Minhag: Difference between revisions
From Halachipedia
→When minhagim clash with halacha
| Line 9: | Line 9: | ||
<p class="indent">Lastly, is it possible to have a temporary minhag? If we assume that minhagim are based on vows, then certainly yes, because it is possible to stipulate that a certain vow should only apply for a certain amount of time.<ref>It is clear from chazal that one may stipulate a vow to apply to a certain time period. A simple proof is the Mishna Nedarim 57a. Additionally, Shulchan Aruch YD 214:1 implies that if one has a practice that one only plans on doing a couple of times and not forever, it isn't binding as an oath, yet to any question, one should stipulate so explicitly. </ref> However, if we suppose that minhagim are based on not breaking from the practices of the everlasting Jewish community, then perhaps it is impossible for minhagim to be temporary just as biblical and rabbinic laws are permanent in nature. Yet, it seems that everyone can agree that minhagim could be instituted temporarily because minhagim are very much based on intent and if the community never accepted the practice with intent that it should last forever, reasonably it should be limited.<ref>The concept that minhagim can have a limited time-frame is shown in Shulchan Aruch YD 228:27.</ref></p> | <p class="indent">Lastly, is it possible to have a temporary minhag? If we assume that minhagim are based on vows, then certainly yes, because it is possible to stipulate that a certain vow should only apply for a certain amount of time.<ref>It is clear from chazal that one may stipulate a vow to apply to a certain time period. A simple proof is the Mishna Nedarim 57a. Additionally, Shulchan Aruch YD 214:1 implies that if one has a practice that one only plans on doing a couple of times and not forever, it isn't binding as an oath, yet to any question, one should stipulate so explicitly. </ref> However, if we suppose that minhagim are based on not breaking from the practices of the everlasting Jewish community, then perhaps it is impossible for minhagim to be temporary just as biblical and rabbinic laws are permanent in nature. Yet, it seems that everyone can agree that minhagim could be instituted temporarily because minhagim are very much based on intent and if the community never accepted the practice with intent that it should last forever, reasonably it should be limited.<ref>The concept that minhagim can have a limited time-frame is shown in Shulchan Aruch YD 228:27.</ref></p> | ||
==Significance of Minhagim== | |||
Minhagim are of such significance that we even find that the angels<ref>Gemara Bava Metsia 86b, Yismach Moshe Beresheet 1:11</ref> and even Hashem himself follow the local practice, minhag.<ref>Sanhedrin 46b, Maharam Mintz (teshuva 54)</ref> Hashem likes a variation of minhagim just as he wanted different tribes each encamped around the Mishkan with a different role.<Ref>Shlah Torah Shebichtav Naso quoting the Arizal</ref> | |||
==When minhagim clash with halacha== | ==When minhagim clash with halacha== | ||
===Minhagim that Contradict the Halacha=== | |||
# A minhag to recite a certain bracha even if it is questionable according to the halacha can be left and not protested.<ref>Gemara Tanait 28b tells the story of Rav who went to Bavel and didn't say anything when he heard the congregation reciting [[Hallel]] on [[Rosh Chodesh]] even though presumably they recited it with a bracha. Pri Chadash 496:2:10 quotes the Maharik (Shoresh 9) who cites this as a proof that one can follow a minhag even against the halacha. The Pri Chadash disagrees and answers that reciting a bracha is different. Since a [[Bracha Levatala| bracha sheino tzaricha]] is only rabbinic and if there's a minhag the rabbis can say that it is permitted to recite a bracha for the sake of a minhag as we find in Beitzah 4b for [[Yom Tov Sheni]].</ref> | |||
# Generally when a minhag is in violation of the halacha, whether it be Biblical or rabbinic, it should be abolished.<ref>Pri Chadash 496:2:10 based on several gemara's as well as a Rivash. However, Lev Avot Lebhar p. 14 tries to prove that we don't follow the Pri Chadash's approach. He quotes that he personally heard from Rav Elyashiv this as well. He also cites Rav Elyashiv in Kovetz Teshuvot 1:60 with a similar idea. He supports his approach with the Petach Dvir OC 2:233 that any practice which can be justified with some opinion should be left alone. Other proofs include: Sdei Chemed 40:37 s.v. hamuram quoting the Zera Yakov, Maharam Paduah 78, and Maharashdam YD 193.</ref> Some, however, hold that if it is an established minhag and it is only in violation of a rabbinic prohibition can be left alone.<ref>Pri Chadash 496:2:10 cites the Masa Hamelech and Bear Sheva who thought that if a minhag is only in vioaltion of a rabbinic prohibition it can be upheld. Rabbi Akiva Eiger in his comments to Pri Chadash there questions the proof of the Pri Chadash from Rosh Hashana 15b against the Masa Hamelech and in fact claims that it is a proof against the Pri Chadash.</ref> | |||
# For example, see the discussions of piyutim during [[Birchot Kriyat Shema]] in OC 68 between the Tur, Bach, and Bet Shaarim whether it is right to upkeep the minhag even though it seems to be problematic in terms of [[hefsek]]. | |||
===Minhagim that Choose a Side in a Halachic Dispute=== | |||
# If a certain halacha isn't clear and there is justifiable basis on either side of the dispute or question at hand, one can view the minhag in order to decide the dispute.<ref>Yerushalmi Peah 7:5, Gemara Brachot 45a. Rambam Shemitta Vyovel 10:6 writes that in calculating the calendaric years of Shemitta he differs from the Geonim in his calculations. Nonetheless, he concludes that since the Geonim have an old tradition for their calculations and the practice is like them, great is the significant of tradition to follow them. Rav Hai Goan in Tamim Deyim 119 seems also to subscribe to this approach in that he first defends the minhag and says that generally you first have to accept minhagim even under question and then answer the questions. He then goes on to justify the particular minhag in question. Tosfot Brachot 21b disagrees with Rashi's practice and yet concludes that the minhag follows Rashi and great is the minhag that we can follow it. Halichot Shlomo ch. 19 fnt. 27 cited by Magen Avot p. 15 cites the the Shoel Umeishiv responded to the Shem Aryeh that although his responses were reasonable he sometimes disagreed because he knew that the practice was otherwise and he tried to explain the basis for the minhag. Rav Shlomo Zalman agreed with such an approach.</ref> | |||
#A minhag is binding if it involves a stringency above the actual strict law. However, generally speaking, a minhag to follow one opinion on a matter that is a dispute in the Rishonim isn't a binding minhag.<ref>[http://www.hebrewbooks.org/pdfpager.aspx?req=14145&st=&pgnum=78&hilite= Sdei Chemed (v. 4, Maarechet Mem, Klal 37)]</ref> | |||
#A minhag | ==Non-Binding Minhagim== | ||
#A minhag that isn't concerned for any opinion or any prohibition isn't a binding minhag.<ref>Igrot Moshe OC 3:64 writes that someone whose father had the practice not to eat gibroks all year isn't binding since it has no reason and gibroks can't be more strict than real chametz which is permitted all year besides [[Pesach]]. Furthermore, Igrot Moshe writes that it is permitted to wear clothing according to his time and place and it isn't a binding minhag to have to wear the clothing of previously generations. This is assuming that the clothing is modest. Bet Yosef 670:1 writes that the practice not to work all of [[Chanuka]] isn't binding since it isn't concerned for all halachic issue.</ref> | |||
==Abrogating Minhagim== | ==Abrogating Minhagim== | ||
