Nullification: Difference between revisions
From Halachipedia
→Kol Dparish
| Line 262: | Line 262: | ||
# An item which is found that separated from a majority but its status is unclear is considered to be like the status of the majority from which it came from.<Ref>Ketubot 9a</ref> | # An item which is found that separated from a majority but its status is unclear is considered to be like the status of the majority from which it came from.<Ref>Ketubot 9a</ref> | ||
# For example, if a piece of meat is found in a community with 10 stores, 9 of which are kosher, and 1 is non-kosher that piece is considered kosher since it is judged by the majority of stores. There is a large dispute regarding whether we judge the majority by the amount of stores or by the overall quantity of meat being sold at each store and if the majority of the total meat sold in all ten stores is kosher the piece is kosher.<Ref>The Binat Adam (Shaar Hakavuah n. 16) writes that the majority for a piece of meat found in the street is determined by the majority of the total amount of meat sold in all of the stores. He explains that the more meat that the likeliness of the meat coming from the kosher stores depends on the amount of kosher meat that transverses this location. His proof is Shekalim 7:1 which according to the Bartenuro depends on the amount of coins that are for korbanot and those designated as shekalim as opposed to the number of buckets designated for each. The Chavot Daat (YD Biurim 110:3) disagrees and holds that the determination of the majority depends on the amount of stores and not the amount of meat. Pitchei Teshuva YD 110:2 cites a large dispute about this question with most holding like the chavot daat. Shaarei Yosher 4:9 explains that the explanation of the Chavot Daat is that the status of the piece of meat became a doubt the minute it left the store it departed from. Therefore, the majority is coming to determine where the piece of meat left from and not the objective status of the piece of meat. He answers Shekalim by applying the principle that a majority made up of disparate part isn't considered a majority at all. See Rama CM 25 and Nodeh Beyehuda CM 2:3. [https://www.hebrewbooks.org/pdfpager.aspx?req=294&pgnum=126 Milchamot Yehuda (Chidushim ch. 7)] explains that this dispute is comparable to the dispute about how to determine a majority for dry solid cold pieces. The dispute is regarding whether a majority depends on the quantity of the pieces of meat or to the total volume of the pieces. Similarly, those who think that a majority is amount determining simply majority of the stores regardless of the quantity would likewise consider a majority for the stores without regard to the amount of meat sold in each store. That dispute is quoted in Pitchei Teshuva 109:1 and Chazon Ish. He also compares this dispute to the question of whether halacha is determining by the simple majority of rabbis and whether that depends on the greatness of the rabbis or not. If the quality and greatness of the rabbis aren't of concern that would correspond with the approach that a majority of pieces irrelevant of size and quantity of stores irrelevant of amount of meat sold there form a majority (see Yevamot 14a, Yad Malachi 230-1, Chinuch n. 78). Meor Yisrael Pesachim 7a and footnotes to Tosfot Harosh and Maharam Chalavah discuss if Tosfot Pesachim 7a is a proof against the Binat Adam.</ref> | # For example, if a piece of meat is found in a community with 10 stores, 9 of which are kosher, and 1 is non-kosher that piece is considered kosher since it is judged by the majority of stores. There is a large dispute regarding whether we judge the majority by the amount of stores or by the overall quantity of meat being sold at each store and if the majority of the total meat sold in all ten stores is kosher the piece is kosher.<Ref>The Binat Adam (Shaar Hakavuah n. 16) writes that the majority for a piece of meat found in the street is determined by the majority of the total amount of meat sold in all of the stores. He explains that the more meat that the likeliness of the meat coming from the kosher stores depends on the amount of kosher meat that transverses this location. His proof is Shekalim 7:1 which according to the Bartenuro depends on the amount of coins that are for korbanot and those designated as shekalim as opposed to the number of buckets designated for each. The Chavot Daat (YD Biurim 110:3) disagrees and holds that the determination of the majority depends on the amount of stores and not the amount of meat. Pitchei Teshuva YD 110:2 cites a large dispute about this question with most holding like the chavot daat. Shaarei Yosher 4:9 explains that the explanation of the Chavot Daat is that the status of the piece of meat became a doubt the minute it left the store it departed from. Therefore, the majority is coming to determine where the piece of meat left from and not the objective status of the piece of meat. He answers Shekalim by applying the principle that a majority made up of disparate part isn't considered a majority at all. See Rama CM 25 and Nodeh Beyehuda CM 2:3. [https://www.hebrewbooks.org/pdfpager.aspx?req=294&pgnum=126 Milchamot Yehuda (Chidushim ch. 7)] explains that this dispute is comparable to the dispute about how to determine a majority for dry solid cold pieces. The dispute is regarding whether a majority depends on the quantity of the pieces of meat or to the total volume of the pieces. Similarly, those who think that a majority is amount determining simply majority of the stores regardless of the quantity would likewise consider a majority for the stores without regard to the amount of meat sold in each store. That dispute is quoted in Pitchei Teshuva 109:1 and Chazon Ish. He also compares this dispute to the question of whether halacha is determining by the simple majority of rabbis and whether that depends on the greatness of the rabbis or not. If the quality and greatness of the rabbis aren't of concern that would correspond with the approach that a majority of pieces irrelevant of size and quantity of stores irrelevant of amount of meat sold there form a majority (see Yevamot 14a, Yad Malachi 230-1, Chinuch n. 78). Meor Yisrael Pesachim 7a and footnotes to Tosfot Harosh and Maharam Chalavah discuss if Tosfot Pesachim 7a is a proof against the Binat Adam.</ref> | ||
# See above if kol dparish applies to dvar sheyesh lo matirin. | # See [[#Dvar_Sheyesh_Lo_Matirin|above]] if kol dparish applies to dvar sheyesh lo matirin. | ||
# See above if kol dparish requires awareness of the prohibition. | # See [[#Awareness_of_the_Nullification|above]] if kol dparish requires awareness of the prohibition. | ||
==''Zeh Vzeh Gorem''== | |||
# Where there are two contributors to a production one which is permitted and one which is forbidden that is called ''zeh v'zeh gorem'' (Heb. זה וזה גורם; lit. this and that cause it). Generally, when each factor could not have independently created the result but together can do so it is permitted.<ref>Pesachim 26b, Avoda Zara 49a, Rif Avoda Zara 21b, Rosh Avoda Zara 3:8, Rambam Machalot Asurot 16:22, Shulchan Aruch Y.D. 142:4</ref> | |||
# If each factor were independently capable of causing the intended product, the product is forbidden and not considered ''zeh v'zeh gorem''.<ref> | |||
# If the forbidden factor makes its impact first and then the permitted one does, it is forbidden and not considered ''zeh v'zeh gorem''. For example, if forbidden wood is used to used to fuel the beginning of the baking of bread but afterwards the forbidden wood is replaced with permitted wood, it is forbidden.<Ref>Rambam Machalot Asurot 16:24, Kesef Mishna's first explanation, Meiri 26b s.v. lifi quoting some mefarshim, Shulchan Aruch Y.D. 142:7, Shach YD 142:13</ref> | |||
# Items produced solely by a forbidden source are forbidden and there is a dispute whether it is rabbinic or biblical.<ref>Maharam Chalavah Pesachim 27b s.v. lmaan clearly writes that the bread produced with forbidden fuel is biblically forbidden. However, the Tosfot Pesachim 75a citing Ri and Ran Avoda Zara 22b vgarsinan hold that that they're only rabbinic. Avnei Meluyim 6 cites this Ran and applies it to all things which were produced by a forbidden factor.</ref> | |||
#''Zeh vzeh gorem'' only applies to items that are forbidden from benefit and not things which are permitted in benefit and just forbidden for eating.<ref>Tosfot Pesachim 26b s.v. chadash, Rabbi Akiva Eiger on Nedarim 6:7</ref> | |||
#''Zeh vzeh gorem'' for chametz is forbidden.<Ref>Magen Avraham 445:5, Avnei Meluyim 6</ref> | |||
#''Zeh vzeh gorem'' for avoda zara according to some is permitted,<ref>Gemara Avoda Zara 48b, Shach YD 142:10, Avnei Meluyim 6</ref> while according to others is forbidden.<ref>Taz 142, Magen Avraham 445:5</ref> | |||
#''Zeh vzeh gorem'' for hekdesh is according to some permitted,<ref>Maharsha Pesachim 27b</ref> while according to others is forbidden.<ref>Maharshal Pesachim 27b, Avnei Meluyim 6, Magen Avraham 445:5</ref> | |||
#''Zeh vzeh gorem'' of a dvar sheyesh lo matirin is forbidden according to most opinions since zeh vzeh gorem is based on nullification and there is no nullification for a dvar sheyesh lo matirin.<ref>Ran Avoda Zara 21a-b clearly explains that zeh vzeh gorem is based on nullification. Also, Kesef Mishna Nedarim 5:15 says that for dvar sheyesh lo matirin we would not apply zeh vzeh gorem muter. Avnei Meluyim 6 elaborates on the approach of the Kesef Mishna.</ref> Some dispute this point and permit it.<ref>[https://www.hebrewbooks.org/pdfpager.aspx?req=1725&st=&pgnum=1134 Chikrei Lev YD 2:2-4] proves this from Temurah 28b that the offspring of a invalid korban is invalid as a korban but it is only one parent that is invalid zeh vzeh gorem is relevant, even though animals are significant. He distinguishes this from the case of dvar sheyesh lo matirin that zeh vzeh gorem isn’t applicable.</ref> | |||
# ''Zeh vzeh gorem'' is forbidden initially, however, if there would be a large loss to avoid it, it is permitted even initially. For example, an oven that was finished with forbidden fuel can now be used with permitted fuel since the baked products would be a result of forbidden and permitted fuel, which is ''zeh v'zeh gorem''. Even though it is only permitted after the fact, the alternative of destroying the oven is a large loss and not necessary.<ref>Tosfot Pesachim s.v. ben, Rosh, Ran. Avnei Meluyim asks why a large loss permits zeh v'zeh gorem initially if the Ran compares ''zeh v'zeh gorem'' to nullification and it is forbidden to nullify something forbidden initially even to avoid a loss. He answers that according to the Rashba who says that ein mevatlin isur lechatchila does not apply when it isn't possible to come to violate the actual prohibition, such as by cooking in a pot with a minimal amount of absorbed tastes which are always nullified. However, the Ran disagrees with the Rashba's idea. Instead he suggests that perhaps there is no prohibition of ein mevatlin isur lechatchila here since it doesn't apply to rabbinic prohibitions and items produced by a forbidden factor are only rabbinic. See there where he isn't certain about this answer for the Ran. See further, the Ran both on the Rif Pesachim and Chiddushin Pesachim 26b does assume that ''zeh v'zeh gorem'' is initially forbidden but permitted to avoid a loss.</ref> | |||
#Bread cooked over avoda zara fuel which was only coals and not a blazing fire is a dispute whether it is permitted.<ref>Bet Yosef 142:4 and Rama 142:4 permit, while Shach 142:10 and Gra 142:7 forbid. The Bet Yosef acknowledges that although the coals of avoda zara are indeed forbidden they do not make the bread forbidden since it isn't a blazing fire and the coals are only forbidden initially. He infers this from the Tur 142:4. However, the Shach 142:10 argues that it is forbidden since the coals of avoda zara are forbidden and would make the food produced over it forbidden. He quotes a Tosefta Orlah 1 which corroborates this point. Shach infers this from the Rambam Avoda Zara as well.</ref> | |||
==Sources== | ==Sources== | ||
<references /> | <references /> | ||
[[Category:Kashrut]] | [[Category:Kashrut]] | ||
