissible to travel through the desert or take a boat.<ref>Binyan Tzion 137. Rabbi Twersky quotes Shem Aryeh 27 who holds that shomer petayim allows traveling through the desert or in a boat only if there's a parnasa need or another real need.</ref> | ||
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# If a terrorist threatens you "either kill another Jew or I'll kill you," you may not kill another Jew and must give up your life.<ref>Sanhedrin 74b</ref> You must also give up your life and not even murder the other Jew indirectly such as by causing a dog to bite someone to showing a non-Jew where the Jew is hiding in order to kill him.<ref>Yavetz (Migdal Oz Otzer Hatov pina 1 n. 82)</ref> | # If a terrorist threatens you "either kill another Jew or I'll kill you," you may not kill another Jew and must give up your life.<ref>Sanhedrin 74b</ref> You must also give up your life and not even murder the other Jew indirectly such as by causing a dog to bite someone to showing a non-Jew where the Jew is hiding in order to kill him.<ref>Yavetz (Migdal Oz Otzer Hatov pina 1 n. 82)</ref> | ||
#If a terrorist threatens you "either let me cut off one limb of your body that won't kill you or I'll kill another Jew," some say that you must allow him to cut off your limb, but most poskim hold that you don't have to, but it is a middat chasidut to do so.<ref>Maharam Ricanti holds that in this case it is an obligation to give up your life. However, Radvaz holds that it is only a middat chasidut. Yavetz (Migdal Oz Otzer Hatov pina 1 n. 83) agrees that it isn't obligation but it is a voluntarily mitzvah if he chooses.</ref> | #If a terrorist threatens you "either let me cut off one limb of your body that won't kill you or I'll kill another Jew," some say that you must allow him to cut off your limb, but most poskim hold that you don't have to, but it is a middat chasidut to do so.<ref>Maharam Ricanti holds that in this case it is an obligation to give up your life. However, Radvaz holds that it is only a middat chasidut. Yavetz (Migdal Oz Otzer Hatov pina 1 n. 83) agrees that it isn't obligation but it is a voluntarily mitzvah if he chooses.</ref> | ||
#If a terrorist threatens you "either give me your sword so that I can kill another Jew or I'll kill you," some say that you may not give up your sword in that case, while most hold that should give up your sword.<ref>Radvaz holds that you may not give your sword in that case. However, Yavetz (Migdal Oz Otzer Hatov pina 1 n. | #If a terrorist threatens you "either give me your sword so that I can kill another Jew or I'll kill you," some say that you may not give up your sword in that case, while most hold that should give up your sword.<ref>Radvaz 4:92 holds that you may not give your sword in that case. However, Yavetz (Migdal Oz Otzer Hatov pina 1 n. 81) argues because you only need to give up your life not to actively kill someone, but you don't need to give up your life not to passively watch another Jew die.</ref> | ||
# A minority position holds that it isn't necessary to endure difficult pain in order to save someone else's life, but most poskim disagree and hold that is necessary.<ref>Yavetz (Migdal Oz Otzer Hatov pina 1 n. 83) holds that it isn't an obligation to go through pain in order to save someone's life. However, Magen Avraham and Yabia Omer 9:12 disagree.</ref> | # A minority position holds that it isn't necessary to endure difficult pain in order to save someone else's life, but most poskim disagree and hold that is necessary.<ref>Yavetz (Migdal Oz Otzer Hatov pina 1 n. 83) holds that it isn't an obligation to go through pain in order to save someone's life. However, Magen Avraham and Yabia Omer 9:12 disagree.</ref> | ||
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