Conversion: Difference between revisions

Latest revision as of 21:37, 21 August 2024

While Judaism does not proselytize^[1], it does welcome converts who come on their own initiative^[2]. There are three basic components to conversion: the acceptance of mitzvot, milah and tevilah. The process is complex and briefly described below. The purpose of the summaries below are for educational purposes only.

Bet Din for Conversion

All aspects of conversion need the presence of bet din.^[3] After the fact, according to some opinions, the conversion is valid as long as the kabbalat mitzvot was performed in the presence of bet din. In such a case we'd be strict to require another conversion.^[4]
The Bet Din for conversions does not need to be comprised of three Torah scholars.^[5]

Order of Procedure

The milah is done before the tevilah. If they did the tevilah before the milah, there is a major dispute if the conversion is effective. Therefore, if the tevilah was performed before the milah, they should repeat the tevilah.^[6]

Time

A conversion should only be performed during the day.^[7] If the acceptance of Mitzvot is performed at night, then this would bdiavad (after the fact) invalidate the conversion. If the milah or tevilah is performed at night, it's disputed if this would bdiavad invalidate the conversion.^[8]
The tevilah of a convert may not be performed on Shabbat nor on Yom Tov.^[9]

Tevilah

Some say that shehechiyanu is recited after the tevilah and completion of conversion.^[10]
Even though brachot on mitzvot are usually recited before the mitzvah is performed, the convert recites the beracha of "al ha'tevilah" after immersing^[11].

Tevilah of Women

Many poskim hold that tevilah needs to be done in the presence of Bet Din.^[12] For purposes of modesty, women can wear a loosely fitted robe that covers her whole body while entering the mikveh in the presence of bet din.^[13]

Pregnant Woman Conversion

If a pregnant woman converts, she should notify the bet din that she is pregnant, otherwise it could be that the conversion for the baby is ineffective.^[14]
If the fetus was a boy and is born on Shabbat, there is a discussion if the milah can be done on the subsequent Shabbat or should be delayed to the following Sunday.^[15]

Acceptance of Mitzvot

A prospective ger must accept all of the mitzvot and tenants of emunah^[16] in front of a Bet Din of three men during the day.^[17] If the convert accepted the mitzvot, but didn't do so in front of a Bet Din, the conversion is invalid.^[18]
If the convert accepted mitzvot, but knows or even intends that due to certain desires he won’t be able to fulfill a certain mitzvah, it is nonetheless absolutely considered acceptance of mitzvot.^[19] Others argue that if he doesn't intend to keep a mitzvah because of his desires, that is an invalid conversion.^[20]
If the convert said that he accepted mitzvot, but in his heart did not intend on keeping the mitzvot, that is an invalid conversion.^[21] If it isn't clear if he accepted the mitzvot, some say that it is a questionable conversion.^[22]
If the convert accepted all the mitzvot aside from one of them, the Bet Din should not accept him as a convert.^[23] After the fact, some say that it is a valid conversion,^[24] while most poskim hold that the conversion is invalid.^[25]
If the convert intends to keep the mitzvot as he sees other "religious" Jews observing them , even though they don't properly keep all of the mitzvot, there is a discussion if this is a valid acceptance of mitzvot.^[26]
If the convert accepted all the mitzvot except for a Rabbinic one, then after the fact the conversion is valid.^[27]
If the convert is converting for the sake of marriage, then after the fact the conversion is valid, as long as they completely accepted all of the mitzvot.^[28]
If someone didn’t accept the mitzvot at the time of the tevilah, but planned on accepting them later, then we don't view him as having accepted the mitzvot until he actually accepts them. Additionally, accepting mitzvot is a prerequisite for tevila, and the tevila needs to be repeated in this case.^[29]
If a Bet Din converts people who don't intent to fulfill the mitzvot, then it's causing a major obstacle to other Jews, as they will think that these people are completely acceptable Jews.^[30]

A Person Who Claims to be Jewish

A person who is assumed to be a non-Jew (as he hasn't been behaving like a Jew), who now claims that his mother was Jewish, is not trusted.^[31]

Milah

If a convert previously had a medical circumcision or was born circumcised, then he needs hatafat dam brit, and no bracha is recited.^[32]
A non-Jew who is unable to have a milah for medical reasons cannot convert.^[33]

Milah by Non-Jew

The milah of gerut certainly needs to be lishma. If the milah is performed by a non-Jew, then it's invalid and the convert needs hatafat dam brit.^[34]

Milah with Anesthesia

Using local anesthesia is permitted for an adult milah. Some even permit general anesthesia.^[35]

Adoption

An adopted child should be converted.^[36]

Conversion for Marriage

Ideally (lechatchila), a person should not convert for the sake of marriage, but after the fact (bdiavad) it's acceptable.^[37]
Even in a circumstance where it is permitted to convert for marriage, the Bet Din should be vigilant in checking and ensuring that the person who converts for marriage accepts the mitzvot completely.^[38]
The bet din should investigate why the convert is converting, and only accept him if he has pure intentions, or if they can assess that his intentions will eventually become pure.^[39]
Some poskim hold that if a couple intends on remaining married, irrespective of whether or not the non-Jewish spouse converts, then such a conversion is not considered for the sake of marriage .^[40]
Also, according to the decision of the bet din, it's possible to accept a convert for marriage, if the husband might be turned away from religion altogether if his "wife" can't convert.^[41]

Marriage after Conversion

A husband and wife who converted together need to wait 3 months before remarrying each other, in order to differentiate between a child that was conceived when she was non-Jewish, and one conceived when she was Jewish. They do not need to wait 3 months if there’s no doubt about whether she’s pregnant, such as if she’s already pregnant,^[42] she’s too old to have children,^[43] or just had her period.^[44] Regarding a pregnancy test see footnote.^[45]
A woman who was previously “married” to a Jew and then converts is required to wait 3 months before getting remarried to her previous husband.^[46] However, they do not need to wait 3 months if it's clear that she’s pregnant or not pregnant, such as if she’s too old to have children.^[47]
A woman who was previously married to a non-Jew and then converts by herself, must wait 3 months before getting married to a Jewish man.^[48] There’s no room for leniency, even if it's clear that she’s not pregnant, such as if she’s too old to have children.^[49]
A single woman who converts does not have to wait 3 months before getting married.^[50] Some hold she has to wait,^[51] but to satisfy this opinion, some hold that a pregnancy test is sufficient.^[52]

Milah for Baby Mistakenly Assumed to Be Jewish

The Mohel himself is not trusted to say that the milah was done for conversion, he would need witnesses for that.^[53] Anyway, a bet din of three is necessary.^[54]
If they did a brit milah mistakenly thinking that the baby was Jewish and did it as a mitzvah and then later realize the children wasn’t Jewish, many poskim hold that the original milah is effective, while others require a new hatafat dam brit.^[55]

Disclosure of Mitzvot

If the Bet Din doesn’t tell the prospective convert about the mitzvot, the conversion is nonetheless valid if he accepted to keep the mitzvot when he’ll learn about them.^[56]

Non-Jew Mixed into Family

Many poskim hold that if an invalid conversion was performed, and the non-Jew married into a Jewish family and generations later it's unknown, that is a serious issue needs to be investigated and revealed.^[57]

Hatafat Dam Brit

A non-Jew who had a medical circumcision and know wants to become Jewish needs hatafat dam brit without a bracha.^[58]
Hatafat dam brit is deoritta according to most poskim.^[59]
Some say that scratching the area of the milah with a nail is sufficient for hatafat dam brit.^[60]Others hold that it is necessary to extract a drop of blood.^[61]

Adoption and Child Conversions

If the parents aren't religious some say that it isn't considered a zachut for the child to be converted and therefore it is invalid even if the child later is religious. Others argue that it is still valid.^[62] Therefore, a bet din may not do such a conversion where the parents aren't religious.^[63] After the fact, if the child wants to be Jewish when he is bar or bat mitzvah they should do another tevilah and accept the mitzvot before bet din. If he doesn't want to be Jewish and protests, certainly the original conversion is uprooted. If he does want to be Jewish and not do another tevila and acceptance of mitzvot before bet din, there is no clear consensus if he is Jewish, though many hold he is not Jewish.^[64]
If the parents are religious it is a valid conversion.^[65]
It is important to tell the children that they were converted and can accept or reject Judaism^[66] before they become bar or bat mitzvah so that they can either accept Judaism or protest the conversion.^[67] If he weren't told, he would be able to protest or accept Judaism whenever he finds out.^[68]
If a child is converted by bet din when he is bar or bat mitzvah he could protest the conversion or accept Torah and mitzvot. A child who converts with his parents might not to be able to protest the conversion when he becomes bar or bat mitzvah.^[69]
There is no mitzvah to adopt and convert a non-Jewish child.^[70]
There is a discussion whether the bracha for the tevila of a child convert is recited by the bet din or child.^[71]
Yichud with children who are adopted is a serious halachic issue and should be dealt with a Rav in advance.^[72]

Russian and Ethiopian Jews

Regarding Ethiopians, Igrot Moshe EH 9:1, Tzitz Eliezer 12:66, 17:48, Yabia Omer EH 8:11, Minchat Avraham 1:16
Radvaz 4:19 and in Divrei Dovid 5 and 9 writes that the Jews of Ethiopia are certainly Jewish and from the tribe of Dan. The Maharikash his student reiterated this point. Yabia Omer EH 8:11 thinks that on this basis we should not question the authenticity of the Jews from Ethiopia as being Jewish. He concludes that they should be accepted without conversion and there is no issue with mamzerut. His reasons that there is no issue of mamzerut are like the Radvaz described that it could be that both their kiddushin and gittin were invalid. Also, Rav Ovadia adds that according to their current tradition their kiddushin didn't involve any giving of money to effectuate the kiddushin which is certainly invalid. Rav Moshe Feinstein, however, in Igrot Moshe EH 5:1 questions the Radvaz that it isn't clear how the Radvaz knew that they were certainly Jewish since they didn't observe the Torah. He therefore treats them as questionably Jewish but says that there is no concern of mamzerut if they do convert. Either way they should be saved from trouble because they might be Jewish. Also, they should be accepted with open arms either as Jews from birth or converts. Tzitz Eliezer 12:66 also questions the authenticity of the Jewishness of the Ethiopian Jews. He thinks that they need to convert but also they would be questionably mamzerim if they want to marry into the Jewish people. His opinion is further clarified in 17:48. There he cites Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, Rav Elyashiv, and Minchat Yitzchak as agreeing that the Ethiopians would need to convert to be accepted as Jews. Rav Avraham Shapira in Minchat Avraham 1:16 and Barkay v. 3 writes that the chief rabbinate accepted the proof from the Radvaz but because there are some concerns that they aren't Jewish they should convert as a chumra. Yalkut Yosef (Klalei Giyur p. 105-6) writes that his father, Rav Ovadia Yosef, accepted this ruling in practice so that there wouldn't be any disputes. Rav Hershel Schachter describes the analytical background of this discussion.
Yabia Omer EH 7:1 ruled that the Russian Jews who say that they're Jewish are believed, however, it is important that they clarify their definition of Jewish. If they know that Judaism depends on the mother then they can be believed. His primary source is that we trust someone who says he's Jewish since the majority of those who claim that they're Jewish are in fact Jewish as long as there wasn't any presumption that they are non-Jewish. He says that this majority applies whether or not they are observant of halacha when they make this claim. This principle that we can rely on majority even if the person currently isn't religious is the subject of debate of rishonim and achronim. Piskei Din Shel Batei Hadin Harabanim v. 9 p. 357 describes this at length. The case they're discussing is about a son who claims he's Jewish but his mother claims she and by extension he are not. In summary, most rishonim (Tosfot Yevamot 47a, Rabbenu Tam in Sefer Hayashar, Ramban, Rashba, etc) hold that claiming that you're Jewish is enough to presume that you're Jewish even if there is no other evidence to support that claim unless there is a presumption that previously he was assumed to be a non-Jew. However, the Meiri and Maggid Mishna hold that further proof is necessary in order to get married. The Bach YD 268 and Shach sides with the lenient rishonim, while the Bet Hillel EH 2 sides with the strict rishonim. Rav Chaim Ozer 3:27 does seem to support the strict approach. Rav Ovadia sided with the Bach who is lenient unlike the Bet Hillel. Rav Moshe in Igrot Moshe EH 1:8 also seems to be strict.

Shabbat

A non-Jew should not observe Shabbat.^[73]
A convert who did milah and didn't do tevilah, according to some poskim should specifically do melacha on Shabbat.^[74] However, most poskim hold that it isn't necessary and shouldn't do melacha.^[75]
A Jew who isn't certain that he is going to convert to be strict, between when he is aware of this doubt and when he converts, he has a dillema whether he should keep Shabbat. If he's non-Jewish he can't keep Shabbat, but if he's Jewish he can. See note for some solutions.^[76]

Teaching Torah

Meiri Sanhedrin 59a s.v. ben writes that a non-Jew who is interested in converting can learn Torah.

Volunteering Mitzvot as a Non-Jew

A non-Jew who volunteers to do mitzvot according to many opinions is rewarded. However, they may not observe mitzvot as an obligation because doing so is considered creating a new religion.^[77]

Conservative Conversions

Conservative conversions are generally considered invalid by Orthodox halacha.^[78]

Baal Teshuva

There is a rabbinic tevilah for someone who completely left Jewish practice and wants to do teshuva.^[79]
The general halacha is that if the mother is Jewish the child is Jewish.^[80]

Sources

↑ Part of the reason for our hesitancy to accept converts is rooted in a statement of the Gemara Kiddushin 70b: "converts are bad like sapachat (a form of Tzara'at) for the Jewish people". Gemara Yevamot 47b says that this is the reason why we discourage converts when they first appear before us, as we challenge their motivations for converting and attempt to dissuade them from doing so. Rashi Kiddushin 70b s.v. kashin explains that since they aren't meticulous in their observance of Mitzvot, naturally born Jews will inevitably be negatively influenced by them. Rashi Niddah 13b s.v. k'sapachat adds that because they aren't experts in Mitzvot, they'll bring about punishment (similar to when the King of Assyria exiled the people of Kutha to the Shomron, they converted to Judaism, and then Hashem punished them for their lack of observance by sending lions to ravage them. See Melachim II 17:25). (As an aside, Rashi Niddah also has an interesting opinion that the concept of "kol yisrael arevim zeh b'zeh" (Shevuot 39a), that all Jews are guarantors for one another, doesn't apply to converts. This is not the accepted practice, as we usually allow a convert to be yotzaih (fulfill his obligation) Kiddush by hearing it from a naturally born Jew, and vice versa as well. However, Beit Yitzchak 2:100:11 seems to adopt this Rashi, that Jews aren't punished for the sins of converts.). Tosfot Kiddushin 70b s.v. kashim quotes an interesting explanation of this Gemara from R' Avraham HaGer (a figure who lived in the days of the Baalai HaTosfot). He argues that converts are in fact more meticulous in their observance of mitzvot than naturally born Jews, and when Hashem sees their dedication, He recalls the shortcomings of the Jewish people and grows angry with them. He draws a parallel to a story in Navi (Melachim I:17) that the woman of Tzarfat accused Eliyahu as being the reason for her son's death, that his piety highlighted her lower spiritual state and incurred Hashem's wrath. Tosfot posits that another way of understanding why converts are bad for the Jewish people is because the Torah warns in twenty four places about oppressing them, and it is very difficult to be properly sensitive towards them and not violate this prohibition.
↑ Gm Yevamot 47a (and paskened in Shulchan Aruch Yoreh De'ah 268:2) states that when an individual comes to convert, we discourage him by mentioning the fact that the Jews are a downtrodden and oppressed nation. If the person acknowledges this and nonetheless expresses his desire to convert, then we accept him as a convert. There is also a discussion as to whether or not there's a Mitzvah to perform conversions. Gemara Yevamot 47b says that once a prospective convert dedicates himself to keep the Mitzvot, we do Milah right away, because "we don't delay a Mitzvah". The simple understanding of this Gemara is that there is a Mitzvah element to converting people. Furthermore, the fact that Gemara Shabbat 137b records that when performing a Milah on a convert, the text of the beracha includes "who has commanded us to give a Milah to converts", indicates that there is a Mitzvah to convert people. Tashbetz (Zohar HaRakia, assin 40) thinks that accepting converts is a Mitzvah, but is unsure under which Mitzvah it would be included. Interestingly, he also thinks that the fact that Beit Din converts a Katan al da'at Beit Din (Ketubot 11a), indicates that there's a Mitzvah to accept converts. Tosfot HaRosh (Shabbat 137b) suggests that accepting converts is included in the Mitzvah of loving the convert, as it's impossible to love him if he doesn't receive a Milah and is converted. Raavad in Sefer Baalai HaNefesh (end of Shaar HaTevilah) learns that the Mitzvah is derived from the fact that Avraham converted people (see Rashi Bereshit 12:5 s.v. asher asu). Another possibility is that it's included in the Mitzvah of loving Hashem, which according to Rambam (Sefer HaMitzvot Asseh 3) includes making Hashem beloved unto others and drawing them to His service.
↑ The Gemara Yevamot 46b establishes that conversion requires the supervision of a Bet Din of three judges based on the fact that the phrase "misphat" is used in the context of conversion. Tosfot s.v. mishpat offers two possibilities as to which passuk the Gemara is alluding to. Tosfot further explains that everyone agrees that three judges are required by conversion, even those who say that a Bet Din for hoda'ot v'hal'vaot, admissions and loans, only needs one judge, because we compare conversion to gzelot v'chavalot, theft and injury, regarding which everyone agrees that you need three judges. This is accepted by the Rambam (Isurei Biyah 13:6) and Shulchan Aruch YD 268:3. Shulchan Aruch YD 268:3 writes that after the fact, the Bet Din is only necessary for the acceptance of mitzvot, while the Rambam and Rif hold it is necessary for the milah and tevilah as well. Tosfot s.v. mishpat raises the issue that if conversion is compared to cases of theft and injury (see earlier in this footnote), then we should require the judges to have bona fide Semicha in an unbroken chain from Moshe Rabbeinu, something which we lack today. Tosfot answers that that even though we don’t have semicha, we can still perform Gerut nowadays, based on the principle of shelichutyahu (Gittin 88b), that the judges nowadays serve as the agents of the judges of old who possessed real Semicha. Tosfot Kiddushin 62b s.v. ger quotes another answer from Rabbeinu Netanel. He notes that Gemara Keritut 9a says that although a Ger must offer a Korban HaGer when converting, we can nevertheless accept converts nowadays that we don't have a Beit HaMikdash, as the Torah says that a Ger can live in "any of your generations", implying even after the destruction of the Beit HaMikdash. Similarly, reasons Rabbeinu Netanel, based on the passuk of "any of your generations", we should be able to accept converts nowadays, even though the chain of Semicha has been broken.
↑
What is the presence of Bet Din necessary for?
- Tosfot Yevamot 45b s.v. mi holds it is necessary for kabbalat mitzvot and not other aspects of the conversion. Nevertheless, three judges are lechatchila (ideally) required even for the Milah and Tevilah. This is also the view of Tosfot Kiddushin 62b s.v. ger. Tosfot's proof is the fact that the Gemara Yevamot 45b tells a story in which people used to refer to a certain person as "the son of a non-Jew". Rav Assi commented: "she certainly was Tovel for Niddah!". Tosfot understands that the Gemara is saying that her Tevilah which she did because she was a Niddah, even though there were no judges present, bdiavad (after the fact) counts for Gerut.
- Rambam Isurei Biya 13:9 hold that three judges are needed for all aspects of the conversion process, and if you don't have this, then the conversion is invalid. The challenge is how he deals with Tosfot's proof. One possibility is that they adopted Tosfot's second approach to the Gemara, that if everyone knows that a certain person did Tevilah, then it's as if they were present and witnessed it. Alternatively, the Gemara is saying that the fact that the woman is acting like she's Jewish by observing the laws of Niddah, is proof that she performed a valid conversion earlier.
- Ramban, Rashba, and Nemukei Yosef (his understanding of the Rif) hold that in order to assume that the children of the convert are the children of a Jewish man, kabbalat mitzvot is the only thing necessary to have in the presence of Bet Din. However, a convert can only marry a Jewish woman if all parts of the conversion process were performed in the presence of a Bet Din.
- Ritva 45b writes that Bet Din is necessary for everything, even after the fact. The Gemara (Tosfot's proof) means that even if you don’t intend for conversion, it is still valid.
- Hagahot Mordechai Yevamot 4:111 says that if a convert converted without a Bet Din, some say that the conversion is invalid, while others say that it's acceptable. Darkei Moshe 268:3 understands that this corresponds to the opinions of Tosfot and Rambam. Mordechai Yevamot 4:36 quotes Rabbenu Simcha and Rabbi Yehuda Bar Yom Tov who hold that a conversion only needs one judge.
- Shulchan Aruch YD 268:3 writes the opinion of Tosfot and Rosh as the anonymous opinion, and then notes the opinion of the Rif and Rambam by name. Yabia Omer YD 1:19 is strict, even though this is against the anonymous opinion cited by Shulchan Aruch. Achiezer 3:27 implies that even after the fact, not having Bet Din for milah or tevila is an issue, like the Rif and Rambam. Similarly, Perach Mateh Aharon 2:51 writes that we’re strict for Rif and Rambam.
↑ Igrot Moshe YD 1:159 clarifies that the three people who serve as a bet din don't all need to be torah scholars.
↑ Rama YD 268:1 quotes a dispute between the Ramban and Raah whether bdiavad (after the fact) the order of milah and tevilah would invalidate the conversion. The Ramban posits that it wouldn't, while Raah believes that it would invalidate the conversion. The Shach 268:2 therefore says that they should do the tevilah again because of this dispute.
↑ Yevamot 46b
↑ Shulchan Aruch 268:3. The anonymous view in Shulchan Aruch is that only if the acceptance of mitzvot is done at night does it invalidate the conversion. He also cites by name the view of Rambam, that if any stage of the conversion is done at night, then it invalidates the conversion. Bach CM 5:6 writes that we should be strict about a din at night because of the Rashbam and Smag that a din at night is effective.
↑ Rambam Issurei Biah 13:6 and Shulchan Aruch 268:4. They give the reason that since conversion is compared to Din (as Yevamot 46b notes that the word "mishpat" is used in association with conversion), it cannot be performed on Shabbat nor on Yom Tov. (Mishnah Beitzah 36b notes that the Rabbis forbade having Din on Shabbat and Yom Tov, and the Gemara explains that we're concerned that a person will come to write things down). Taz 268:11 raises the issue that the Gemara Yevamot 46b gives a different reason for this Halacha, namely that we don't "fix a person on Shabbat". (This a Rabbinic form of "fixing a vessel", similar to the prohibition mentioned in Beitzah 36b that one cannot separate Terumot and Maasarot on Shabbat and Yom Tov, as one is fixing the remainder of the produce). He suggests that since the Gemara Beitzah 18a permits a person who is impure (tameh) to immerse on Shabbat and Yom Tov, because it appears like he's cooling off and isn't trying to fix his impure state, the same logic should allow a convert to immerse as well. Thus, the Rambam paskens like the sugya in Beitzah over Yevamot 46b. Kesef Mishneh on Rambam offers the same approach. Interestingly, Tosfot Yeshanim Yevamot 46b s.v. lefi'kach, suggests an answer to resolve the contradiction between Yevamot 46b and Beitzah 18a. He posits that the "fix" of a person going from impure to pure, is much less than the "fix" of a non-Jew becoming Jewish, and that's why the latter is forbidden.
↑ Radvaz 1:434 holds that a shehechiyanu is recited at the completion of conversion (and not at the milah) since he is now joyous that he is now able to fulfill mitzvot.
↑ Pesachim 7b. There is an interesting discussion regarding when the Beit Din recites the bracha of "al ha'tevilah" when they convert a baby (Ketubot 11a). According to the Gemara Pesachim's reasoning, they should do so beforehand, as the only reason why a convert typically says it afterwards, is because he cannot recite a bracha while he is still non-Jewish. This is the view of Raavad in Baalai HaNefesh (at the end of Shaar HaTevilah). Rav Schachter (Eretz HaTzvi p. 32) argues that the Bet Din should recite a bracha after the Tevilah in this case, as the bracha goes on the chalot (onset) of the conversion.
↑ Regarding whether or not the lack of Bet Din bdiavad (after the fact) invalidates the conversion: the anonymous opinion in Shulchan Aruch 268:3 is that it doesn't (in accordance with the view of Tosfot Kiddushin 62b s.v. ger and Tosfos Yevamot 45b s.v. mi), and the yesh omrim cites Rambam who thinks that it would invalidate the conversion.
↑
Rambam and Shulchan Aruch hold that the tevila of both men and women need to be in front of bet din. Minchat Yitzchak 4:34:3 writes that it is possible that after the fact it is an effective conversion, since according to Tosfot a bet din isn't necessary for tevila. Furthermore, according to others it might be effective since the Bet Din knows that she went into the mikveh. Yabia Omer YD 1:19 says that they need to do the gerut again because it might not have been a valid gerut at all. He would allow her to wear a loosely fitted robe or a sheet above the water to make it more modest.
- Igrot Moshe YD 2:127 agrees that it is an unresolved machloket and needs to be redone. However, in Igrot Moshe 3:112 (11 years after previous one) he says that even if only one of the judges saw the woman go into the mikvah, and others were there and heard it, it is valid. There he explains that even according to the Rambam and Rif it is valid since the judges know she went to the mikveh properly even though they didn't see it. It seems to be a contradiction to his earlier teshuva. Teshuvot Vehanhagot 1:621 also says that it needs to be redone if the tevila was done without the bet din watching in the room.
↑ Dagul Mirvava 268:6 notes that the presence of bet din is necessary for the tevila of the baby (since the baby doesn't have kabbalat mitzvot). If the bet din wasn't aware of the fetus it is like the bet din isn't present. Aruch Hashulchan 268:11 is lenient since we hold like the opinion that the fetus is part of the mother and the conversion of the mother works for the baby. Igrot Moshe YD 1:158 says that it is proper to be strict for the dagul mirvava.
↑ Rav Dovid Karliner (Piskei Halachot p. 7 fnt. 5) writes that if a pregnant woman converted with her fetus and the fetus is a boy, it can have the milah on Shabbat. He argues with the Ramban that the milah is part of the gerut. Rav Chaim Ozer in Achiezer 4:44 agreed.
↑ Rambam Isurei Biyah 14:2, Maggid Mishna 14:1, Orchot Chaim (Hilchot Isurei Biya 9), Shulchan Aruch Y.D. 268:2, Levush 268:2. Lhorot Natan 14:59 holds that if they converted with a warped idea of emunah, such as believing that the Christian New Testament is true, the conversion is invalid. Piskei Din Yerushalayim (Dinei Mamonot v. 14 p. 422 n. 4) agrees that if someone believes both in Christianity and Judaism, then his conversion is invalid. Gerut Kehilchata 2:15 writes that he needs to accept mitzvot with the understanding that we keep mitzvot because they were commanded by Hashem through Moshe.
↑ Tosfot Yevamot 45b s.v. mi clarifies that accepting mitzvot is a critical part of conversion and is invalid without it. Shulchan Aruch Y.D. 268:3 codifies Tosfot. Chemdat Shlomo 1:29, Bet Meir, Achiezer, and Igrot Moshe all hold that acceptance of mitzvot is critical and without it the conversion isn’t valid. There is a minority view held by Rav Ben Zion Uziel (Shut Piskei Uziel Siman 65), that the acceptance of mitzvot is not something that would bdiavad (after the fact) invalidate the conversion. This view is not accepted by the Poskim.
↑ Tosfot Yevamot 45b s.v. mi, Ramban Yevamot 45b, Shulchan Aruch Y.D. 268:3
↑ Achiezer 3:26:4 explains that accepting mitzvot means that a person accepts that they’re all true and binding. If he says that he doesn’t want to accept one mitzvah, it isn’t an acceptance of mitzvot. However, if he says that he accepts all mitzvot, yet knows that because of a certain desire, he won't be able to keep one mitzvah, it is nonetheless a valid conversion. Minchat Asher (Shabbat 34:1) writes that if he doesn't intend to violate a mitzvah because of a desire, but rather just knows that likely because of the difficulty of mitzvot that he will be overcome with desire and not fulfill a mitzvah, that is certainly considered a valid conversion.
↑ Dvar Avraham argues that it shouldn’t be a valid conversion, but isn’t completely convinced that after the fact it is invalid. Lhorot Natan is convinced that the Achiezer is incorrect. Accepting mitzvot means accepting actually practicing all the mitzvot.
↑
Bet Yitzchak YD 2:100:9, Achiezer 3:26, Igrot Moshe YD 1:157 and 3:108, Minchat Yitzchak 6:107. Bet Yitzchak explains that the concept that intentions can't invalidate a statement (dvarim shebelev einam dvarim), is limited to interpersonal matters between two different people. However, conversion is between a person and Hashem, and one's intentions certainly do count. Therefore, if the convert says that he plans to keep Torah but his intentions are otherwise, then the conversion is invalid. Another salient point is the fact that Tosfot Kiddushin 49b s.v. devarim says that if something is so clear, even though it's not explictily stated, then in such a situation we'd consider it meaningful and significant (devarim shebelev havaih devarim). So too over here, if it's clear as day that someone doesn't intend to dedicate himself to Mitzvot, then we'd take that into account and invalidate the conversion.
- In a specific case of a woman who said that she accepted the mitzvot but had in mind to violate some halachot, Igrot Moshe 3:108 writes that it is a valid conversion. His reasons are (1) since her children are practicing Judaism, she isn't trusted about them to say that they're not Jewish. (2) dvar shebelev einam dvarim, unless there is a clear circumstance that everyone knew that contradicts her words. (3) If she accepts the mitzvot, but because of financial pressures she won't be able to practically keep all the mitzvot, then that is considered an acceptance of mitzvot. R' Moshe isn't certain about this last reason. However, regarding (1) Achiezer 3:26:2 argues that for the actual acceptance of mitzvot, dvarim shebelev ainam devarim isn't relevant, since it is a matter between him and Heaven, regarding which intentions are critical.
↑ Igrot Moshe YD 3:106 writes that although the convert said that he accepts mitzvot, if the circumstances make it clear that this statement is dubious, the validity of the conversion is questionable. Kger Kezrach ch. 32 discusses this opinion and supports it.
↑ Bechorot 30b. The Gemara says that even if he only rejects a Rabbinic law, we don't accept him as a convert. See below if the rejection of a Rabbinic law would invalidate a conversion after the fact.
↑
Igrot Moshe YD 3:106
- Gemara Shabbat 31a describes a case in which Hillel converted someone, even though that individual didn't accept the legitimacy of the Oral Torah. Rashi 31a s.v. gayrey says that Hillel converted him because this fellow didn't deny the Oral Torah, but simply had a hard time believing that it was from Hashem. Hillel was confident that after he taught him, that he'd trust him that it came from Hashem. Igrot Moshe 3:106 learns from Rashi that not accepting one mitzvah doesn't invalidate the conversion, but you shouldn't perform such a conversion unless you know that he will end accepting all of the mitzvot. Minchat Asher Shabbat 34:1 understands this Rashi differently. The convert under question did accept the fact that the Oral Torah is binding, but wasn't necessarily convinced that it's Divine. Hillel was confident that he could correct this error later, and that's why he accepted him.
↑ Bet Yitzchak, Biur Halacha 304. Achiezer 3:26 is uncertain. It seems that Rav Moshe retracted his position, because both in Igrot Moshe YD 3:107 and 3:108, which are written after 3:106, he says that it isn’t a valid conversion. Igrot Moshe 3:106 holds that chutz mdvar echad is only lechatchila, but in 3:107 and 3:108 he says that isn't the case, and that it even invalidates the conversion after the fact.
↑ Igrot Moshe 3:106 suggests that perhaps it is an acceptance of mitzvot if she plans on doing mitzvot like other "religious" Jews, even though they violate certain halachot such as tzeniyut. R' Moshe compares this to someone who converts and lives amongst gentiles, which the Gemara (Shabbat 68a) considers to be a legitimate convert. Such a person is committed to mitzvot, even though he hasn't been properly educated in how to keep them. Similarly, this woman is committed to mitzvot, even though she hasn't been properly educated and is erroneously following a certain community's mistaken practices. Nonetheless, R' Moshe isn't ready to be lenient based on that logic.
↑ Bet Meir, Biur Halacha. Achiezer 3:26 isn’t certain if it's a valid conversion on a Biblical level, or if it isn't a valid conversion at all.
↑ Yevamot 24b, Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Deah 268:12. Igrot Moshe, Achiezer, Dvar Avraham. Interestingly, there's an opinion in the Tannaim (cited on Yevamot 24b) who holds that it isn't a valid conversion after the fact, but this isn't how we pasken. Either way, we ideally try to avoid accepting converts who are only doing so for the sake of marriage (see Shulchan Aruch ibid).
↑ Igrot Moshe 3:108
↑ The Achronim discuss if Bet Din violates Lifnai Ivair (placing a stumbling block before a blind person) if they convert someone who doesn't intend to keep the Mitzvot, as they are causing him to inevitably commit sins. R' Yitzchak Shmelkes in Bet Yitzchak YD 2:100:11 offers a few arguments for why there would no issue of Lifnai Ivair. First, if he intends to keep the Mitzvot, then we can assume that he will follow through on his commitment. If he doesn't intend to keep the Mitzvot, then he's not Jewish, and he doesn't have to observe the Mitzvot. Second, it's better for him to be Jewish rather than non-Jewish, even if he will violate prohibitions, as all of Yisrael has a portion in Olam Habah (Sanhedrin 90a). However, he adds that converting people who don't intend to keep the mitzvot is a stumbling block to others who will think that they're Jewish, when they're actually non-Jewish. He therefore concludes that it isn't proper to accept convert who doesn't intend to keep mitzvot. Minchat Shlomo 1:35:3 disagrees with R' Yitzchak Shmelkes and thinks that it's lifnei iver to cause someone who doesn't intend to keep halacha to become Jewish and then subsequently be punished for his sins. Igrot Moshe YD 1:157 writes that there is no reason to accept a convert who isn't going to practice mitzvot.
↑ Achiezer 3:27
↑ Tosfot Yevamot 46b s.v. drabbi yosi quotes a dispute between the Bahag and Rabbenu Chananel whether a convert who already has a milah needs hatafat dam brit. Bahag holds that he does, while Rabbeinu Chananel thinks that he does not. The Tur 268:1 cites the Itur who says that a non-Jew born without a foreskin doesn't need a hatafat dam brit, while a convert who already had a medical circumcision needs a hatafat dam brit. Bet Yosef cites the Rif Shabbat 55b, Rosh Shabbat 19:5, and Rambam Shabbat 1:7 as holding like the Bahag. Shulchan Aruch Y.D. 268:1 paskens that hatafat dam brit should be performed, but no bracha should be recited. Shach 268:1 explains that there is no bracha because it is a dispute in the rishonim (based on the general rule of safek berachot l'hakel, that whenever a doubt arises regarding brachot, the bracha is omitted).
↑ Tosfot Yevamot 46b s.v. drabbi yosi writes that if a male's reproductive organ was cut off, then he can still convert, as he becomes Jewish with tevilah alone, like women. Shulchan Aruch Y.D. 268:1 codifies this position. Although someone who can't have a milah for medical reasons seems to be similar to that case, the Achiezer 4:45 and 4:46 rejects that comparison and holds that he can't convert. This is also the opinion of Zecher Yitzchak 3, Derech Pikudecha (Mitzchak Aseh 2, Dibbur 30), Rav Kook (Daat Kohen 150), and Rav Tzvi Pesach Frank YD 220. Rav Kook distinguishes between from the case of Tosfot since the medical situation could be temporary, it could be possible if they want to put themselves in danger, or that we don’t have shiluchutayhu for an uncommon situation.
↑ Achiezer 3:27
↑ R' Shternbuch in Teshuvot Vehanhagot 1:590 and 2:510 permits local anthesia. However, he forbids using general anesthesia, because it's as if one is doing the mitzvah thoughtlessly (mitasek). He argues that the milah is part of the process of gerut, and must therefore be done with intent to accept the Torah. When a person is under general anesthesia, he is unable to accept the mitzvot with the proper intent. Yabia Omer YD 5:22 disagrees and allows local as well as general anesthesia for an adult milah. Imrei Yosher 2:140 forbids even local anesthesia, because milah should involve pain. Also, the minhag was to never use anesthesia, even though it was readily available. Yabia Omer YD 5:22 proves from the Gemara that one is able to fulfill mitzvot via a shliach (an agent) even when he's asleep. Gemara Gittin 70b indicates that if a person appoints a shliach to divorce his wife, the shliach can go ahead and do so, even though the person who sent him is now asleep. This Gemara is codified by Bet Shmuel Even HaEzer 121:2. Seridei Esh 3:96 only permitted local anesthesia. Chelkat Yoav (Ohel Moed 1:7 cited by Yabia Omer) was lenient and even permitted general anesthesia. He bases himself on the view of Maharach Or Zaruah 11, who holds that the Mitzvah of Milah is fulfilled when a person is in a state of being circumcised (chalot milah), as opposed to the act of circumcision (maaseh milah). Chelkat Yaakov therefore argues that there's no need for someone to be conscious while the milah takes place, as the mitzvah is fulfilled afterwards when he wakes up and is circumcised. Chelkat Yaakov doesn't think that pain is a necessary component of Milah, disagreeing with the Koret Habrit (261:4), who believes that pain is an essential ingredient of Milah. With regards to the above Maharch Ohr Zarua, he argues his point based on a story cited in the Gemara Menachot 43b. When King David entered the bathhouse, he was upset that he didn't have any Mitzvot with him, until he remembered that he still had his Milah with him. Maharach Ohr Zarua argues that if the mitzvah of milah is limited to the act of circumcision, then David didn't have any mitzvot with him. Rather, it must be that the mitzvah of milah is fulfilled when a person is in a state of being circumcised, and this is why David was happy.
↑ Igrot Moshe YD 2:126 writes that you can't trust the adoption agency that the baby is Jewish. If you did, then it would be a problem of asufi. (An asufi a child who is found in the street, and we don't know the identity of its parents. We assume that it's a safek mamzer. See Mishna Kiddushin 69a and 74a). R' Moshe writes that we assume that he's non-Jewish and can convert.
↑ Yevamot 24b. The Ritva writes that the reason it's acceptable after the fact, is because we assume that they authentically committed themselves to mitzvot, even though their marriage is what pressured them into doing so. Hagahot Mordechai (Yevamot 4:101 s.v. katuv) seems to write that it's only valid if afterwards we see that they keep halacha properly.
↑ Igrot Moshe YD 1:159 notes that since many people who convert for marriage don't really accept the mitzvot, one should be very wary of accepting such a convert. He says that the majority of people who converted for marriage in America during the 1950s are not valid converts, because they didn't actually accept the mitzvot. Bet Yitzchak YD 2:100:9 echoes this sentiment with regards to Ashkenazic countries in the 1800s.
↑ Achiezer 3:27. Shach 268-23 paskens like Tosfot 24b s.v. lo, who understands that the reason Hillel converted someone who wanted to become the Kohen Gadol (Shabbat 31a), even though we don't accept people who convert for ulterior motives, is because Hillel was confident that he would eventually be committed for the right reasons. Shach notes that this is the source that we follow Bet Din's evaluation, and that if they think the situation will turn out well, then we go by that. Achiezer 3:26:2 suggests that if it's evident to the bet din that his intent isn't pure, then they can't lechatchila accept him as a convert . However, if his intentions aren't clear, even after their investigation, then they can accept him as a convert.
↑ Achiezer 3:26:7
↑ Achiezer 3:26:7 based on Rav Shlomo Kluger. See Minchat Yitzchak 6:107 s.v. vheneh who writes that if a Jew married a non-Jew, it is better to leave her as a non-Jew than have her convert and not keep the laws of niddah, which is worse.
↑ Rav Shlomo Amar in Shma Shlomo 5:9-12 following the Dagul Mirvava
↑ Dagul Mirvava 13:5
↑ Igrot Moshe EH 2:5
↑ Shemesh Umagen 2:41:5 writes that a blood test that checks if she's pregnant is not sufficient evidence to exempt from havchana, because it isn't always accurate. Rav Schachter quotes his father that a pregnancy test is reliable, and there's no need to wait three months.
↑ Shulchan Aruch E.H. 13:5
↑ Rav Elyashiv (Kovetz Teshuvot 3:150) writes that a non-Jewish woman married to a Jew who converted does not need havchana if it is clear that she’s not pregnant such as if she’s too old to have children. He writes that this is included in the leniency of the Dagul Mirvava since regarding two Jews this case is impossible. The only case that is comparable to two Jews who were married and got divorced is two non-Jews who were married and now she converted and married another Jew. In that case, there is no leniency even if it is known that she’s pregnant or not pregnant. Yabia Omer EH 9:12:1-2 quotes Isa Bracha who was lenient about a even case of a woman who was married to a Jew and wants to convert since it is similar to a woman who became pregnant out of wedlock (Shulchan Aruch E.H. 13:6). However, he quotes that Rav Uziel and Melamed Lhoil who rejected that concept since she wants to be married to him and become pregnant from him. Nonetheless, he's lenient with a pregnancy test and doesn't explain further.
↑ Shulchan Aruch E.H. 13:5
↑ Chelkat Mechokek 13:4 isn’t sure about this. Dagul Mirvava isn’t lenient against Chelkat Mechokek. Igrot Moshe YD 3:110 and EH 2:5 follows Dagul Mirvava, but isn’t more lenient than that.
↑ Shulchan Aruch E.H. 13:5, Bet Shmuel 13:7, Yabia Omer EH 9:17:1-2
↑ Radvaz cited by Pitchei Teshuva 13:5
↑ Dibrot Eliyahu 7:119 only relies on a pregnancy test for a single woman who converts, which according to Shulchan Aruch doesn't need havchana. He doesn't rely on it for a married woman who converts since according to Shulchan Aruch she needs havchana.
↑ Igrot Moshe 2:128 writes that the mohel isn't trusted to say it was for gerut. He needs another witness so that there's at least two witnesses. Anyway, there should be three for a bet din. He doesn't rely on a safek safeka of the Rach and maybe the mohel did it for conversion.
↑ Shulchan Aruch 268:3. Igrot Moshe YD 2:126 implies that the three people constituting the bet din need to be aware that they're watching a process of conversion and not thinking it is just a regular milah. However, they don't need to formally think that they're doing the conversion as the bet din.
↑
In terms of intent, Melamed Lhoil 2:82 writes that intent for a gerut of mitzvah is the same intent for milah of gerut and nothing else is necessary. Igrot Moshe YD 1:158 s.v. vheneh and Har Tzvi YD 2:219 agree. However, Gerut Khilchata 3:4 p. 25 quotes that Rav Elyashiv disagreed.
- In terms of having the presence of a Bet Din, Igrot Moshe YD 1:158 writes that there is room to be lenient for several reasons: (a) According to the Bach 268:7 a bet din isn’t necessary for milah. (b) According to the Bet Yosef a bet din is necessary for milah but perhaps that’s only if the milah is done second. (c) Even if a milah was done without a bet din according to Tosfot that is acceptable since the kabbalat mitzvot was in bet din. (d) If a convert had a milah without a bet din they don’t need to do hatafat dam brit according to the Rabbenu Chananel.
- * Igrot Moshe 2:126 is lenient not to require hatafat dam brit because likely the mohel knew that the baby was non-Jewish and there were another two religious people in attendance.
- Igrot Moshe YD 3:105 writes that in an extenuating circumstance it is permissible to rely on the opinion that hatafat dam brit isn't necessary if there was a milah done for a mitzvah and it could be assumed that there were 3 religious men at the brit or at least publicized to 3 religious men that there was going to be a brit.
↑ Nemukei Yosef (Yevamot 16a s.v. tanu), Bet Yosef YD 268:2, Shach 268:3, Chemdat Shlomo 1:29, Igrot Moshe YD 1:159
↑ Rav Elyashiv (Kovetz Teshuvot 4:136) writes that the principle that a mamzer that got mixed into a family does not need to be revealed and is permitted when it is in later generations unknown (Kiddushin 71a) does not apply to non-Jews. Rav Chaim Kanievsky (Ktzaruf Kesef p. 11 cited by R’ Yitzchaki cited below) agreed. See Rav Yoel Amital’s article in Hamaayan where he argues that the Dvar Yehoshua and Chazon Ish EH 1:18 think that it is applicable to non-Jews. Also see Rav Dovid Yitzchaki who argues that the Chazon Ish does not mean that.
↑ Shulchan Aruch Y.D. 268:1, Shach 268:2
↑ Achiezer 3:27 unlike Yam Shel Shlomo
↑ Teshuvot Vehanhagot 2:510
↑ Achiezer 3:27 writes that the hatafat dam brit is sufficient with a prick to make it only bleed a drop.
↑
- Bet Yitzchak EH 1:29:8 suggests that for a child conversion with non-religious parents, the mother non-Jewish and father Jewish, it is possibly a benefit to the child since will merit a portion in olam haba, even if he will sin. Nonetheless, he says that since it isn't a clear benefit he would be able to protest later even according to the Chatom Sofer. Bet Yitzchak YD 2:100:11 reiterates this point.
- Igrot Moshe YD 1:158 implies that it isn't clear if it is a benefit to the child if he is going to be raised by non-religious parents, since he can have olam haba. Therefore, he thinks it would be proper for him to do another tevilah when he becomes bar or bat mitzvah and accept mitzvot. He raises this possibility again in Igrot Moshe EH 4:26:3. There he writes that if the children are going to a Jewish day school and the parents are intermarried they should convert the children and it will be a benefit to them since they go to a Jewish day school, even though it isn't a clear benefit.
- Minchat Yitzchak 3:99 writes that the conversion of a child for a non-religious couple would be invalid since it isn't a favor for the child since he could be non-Jewish and not be culpable for any Torah prohibitions, but now that he is Jewish he is obligated to follow the Torah and will be punished for not doing so. Since he isn't going to be brought up in a religious environment he is likely not going to be religious when he grows up. Even if it turns out that he is religious later it is still invalid since at the time of the conversion it didn't seem like a benefit to the child. Secondly, we couldn't assume he's Jewish until he is bar or bat mitzvah and accepted mitzvot because until then it won't be clear that he'll accept Judaism. Thirdly, in order to be Jewish later he must accept mitzvot when he becomes bar or bat mitzvah (Tosfot Sanhedrin 68b). Minchat Yitzchak 6:105 reiterates this position. He notes the opinion of the Bach 268 and Ritva Ketubot 11a in understanding Rashi that the conversion is only for rabbinic purposes and wonders how he could marry a Jewish woman on that basis. Tosfot Ketubot 11a also assumes that the conversion is only rabbinic but nonetheless concludes that he is treated like a Jew in all respects even for biblical laws. The Rashba and Ritva Ketubot 11a though hold that the conversion is completely and unquestionably biblically valid.
- Seridei Esh 1:46 says it is ineffective even after the fact, but in 2:63 (written earlier) he says that initially you shouldn't convert a child for non-religious parents. Rav Elyashiv (Kovetz Teshuvot 1:29) argues with Rav Moshe that it is not a zechut since even if he isn't aware of the sins he still needs atonement for them. Seemingly it would be ineffective even after the fact. Similarly, Rav Kook (Daat Kohen YD 147) writes 3 reasons why they can't accept a child convert for a non-religious couple: a) Every convert needs kabbalat mitzvot and the parents can express that their intention to accept mitzvot and raise him in that spirit. b) If the child himself want the conversion he needs to have his parents request the conversion (based on Ravyah) but if the parents don't plan to raise him to mitzvot it is like they're not asking for conversion. c) There is no mechanism of sheliychutahu for the bet din to perform the conversion since it isn't such an important spiritual loss for them to covert in such a case. Seemingly it should be ineffective even after the fact.
- However, Rav Herzog (Heichal Yitzchak EH 1:21) writes that the bet din shouldn't initially accept such a convert if the parents aren't religious. Also, Piskei Din of Batei Din HaRabbanim v. 1 pp. 375-379 records the ruling of Rav Elyashiv, Rav Jolty, and Rav Yakov Ades that they shouldn't do such a conversion but after the fact the conversion is subject to doubt whether it is valid.
- Klalei Hagiyur of Rav Yitzchak Yosef pp. 53-64 collects many who hold that the conversion is only valid if the parents are religious and supports this from Rav Kook in Daat Kohen YD 147, Zecher Yitzchak 2, Rav Elyashiv (Kovetz Teshuvot 1:103), Shevet Halevi 6:202, Chelkat Yakov 1:128:4, Rav Yitzchak Elchanan quoted by Mateh Levi 2:55, and Seridei Esh 2:61:3. He also says that he heard it from his father Rav Ovadia Yosef. However, he notes that this is in opposition to the Bet Yitzchak and Rav Moshe Feinstein (Igrot Moshe 1:158, EH 4:26:3) and Dibrot Moshe (Shabbat 64:11) where he is inclined to this possibility but not certain.
↑ Yalkut Yosef concludes not to convert a child with non-religious parents. He adds that this was also the position of Rav Herzog (Heichal Yitzchak EH 1:21), Rav Shaul Yisraeli (Mishpatei Shaul 38), and Rav Massas (Shemesh Umagen 3:62).
↑ Yalkut Yosef cites Piskei Din Harabbanim v. 1 pp. 375-379 by Rav Yakov Ades, Rav Elyashiv, and Rav Jolty that after the fact it isn't clear that it is ineffective.
↑
Igrot Moshe YD 1:162 writes that the child can protest even according to the Chatom Sofer since it could be that he would have preferred non-Jewish adopted parents. Yalkut Yosef (Klalei Hagiyur p. 53) agrees that we would accept an adopted child for conversion if the parents are religious. Minchat Yitzchak 3:99 doesn't recommend it and only would allow it after the fact if they already did the adoption. Igrot Moshe concludes that he doesn't recommend adopting non-Jewish children and converting them since there is no mitzvah to do so.
- Issues with adoption: the parents need to be religious for the conversion to be valid, they need to tell the child before he becomes a bar or bat mitzvah and have him accept mitzvot. If he doesn't know his practicing Judaism isn't an implicit acceptance. Also, the entire concept of accepting a child convert when he is too young to choose to covert is a major question. The Ravyah cited by Mordechai (Yevamot 4:40) writes that would can't convert a child unless he explicit requests it. (This is also the opinion of the Raah cited by Shitah Mikubeset Ketubot 11a.) Minchat Yitzchak isn't certain if the Ravyah would allow the conversion after the fact if it wasn't against the child's will but the child didn't say anything, as is the case with a baby. He also notes that the Bach and Darkei Moshe understand that the Ran disagrees with this Ravyah. Additionally, the Rambam disagrees with the Ravyah. Nonetheless, the Shach cites the Ravyah and together with Shulchan Aruch would hold that it is only possible to convert a child if the parents agreed or the child requests it. Therefore, Minchat Yitzchak says that even for a religious couple it isn't advised to adopt and convert, though after the fact he thinks it is possible to rely on the Ran and Rambam and perhaps his understanding of the Ravyah. Similarly, Shevet Halevi 6:202 rules that even according to the Ravyah it is permitted in cases of adoption because it isn't against the will of the child.
↑ Meged Yehuda YD 28 writes that he needs to know he's Jewish otherwise he could protest later in life, but he doesn't not need to know that he can protest. Rav Soloveitchik in Mpeninei Harav p. 243 wasn't sure about this.
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Igrot Moshe YD 1:162 s.v. ub'esem implies that even if the child never found out his entire life it is a valid conversion, however, it is ill-advised because he will likely find out and you wouldn't want him to protest the conversion at a later age. Minchat Yitzchak 3:99:13 disagrees on the grounds that not protesting is accepting the mitzvot and if a child never did that he did not accept the mitzvot and is not Jewish. This position is evident in Tosfot Sanhedrin 68b.
- Kaneh Bosem YD 1:115 considers that according to the strict halacha it isn't necessary to tell the convert that he is a convert but after he asked Dayan Weiss he concludes that you must tell the convert. His reasoning was that according to Tosfot Sanhedrin 68b without telling the convert it isn't considered a valid acceptance of mitzvot and according to Tosfot Ketubot 11a without telling them it remains a rabbinic conversion instead of a biblical one. However, according to the Rashba and Ritva Ketubot 11a it might not be necessary ever to tell them. Also, according to the Chatom Sofer YD 253 since the child converted with the parents the child can't reject Judaism and accordingly wouldn't be necessary to tell them.
↑ Igrot Moshe YD 1:162 thinks that since the only reason we can assume he is Jewish until he protests is because there is an assumption that when growing up in a Jewish family he is going to accept the mitzvot when he becomes bar or bat mitzvah. However, if they weren't told until they were teenagers or after it isn't such a clear presumption. Once he is independent and also has a greater temptation to sin there is no assumption he will accept mitzvot. Therefore it would even be questionable to allow him to marry a Jewish girl because of the concern that he will later find out that he was converted and protest it and become a non-Jew married to a Jewish woman. Minchat Yitzchak 3:99:13 agrees. Shevet Halevi 5:250 also concludes that it is necessary to tell the convert that he was converted as a child otherwise we can't assume that they're Jewish because they might later find out and protest it. Even in an extenuating circumstance it is necessary to tell the child.
↑ Chatom Sofer YD 253 writes that a child who converted with his parents can't later protest the conversion. This is premised on the opinion of the Rif, who doesn't allow a child convert to protest later, and Bahag, who wouldn't allow a child conversion without parent's consent. He also believes this is the opinion of the Rambam that it is only possible for a child convert to protest the conversion if it wasn't done by the request of his parents. Pitchei Teshuva 268:8 cites this teshuva. Bet Yitzchak 1:29:8 notes that this position is against Shulchan Aruch and although the Chatom Sofer's view should be noted we don't accept it.
↑ Minchat Yitzchak 3:99:1 quoting Rashba Ketubot 11a, Tosfot Ketubot 44a s.v. hagiyoret, and Ran Ketubot 44a. Igrot Moshe YD 1:162 agrees.
↑ Gerut Kehilchata 6:12. See Shevet Halevi 6:194. Derech Pikudecha (Mitzvah Aseh 2, Dibbur 31) isn't sure if the bet din can recite a bracha at the conversion of a child because he might later decide not to accept Judaism. See Rashba Ketubot 11a.
↑ Shevet Halevi 5:205:8 and 6:196 writes that there is no valid permit to violate yichud when adopting children. He says that just because they are brought by parents and feel close to them emotionally it isn't the same as natural parents. He clarifies that he isn't against adoption but it should be done in a way that avoid any question of yichud. Tzitz Eliezer 6:40:21 writes as a way of justifying the practice (limmud zechut) but doesn't actually endorse it. The main reason to be lenient is that since they're brought up by their adopted parent they don't feel any attraction to them.
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Sanhedrin 58b. According to Rashi Sanhedrin 58b s.v. amar writes that it is forbidden even if one doesn't intend to abstain from melacha for religious purposes and it is just to rest. The Rambam (Melachim 10:9) holds that it is only forbidden if they intend to do so for a religious purpose since it is like creating a new religion. Yad Ramah Sanhedrin 58b s.v. v'amar identifies this dispute. Meiri 59a s.v. ben writes that a non-Jew can't observe another day of the week as Shabbat because Jews might mistakenly learn from him.
- The Rambam (Melachim 10:9) implies that it is forbidden for a non-Jew to keep Shabbat or even another day during the week as a day of rest but only if it is for religious reasons. If it is for leisure it is permitted. This is further implied by Yad Ramah 58b s.v. vamar who contrasts the opinion of the Rambam with another opinion (either Rashi or one similar to Rashi) that holds keeping Shabbat purely for leisure is also forbidden. Meiri 59a s.v. ben seems to follow the approach of the Rambam in this respect. Rashi Sanhedrin 58b is of the opinion that for leisure is also forbidden. Igrot Moshe YD 2:7 writes that the Rambam agrees with Rashi.
↑ Avnei Nezer YD 351:4-5 writes that according to the Zohar the Jews kept Shabbat after Marah because that's when they completed their milah with priya, even though they didn't complete their conversion at matan torah. Though, he thinks that the rishonim (Tosfot Yevamot 46b, Rashba Yevamot 71a, Ran a"z 26b) sound like this is incorrect and a convert with milah without tevilah is still a complete non-Jew. Rav Zevulun Charlop cites Pachad Yitzchak (Igrot 56) who distinguishes between Shabbat at marah and Shabbat today for someone who has milah.
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In April 1848, a non-Jew from Morocco came to Yerushalayim to convert. While recovering from the milah before the tevilah, on Shabbat Rav Asher Lemel was asked whether or not this perspective convert should keep Shabbat. Rav Lamel told him not to keep Shabbat. Afterwards the rabbis of Yerushalayim all disagreed with Rav Lamel on the grounds that the minhag previously was not to be concerned about this and let the perspective convert keep Shabbat. The Binyan Tzion 91 writes that according to his investigations the minhag in Germany was like it was in Yerushalayim. Also, he held that a non-Jew who did milah and not yet tevila should keep Shabbat. 1) Brit milah is a covenant and Shabbat is a covenant; once one forged one covenant with Hashem it isn't reasonable that one needs to break the other. 2) Tosfot Keritut 9a implies that brit milah causes a person to become separated from the other nations even before completing the conversion. He concludes that he is obligated to keep Shabbat.
- Lhorot Natan 1:38:15 writes that there is a great proof from Tosfot Yeshanim Yevamot 48b and Midrash Rabba (Devarim 1:27) that it is permitted for a convert who do milah to keep Shabbat even though he didn't finish converting.
↑ Chashukei Chemed Sanhedrin 58b writes about someone from Russian extraction and isn't sure if he is Jewish. Between when he became aware of this and his conversion, can he keep Shabbat? If he is non-Jewish he can't keep Shabbat, but if he's Jewish he should keep Shabbat? Solutions that Chashukei Chemed quotes include: wearing tzitzit in the public domain (Maharam Shik OC 145 quoting the Chatom Sofer), asking a non-Jew to work for him (Maharam Shik), or working on Saturday night (Panim Yafot Beresheet 8:22).
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The Rambam Melachim 10:10 writes that a non-Jew who wants to fulfill mitzvot and receive reward we shouldn't stop him. On the other hand, in 10:9 he writes that we shouldn't let him do a mitzvah that he isn't obligated in because he is creating a non-religion in doing so. He should either convert or only keep the 7 mitzvot of bnei noach. The Radvaz explains that the distinction is whether he intends to create a new religion. If he just does a mitzvah voluntarily not intending that it is an obligationi that is acceptable, while if he is does it with the intention of being a commandment he should be stopped. While it seems from the Rambam and Radvaz that the non-Jew is rewarded for doing a mitzvah voluntarily it isn’t absolutely clear. It is possible that the non-Jew is doing the mitzvah voluntarily to get rewarded but isn’t actually going to be rewarded. That is the position of Rav Moshe Feinstein in Igrot Moshe YD 2:7.
- However, in light of the Rambam responsa 148 (Blau, Pear Hadur 60) it seems clear that the Rambam holds that a non-Jew who does a mitzvah voluntarily is indeed rewarded. He seems to apply it to all the mitzvot. The Meiri Sanhedrin 59a s.v. ben also says this, but Igrot Moshe YD 2:7 writes that it is a scribal error. The other proofs against Igrot Moshe like Pirush Mishnayot of Rambam Trumot 3:9 are dealt with in that teshuva.
↑ Igrot Moshe YD 3:77:2. Minchat Yitzchak 6:108 writes that you shouldn't let Conservative rabbis use your mikveh for a conversion.
↑ Rama 268:12. The Gra cites the source for the Tevilah in Avot D'Rabbi Natan 8:8.
↑ Igrot Moshe EH 1:8 has a fascinating nuance in some rishonim that if the father wasn't Jewish and the mother was completely not religious the child is considered not Jewish. However, Rashbash cited by Bedek Habayit YD 268:12 disagrees that Jewishness is decided by the mother even if she is not religious and the father was non-Jewish.

A

[1] Part of the reason for our hesitancy to accept converts is rooted in a statement of the Gemara Kiddushin 70b: "converts are bad like sapachat (a form of Tzara'at) for the Jewish people". Gemara Yevamot 47b says that this is the reason why we discourage converts when they first appear before us, as we challenge their motivations for converting and attempt to dissuade them from doing so. Rashi Kiddushin 70b s.v. kashin explains that since they aren't meticulous in their observance of Mitzvot, naturally born Jews will inevitably be negatively influenced by them. Rashi Niddah 13b s.v. k'sapachat adds that because they aren't experts in Mitzvot, they'll bring about punishment (similar to when the King of Assyria exiled the people of Kutha to the Shomron, they converted to Judaism, and then Hashem punished them for their lack of observance by sending lions to ravage them. See Melachim II 17:25). (As an aside, Rashi Niddah also has an interesting opinion that the concept of "kol yisrael arevim zeh b'zeh" (Shevuot 39a), that all Jews are guarantors for one another, doesn't apply to converts. This is not the accepted practice, as we usually allow a convert to be yotzaih (fulfill his obligation) Kiddush by hearing it from a naturally born Jew, and vice versa as well. However, Beit Yitzchak 2:100:11 seems to adopt this Rashi, that Jews aren't punished for the sins of converts.). Tosfot Kiddushin 70b s.v. kashim quotes an interesting explanation of this Gemara from R' Avraham HaGer (a figure who lived in the days of the Baalai HaTosfot). He argues that converts are in fact more meticulous in their observance of mitzvot than naturally born Jews, and when Hashem sees their dedication, He recalls the shortcomings of the Jewish people and grows angry with them. He draws a parallel to a story in Navi (Melachim I:17) that the woman of Tzarfat accused Eliyahu as being the reason for her son's death, that his piety highlighted her lower spiritual state and incurred Hashem's wrath. Tosfot posits that another way of understanding why converts are bad for the Jewish people is because the Torah warns in twenty four places about oppressing them, and it is very difficult to be properly sensitive towards them and not violate this prohibition.

[2] Gm Yevamot 47a (and paskened in Shulchan Aruch Yoreh De'ah 268:2) states that when an individual comes to convert, we discourage him by mentioning the fact that the Jews are a downtrodden and oppressed nation. If the person acknowledges this and nonetheless expresses his desire to convert, then we accept him as a convert. There is also a discussion as to whether or not there's a Mitzvah to perform conversions. Gemara Yevamot 47b says that once a prospective convert dedicates himself to keep the Mitzvot, we do Milah right away, because "we don't delay a Mitzvah". The simple understanding of this Gemara is that there is a Mitzvah element to converting people. Furthermore, the fact that Gemara Shabbat 137b records that when performing a Milah on a convert, the text of the beracha includes "who has commanded us to give a Milah to converts", indicates that there is a Mitzvah to convert people. Tashbetz (Zohar HaRakia, assin 40) thinks that accepting converts is a Mitzvah, but is unsure under which Mitzvah it would be included. Interestingly, he also thinks that the fact that Beit Din converts a Katan al da'at Beit Din (Ketubot 11a), indicates that there's a Mitzvah to accept converts. Tosfot HaRosh (Shabbat 137b) suggests that accepting converts is included in the Mitzvah of loving the convert, as it's impossible to love him if he doesn't receive a Milah and is converted. Raavad in Sefer Baalai HaNefesh (end of Shaar HaTevilah) learns that the Mitzvah is derived from the fact that Avraham converted people (see Rashi Bereshit 12:5 s.v. asher asu). Another possibility is that it's included in the Mitzvah of loving Hashem, which according to Rambam (Sefer HaMitzvot Asseh 3) includes making Hashem beloved unto others and drawing them to His service.

[3] The Gemara Yevamot 46b establishes that conversion requires the supervision of a Bet Din of three judges based on the fact that the phrase "misphat" is used in the context of conversion. Tosfot s.v. mishpat offers two possibilities as to which passuk the Gemara is alluding to. Tosfot further explains that everyone agrees that three judges are required by conversion, even those who say that a Bet Din for hoda'ot v'hal'vaot, admissions and loans, only needs one judge, because we compare conversion to gzelot v'chavalot, theft and injury, regarding which everyone agrees that you need three judges. This is accepted by the Rambam (Isurei Biyah 13:6) and Shulchan Aruch YD 268:3. Shulchan Aruch YD 268:3 writes that after the fact, the Bet Din is only necessary for the acceptance of mitzvot, while the Rambam and Rif hold it is necessary for the milah and tevilah as well. Tosfot s.v. mishpat raises the issue that if conversion is compared to cases of theft and injury (see earlier in this footnote), then we should require the judges to have bona fide Semicha in an unbroken chain from Moshe Rabbeinu, something which we lack today. Tosfot answers that that even though we don’t have semicha, we can still perform Gerut nowadays, based on the principle of shelichutyahu (Gittin 88b), that the judges nowadays serve as the agents of the judges of old who possessed real Semicha. Tosfot Kiddushin 62b s.v. ger quotes another answer from Rabbeinu Netanel. He notes that Gemara Keritut 9a says that although a Ger must offer a Korban HaGer when converting, we can nevertheless accept converts nowadays that we don't have a Beit HaMikdash, as the Torah says that a Ger can live in "any of your generations", implying even after the destruction of the Beit HaMikdash. Similarly, reasons Rabbeinu Netanel, based on the passuk of "any of your generations", we should be able to accept converts nowadays, even though the chain of Semicha has been broken.

[4] What is the presence of Bet Din necessary for?
Tosfot Yevamot 45b s.v. mi holds it is necessary for kabbalat mitzvot and not other aspects of the conversion. Nevertheless, three judges are lechatchila (ideally) required even for the Milah and Tevilah. This is also the view of Tosfot Kiddushin 62b s.v. ger. Tosfot's proof is the fact that the Gemara Yevamot 45b tells a story in which people used to refer to a certain person as "the son of a non-Jew". Rav Assi commented: "she certainly was Tovel for Niddah!". Tosfot understands that the Gemara is saying that her Tevilah which she did because she was a Niddah, even though there were no judges present, bdiavad (after the fact) counts for Gerut.

Rambam Isurei Biya 13:9 hold that three judges are needed for all aspects of the conversion process, and if you don't have this, then the conversion is invalid. The challenge is how he deals with Tosfot's proof. One possibility is that they adopted Tosfot's second approach to the Gemara, that if everyone knows that a certain person did Tevilah, then it's as if they were present and witnessed it. Alternatively, the Gemara is saying that the fact that the woman is acting like she's Jewish by observing the laws of Niddah, is proof that she performed a valid conversion earlier.

Ramban, Rashba, and Nemukei Yosef (his understanding of the Rif) hold that in order to assume that the children of the convert are the children of a Jewish man, kabbalat mitzvot is the only thing necessary to have in the presence of Bet Din. However, a convert can only marry a Jewish woman if all parts of the conversion process were performed in the presence of a Bet Din.

Ritva 45b writes that Bet Din is necessary for everything, even after the fact. The Gemara (Tosfot's proof) means that even if you don’t intend for conversion, it is still valid.

Hagahot Mordechai Yevamot 4:111 says that if a convert converted without a Bet Din, some say that the conversion is invalid, while others say that it's acceptable. Darkei Moshe 268:3 understands that this corresponds to the opinions of Tosfot and Rambam. Mordechai Yevamot 4:36 quotes Rabbenu Simcha and Rabbi Yehuda Bar Yom Tov who hold that a conversion only needs one judge.

Shulchan Aruch YD 268:3 writes the opinion of Tosfot and Rosh as the anonymous opinion, and then notes the opinion of the Rif and Rambam by name. Yabia Omer YD 1:19 is strict, even though this is against the anonymous opinion cited by Shulchan Aruch. Achiezer 3:27 implies that even after the fact, not having Bet Din for milah or tevila is an issue, like the Rif and Rambam. Similarly, Perach Mateh Aharon 2:51 writes that we’re strict for Rif and Rambam.

[5] Tosfot Yevamot 45b s.v. mi holds it is necessary for kabbalat mitzvot and not other aspects of the conversion. Nevertheless, three judges are lechatchila (ideally) required even for the Milah and Tevilah. This is also the view of Tosfot Kiddushin 62b s.v. ger. Tosfot's proof is the fact that the Gemara Yevamot 45b tells a story in which people used to refer to a certain person as "the son of a non-Jew". Rav Assi commented: "she certainly was Tovel for Niddah!". Tosfot understands that the Gemara is saying that her Tevilah which she did because she was a Niddah, even though there were no judges present, bdiavad (after the fact) counts for Gerut.

[6] Rambam Isurei Biya 13:9 hold that three judges are needed for all aspects of the conversion process, and if you don't have this, then the conversion is invalid. The challenge is how he deals with Tosfot's proof. One possibility is that they adopted Tosfot's second approach to the Gemara, that if everyone knows that a certain person did Tevilah, then it's as if they were present and witnessed it. Alternatively, the Gemara is saying that the fact that the woman is acting like she's Jewish by observing the laws of Niddah, is proof that she performed a valid conversion earlier.

[7] Ramban, Rashba, and Nemukei Yosef (his understanding of the Rif) hold that in order to assume that the children of the convert are the children of a Jewish man, kabbalat mitzvot is the only thing necessary to have in the presence of Bet Din. However, a convert can only marry a Jewish woman if all parts of the conversion process were performed in the presence of a Bet Din.

[8] Ritva 45b writes that Bet Din is necessary for everything, even after the fact. The Gemara (Tosfot's proof) means that even if you don’t intend for conversion, it is still valid.

[9] Hagahot Mordechai Yevamot 4:111 says that if a convert converted without a Bet Din, some say that the conversion is invalid, while others say that it's acceptable. Darkei Moshe 268:3 understands that this corresponds to the opinions of Tosfot and Rambam. Mordechai Yevamot 4:36 quotes Rabbenu Simcha and Rabbi Yehuda Bar Yom Tov who hold that a conversion only needs one judge.

[10] Shulchan Aruch YD 268:3 writes the opinion of Tosfot and Rosh as the anonymous opinion, and then notes the opinion of the Rif and Rambam by name. Yabia Omer YD 1:19 is strict, even though this is against the anonymous opinion cited by Shulchan Aruch. Achiezer 3:27 implies that even after the fact, not having Bet Din for milah or tevila is an issue, like the Rif and Rambam. Similarly, Perach Mateh Aharon 2:51 writes that we’re strict for Rif and Rambam.

[5] Igrot Moshe YD 1:159 clarifies that the three people who serve as a bet din don't all need to be torah scholars.

[6] Rama YD 268:1 quotes a dispute between the Ramban and Raah whether bdiavad (after the fact) the order of milah and tevilah would invalidate the conversion. The Ramban posits that it wouldn't, while Raah believes that it would invalidate the conversion. The Shach 268:2 therefore says that they should do the tevilah again because of this dispute.

[7] Yevamot 46b

[8] Shulchan Aruch 268:3. The anonymous view in Shulchan Aruch is that only if the acceptance of mitzvot is done at night does it invalidate the conversion. He also cites by name the view of Rambam, that if any stage of the conversion is done at night, then it invalidates the conversion. Bach CM 5:6 writes that we should be strict about a din at night because of the Rashbam and Smag that a din at night is effective.

[9] Rambam Issurei Biah 13:6 and Shulchan Aruch 268:4. They give the reason that since conversion is compared to Din (as Yevamot 46b notes that the word "mishpat" is used in association with conversion), it cannot be performed on Shabbat nor on Yom Tov. (Mishnah Beitzah 36b notes that the Rabbis forbade having Din on Shabbat and Yom Tov, and the Gemara explains that we're concerned that a person will come to write things down). Taz 268:11 raises the issue that the Gemara Yevamot 46b gives a different reason for this Halacha, namely that we don't "fix a person on Shabbat". (This a Rabbinic form of "fixing a vessel", similar to the prohibition mentioned in Beitzah 36b that one cannot separate Terumot and Maasarot on Shabbat and Yom Tov, as one is fixing the remainder of the produce). He suggests that since the Gemara Beitzah 18a permits a person who is impure (tameh) to immerse on Shabbat and Yom Tov, because it appears like he's cooling off and isn't trying to fix his impure state, the same logic should allow a convert to immerse as well. Thus, the Rambam paskens like the sugya in Beitzah over Yevamot 46b. Kesef Mishneh on Rambam offers the same approach. Interestingly, Tosfot Yeshanim Yevamot 46b s.v. lefi'kach, suggests an answer to resolve the contradiction between Yevamot 46b and Beitzah 18a. He posits that the "fix" of a person going from impure to pure, is much less than the "fix" of a non-Jew becoming Jewish, and that's why the latter is forbidden.

[10] Radvaz 1:434 holds that a shehechiyanu is recited at the completion of conversion (and not at the milah) since he is now joyous that he is now able to fulfill mitzvot.

[11] Pesachim 7b. There is an interesting discussion regarding when the Beit Din recites the bracha of "al ha'tevilah" when they convert a baby (Ketubot 11a). According to the Gemara Pesachim's reasoning, they should do so beforehand, as the only reason why a convert typically says it afterwards, is because he cannot recite a bracha while he is still non-Jewish. This is the view of Raavad in Baalai HaNefesh (at the end of Shaar HaTevilah). Rav Schachter (Eretz HaTzvi p. 32) argues that the Bet Din should recite a bracha after the Tevilah in this case, as the bracha goes on the chalot (onset) of the conversion.

[12] Regarding whether or not the lack of Bet Din bdiavad (after the fact) invalidates the conversion: the anonymous opinion in Shulchan Aruch 268:3 is that it doesn't (in accordance with the view of Tosfot Kiddushin 62b s.v. ger and Tosfos Yevamot 45b s.v. mi), and the yesh omrim cites Rambam who thinks that it would invalidate the conversion.

[13] Rambam and Shulchan Aruch hold that the tevila of both men and women need to be in front of bet din. Minchat Yitzchak 4:34:3 writes that it is possible that after the fact it is an effective conversion, since according to Tosfot a bet din isn't necessary for tevila. Furthermore, according to others it might be effective since the Bet Din knows that she went into the mikveh. Yabia Omer YD 1:19 says that they need to do the gerut again because it might not have been a valid gerut at all. He would allow her to wear a loosely fitted robe or a sheet above the water to make it more modest.
Igrot Moshe YD 2:127 agrees that it is an unresolved machloket and needs to be redone. However, in Igrot Moshe 3:112 (11 years after previous one) he says that even if only one of the judges saw the woman go into the mikvah, and others were there and heard it, it is valid. There he explains that even according to the Rambam and Rif it is valid since the judges know she went to the mikveh properly even though they didn't see it. It seems to be a contradiction to his earlier teshuva. Teshuvot Vehanhagot 1:621 also says that it needs to be redone if the tevila was done without the bet din watching in the room.

[20] Igrot Moshe YD 2:127 agrees that it is an unresolved machloket and needs to be redone. However, in Igrot Moshe 3:112 (11 years after previous one) he says that even if only one of the judges saw the woman go into the mikvah, and others were there and heard it, it is valid. There he explains that even according to the Rambam and Rif it is valid since the judges know she went to the mikveh properly even though they didn't see it. It seems to be a contradiction to his earlier teshuva. Teshuvot Vehanhagot 1:621 also says that it needs to be redone if the tevila was done without the bet din watching in the room.

[14] Dagul Mirvava 268:6 notes that the presence of bet din is necessary for the tevila of the baby (since the baby doesn't have kabbalat mitzvot). If the bet din wasn't aware of the fetus it is like the bet din isn't present. Aruch Hashulchan 268:11 is lenient since we hold like the opinion that the fetus is part of the mother and the conversion of the mother works for the baby. Igrot Moshe YD 1:158 says that it is proper to be strict for the dagul mirvava.

[15] Rav Dovid Karliner (Piskei Halachot p. 7 fnt. 5) writes that if a pregnant woman converted with her fetus and the fetus is a boy, it can have the milah on Shabbat. He argues with the Ramban that the milah is part of the gerut. Rav Chaim Ozer in Achiezer 4:44 agreed.

[16] Rambam Isurei Biyah 14:2, Maggid Mishna 14:1, Orchot Chaim (Hilchot Isurei Biya 9), Shulchan Aruch Y.D. 268:2, Levush 268:2. Lhorot Natan 14:59 holds that if they converted with a warped idea of emunah, such as believing that the Christian New Testament is true, the conversion is invalid. Piskei Din Yerushalayim (Dinei Mamonot v. 14 p. 422 n. 4) agrees that if someone believes both in Christianity and Judaism, then his conversion is invalid. Gerut Kehilchata 2:15 writes that he needs to accept mitzvot with the understanding that we keep mitzvot because they were commanded by Hashem through Moshe.

[17] Tosfot Yevamot 45b s.v. mi clarifies that accepting mitzvot is a critical part of conversion and is invalid without it. Shulchan Aruch Y.D. 268:3 codifies Tosfot. Chemdat Shlomo 1:29, Bet Meir, Achiezer, and Igrot Moshe all hold that acceptance of mitzvot is critical and without it the conversion isn’t valid. There is a minority view held by Rav Ben Zion Uziel (Shut Piskei Uziel Siman 65), that the acceptance of mitzvot is not something that would bdiavad (after the fact) invalidate the conversion. This view is not accepted by the Poskim.

[18] Tosfot Yevamot 45b s.v. mi, Ramban Yevamot 45b, Shulchan Aruch Y.D. 268:3

[19] Achiezer 3:26:4 explains that accepting mitzvot means that a person accepts that they’re all true and binding. If he says that he doesn’t want to accept one mitzvah, it isn’t an acceptance of mitzvot. However, if he says that he accepts all mitzvot, yet knows that because of a certain desire, he won't be able to keep one mitzvah, it is nonetheless a valid conversion. Minchat Asher (Shabbat 34:1) writes that if he doesn't intend to violate a mitzvah because of a desire, but rather just knows that likely because of the difficulty of mitzvot that he will be overcome with desire and not fulfill a mitzvah, that is certainly considered a valid conversion.

[20] Dvar Avraham argues that it shouldn’t be a valid conversion, but isn’t completely convinced that after the fact it is invalid. Lhorot Natan is convinced that the Achiezer is incorrect. Accepting mitzvot means accepting actually practicing all the mitzvot.

[21] Bet Yitzchak YD 2:100:9, Achiezer 3:26, Igrot Moshe YD 1:157 and 3:108, Minchat Yitzchak 6:107. Bet Yitzchak explains that the concept that intentions can't invalidate a statement (dvarim shebelev einam dvarim), is limited to interpersonal matters between two different people. However, conversion is between a person and Hashem, and one's intentions certainly do count. Therefore, if the convert says that he plans to keep Torah but his intentions are otherwise, then the conversion is invalid. Another salient point is the fact that Tosfot Kiddushin 49b s.v. devarim says that if something is so clear, even though it's not explictily stated, then in such a situation we'd consider it meaningful and significant (devarim shebelev havaih devarim). So too over here, if it's clear as day that someone doesn't intend to dedicate himself to Mitzvot, then we'd take that into account and invalidate the conversion.
In a specific case of a woman who said that she accepted the mitzvot but had in mind to violate some halachot, Igrot Moshe 3:108 writes that it is a valid conversion. His reasons are (1) since her children are practicing Judaism, she isn't trusted about them to say that they're not Jewish. (2) dvar shebelev einam dvarim, unless there is a clear circumstance that everyone knew that contradicts her words. (3) If she accepts the mitzvot, but because of financial pressures she won't be able to practically keep all the mitzvot, then that is considered an acceptance of mitzvot. R' Moshe isn't certain about this last reason. However, regarding (1) Achiezer 3:26:2 argues that for the actual acceptance of mitzvot, dvarim shebelev ainam devarim isn't relevant, since it is a matter between him and Heaven, regarding which intentions are critical.

[29] In a specific case of a woman who said that she accepted the mitzvot but had in mind to violate some halachot, Igrot Moshe 3:108 writes that it is a valid conversion. His reasons are (1) since her children are practicing Judaism, she isn't trusted about them to say that they're not Jewish. (2) dvar shebelev einam dvarim, unless there is a clear circumstance that everyone knew that contradicts her words. (3) If she accepts the mitzvot, but because of financial pressures she won't be able to practically keep all the mitzvot, then that is considered an acceptance of mitzvot. R' Moshe isn't certain about this last reason. However, regarding (1) Achiezer 3:26:2 argues that for the actual acceptance of mitzvot, dvarim shebelev ainam devarim isn't relevant, since it is a matter between him and Heaven, regarding which intentions are critical.

[22] Igrot Moshe YD 3:106 writes that although the convert said that he accepts mitzvot, if the circumstances make it clear that this statement is dubious, the validity of the conversion is questionable. Kger Kezrach ch. 32 discusses this opinion and supports it.

[23] Bechorot 30b. The Gemara says that even if he only rejects a Rabbinic law, we don't accept him as a convert. See below if the rejection of a Rabbinic law would invalidate a conversion after the fact.

[24] Igrot Moshe YD 3:106
Gemara Shabbat 31a describes a case in which Hillel converted someone, even though that individual didn't accept the legitimacy of the Oral Torah. Rashi 31a s.v. gayrey says that Hillel converted him because this fellow didn't deny the Oral Torah, but simply had a hard time believing that it was from Hashem. Hillel was confident that after he taught him, that he'd trust him that it came from Hashem. Igrot Moshe 3:106 learns from Rashi that not accepting one mitzvah doesn't invalidate the conversion, but you shouldn't perform such a conversion unless you know that he will end accepting all of the mitzvot. Minchat Asher Shabbat 34:1 understands this Rashi differently. The convert under question did accept the fact that the Oral Torah is binding, but wasn't necessarily convinced that it's Divine. Hillel was confident that he could correct this error later, and that's why he accepted him.

[33] Gemara Shabbat 31a describes a case in which Hillel converted someone, even though that individual didn't accept the legitimacy of the Oral Torah. Rashi 31a s.v. gayrey says that Hillel converted him because this fellow didn't deny the Oral Torah, but simply had a hard time believing that it was from Hashem. Hillel was confident that after he taught him, that he'd trust him that it came from Hashem. Igrot Moshe 3:106 learns from Rashi that not accepting one mitzvah doesn't invalidate the conversion, but you shouldn't perform such a conversion unless you know that he will end accepting all of the mitzvot. Minchat Asher Shabbat 34:1 understands this Rashi differently. The convert under question did accept the fact that the Oral Torah is binding, but wasn't necessarily convinced that it's Divine. Hillel was confident that he could correct this error later, and that's why he accepted him.

[25] Bet Yitzchak, Biur Halacha 304. Achiezer 3:26 is uncertain. It seems that Rav Moshe retracted his position, because both in Igrot Moshe YD 3:107 and 3:108, which are written after 3:106, he says that it isn’t a valid conversion. Igrot Moshe 3:106 holds that chutz mdvar echad is only lechatchila, but in 3:107 and 3:108 he says that isn't the case, and that it even invalidates the conversion after the fact.

[26] Igrot Moshe 3:106 suggests that perhaps it is an acceptance of mitzvot if she plans on doing mitzvot like other "religious" Jews, even though they violate certain halachot such as tzeniyut. R' Moshe compares this to someone who converts and lives amongst gentiles, which the Gemara (Shabbat 68a) considers to be a legitimate convert. Such a person is committed to mitzvot, even though he hasn't been properly educated in how to keep them. Similarly, this woman is committed to mitzvot, even though she hasn't been properly educated and is erroneously following a certain community's mistaken practices. Nonetheless, R' Moshe isn't ready to be lenient based on that logic.

[27] Bet Meir, Biur Halacha. Achiezer 3:26 isn’t certain if it's a valid conversion on a Biblical level, or if it isn't a valid conversion at all.

[28] Yevamot 24b, Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Deah 268:12. Igrot Moshe, Achiezer, Dvar Avraham. Interestingly, there's an opinion in the Tannaim (cited on Yevamot 24b) who holds that it isn't a valid conversion after the fact, but this isn't how we pasken. Either way, we ideally try to avoid accepting converts who are only doing so for the sake of marriage (see Shulchan Aruch ibid).

[29] Igrot Moshe 3:108

[30] The Achronim discuss if Bet Din violates Lifnai Ivair (placing a stumbling block before a blind person) if they convert someone who doesn't intend to keep the Mitzvot, as they are causing him to inevitably commit sins. R' Yitzchak Shmelkes in Bet Yitzchak YD 2:100:11 offers a few arguments for why there would no issue of Lifnai Ivair. First, if he intends to keep the Mitzvot, then we can assume that he will follow through on his commitment. If he doesn't intend to keep the Mitzvot, then he's not Jewish, and he doesn't have to observe the Mitzvot. Second, it's better for him to be Jewish rather than non-Jewish, even if he will violate prohibitions, as all of Yisrael has a portion in Olam Habah (Sanhedrin 90a). However, he adds that converting people who don't intend to keep the mitzvot is a stumbling block to others who will think that they're Jewish, when they're actually non-Jewish. He therefore concludes that it isn't proper to accept convert who doesn't intend to keep mitzvot. Minchat Shlomo 1:35:3 disagrees with R' Yitzchak Shmelkes and thinks that it's lifnei iver to cause someone who doesn't intend to keep halacha to become Jewish and then subsequently be punished for his sins. Igrot Moshe YD 1:157 writes that there is no reason to accept a convert who isn't going to practice mitzvot.

[31] Achiezer 3:27

[32] Tosfot Yevamot 46b s.v. drabbi yosi quotes a dispute between the Bahag and Rabbenu Chananel whether a convert who already has a milah needs hatafat dam brit. Bahag holds that he does, while Rabbeinu Chananel thinks that he does not. The Tur 268:1 cites the Itur who says that a non-Jew born without a foreskin doesn't need a hatafat dam brit, while a convert who already had a medical circumcision needs a hatafat dam brit. Bet Yosef cites the Rif Shabbat 55b, Rosh Shabbat 19:5, and Rambam Shabbat 1:7 as holding like the Bahag. Shulchan Aruch Y.D. 268:1 paskens that hatafat dam brit should be performed, but no bracha should be recited. Shach 268:1 explains that there is no bracha because it is a dispute in the rishonim (based on the general rule of safek berachot l'hakel, that whenever a doubt arises regarding brachot, the bracha is omitted).

[33] Tosfot Yevamot 46b s.v. drabbi yosi writes that if a male's reproductive organ was cut off, then he can still convert, as he becomes Jewish with tevilah alone, like women. Shulchan Aruch Y.D. 268:1 codifies this position. Although someone who can't have a milah for medical reasons seems to be similar to that case, the Achiezer 4:45 and 4:46 rejects that comparison and holds that he can't convert. This is also the opinion of Zecher Yitzchak 3, Derech Pikudecha (Mitzchak Aseh 2, Dibbur 30), Rav Kook (Daat Kohen 150), and Rav Tzvi Pesach Frank YD 220. Rav Kook distinguishes between from the case of Tosfot since the medical situation could be temporary, it could be possible if they want to put themselves in danger, or that we don’t have shiluchutayhu for an uncommon situation.

[34] Achiezer 3:27

[35] R' Shternbuch in Teshuvot Vehanhagot 1:590 and 2:510 permits local anthesia. However, he forbids using general anesthesia, because it's as if one is doing the mitzvah thoughtlessly (mitasek). He argues that the milah is part of the process of gerut, and must therefore be done with intent to accept the Torah. When a person is under general anesthesia, he is unable to accept the mitzvot with the proper intent. Yabia Omer YD 5:22 disagrees and allows local as well as general anesthesia for an adult milah. Imrei Yosher 2:140 forbids even local anesthesia, because milah should involve pain. Also, the minhag was to never use anesthesia, even though it was readily available. Yabia Omer YD 5:22 proves from the Gemara that one is able to fulfill mitzvot via a shliach (an agent) even when he's asleep. Gemara Gittin 70b indicates that if a person appoints a shliach to divorce his wife, the shliach can go ahead and do so, even though the person who sent him is now asleep. This Gemara is codified by Bet Shmuel Even HaEzer 121:2. Seridei Esh 3:96 only permitted local anesthesia. Chelkat Yoav (Ohel Moed 1:7 cited by Yabia Omer) was lenient and even permitted general anesthesia. He bases himself on the view of Maharach Or Zaruah 11, who holds that the Mitzvah of Milah is fulfilled when a person is in a state of being circumcised (chalot milah), as opposed to the act of circumcision (maaseh milah). Chelkat Yaakov therefore argues that there's no need for someone to be conscious while the milah takes place, as the mitzvah is fulfilled afterwards when he wakes up and is circumcised. Chelkat Yaakov doesn't think that pain is a necessary component of Milah, disagreeing with the Koret Habrit (261:4), who believes that pain is an essential ingredient of Milah. With regards to the above Maharch Ohr Zarua, he argues his point based on a story cited in the Gemara Menachot 43b. When King David entered the bathhouse, he was upset that he didn't have any Mitzvot with him, until he remembered that he still had his Milah with him. Maharach Ohr Zarua argues that if the mitzvah of milah is limited to the act of circumcision, then David didn't have any mitzvot with him. Rather, it must be that the mitzvah of milah is fulfilled when a person is in a state of being circumcised, and this is why David was happy.

[36] Igrot Moshe YD 2:126 writes that you can't trust the adoption agency that the baby is Jewish. If you did, then it would be a problem of asufi. (An asufi a child who is found in the street, and we don't know the identity of its parents. We assume that it's a safek mamzer. See Mishna Kiddushin 69a and 74a). R' Moshe writes that we assume that he's non-Jewish and can convert.

[37] Yevamot 24b. The Ritva writes that the reason it's acceptable after the fact, is because we assume that they authentically committed themselves to mitzvot, even though their marriage is what pressured them into doing so. Hagahot Mordechai (Yevamot 4:101 s.v. katuv) seems to write that it's only valid if afterwards we see that they keep halacha properly.

[38] Igrot Moshe YD 1:159 notes that since many people who convert for marriage don't really accept the mitzvot, one should be very wary of accepting such a convert. He says that the majority of people who converted for marriage in America during the 1950s are not valid converts, because they didn't actually accept the mitzvot. Bet Yitzchak YD 2:100:9 echoes this sentiment with regards to Ashkenazic countries in the 1800s.

[39] Achiezer 3:27. Shach 268-23 paskens like Tosfot 24b s.v. lo, who understands that the reason Hillel converted someone who wanted to become the Kohen Gadol (Shabbat 31a), even though we don't accept people who convert for ulterior motives, is because Hillel was confident that he would eventually be committed for the right reasons. Shach notes that this is the source that we follow Bet Din's evaluation, and that if they think the situation will turn out well, then we go by that. Achiezer 3:26:2 suggests that if it's evident to the bet din that his intent isn't pure, then they can't lechatchila accept him as a convert . However, if his intentions aren't clear, even after their investigation, then they can accept him as a convert.

[40] Achiezer 3:26:7

[41] Achiezer 3:26:7 based on Rav Shlomo Kluger. See Minchat Yitzchak 6:107 s.v. vheneh who writes that if a Jew married a non-Jew, it is better to leave her as a non-Jew than have her convert and not keep the laws of niddah, which is worse.

[42] Rav Shlomo Amar in Shma Shlomo 5:9-12 following the Dagul Mirvava

[43] Dagul Mirvava 13:5

[44] Igrot Moshe EH 2:5

[45] Shemesh Umagen 2:41:5 writes that a blood test that checks if she's pregnant is not sufficient evidence to exempt from havchana, because it isn't always accurate. Rav Schachter quotes his father that a pregnancy test is reliable, and there's no need to wait three months.

[46] Shulchan Aruch E.H. 13:5

[47] Rav Elyashiv (Kovetz Teshuvot 3:150) writes that a non-Jewish woman married to a Jew who converted does not need havchana if it is clear that she’s not pregnant such as if she’s too old to have children. He writes that this is included in the leniency of the Dagul Mirvava since regarding two Jews this case is impossible. The only case that is comparable to two Jews who were married and got divorced is two non-Jews who were married and now she converted and married another Jew. In that case, there is no leniency even if it is known that she’s pregnant or not pregnant. Yabia Omer EH 9:12:1-2 quotes Isa Bracha who was lenient about a even case of a woman who was married to a Jew and wants to convert since it is similar to a woman who became pregnant out of wedlock (Shulchan Aruch E.H. 13:6). However, he quotes that Rav Uziel and Melamed Lhoil who rejected that concept since she wants to be married to him and become pregnant from him. Nonetheless, he's lenient with a pregnancy test and doesn't explain further.

[48] Shulchan Aruch E.H. 13:5

[49] Chelkat Mechokek 13:4 isn’t sure about this. Dagul Mirvava isn’t lenient against Chelkat Mechokek. Igrot Moshe YD 3:110 and EH 2:5 follows Dagul Mirvava, but isn’t more lenient than that.

[50] Shulchan Aruch E.H. 13:5, Bet Shmuel 13:7, Yabia Omer EH 9:17:1-2

[51] Radvaz cited by Pitchei Teshuva 13:5

[52] Dibrot Eliyahu 7:119 only relies on a pregnancy test for a single woman who converts, which according to Shulchan Aruch doesn't need havchana. He doesn't rely on it for a married woman who converts since according to Shulchan Aruch she needs havchana.

[53] Igrot Moshe 2:128 writes that the mohel isn't trusted to say it was for gerut. He needs another witness so that there's at least two witnesses. Anyway, there should be three for a bet din. He doesn't rely on a safek safeka of the Rach and maybe the mohel did it for conversion.

[54] Shulchan Aruch 268:3. Igrot Moshe YD 2:126 implies that the three people constituting the bet din need to be aware that they're watching a process of conversion and not thinking it is just a regular milah. However, they don't need to formally think that they're doing the conversion as the bet din.

[55] In terms of intent, Melamed Lhoil 2:82 writes that intent for a gerut of mitzvah is the same intent for milah of gerut and nothing else is necessary. Igrot Moshe YD 1:158 s.v. vheneh and Har Tzvi YD 2:219 agree. However, Gerut Khilchata 3:4 p. 25 quotes that Rav Elyashiv disagreed.
In terms of having the presence of a Bet Din, Igrot Moshe YD 1:158 writes that there is room to be lenient for several reasons: (a) According to the Bach 268:7 a bet din isn’t necessary for milah. (b) According to the Bet Yosef a bet din is necessary for milah but perhaps that’s only if the milah is done second. (c) Even if a milah was done without a bet din according to Tosfot that is acceptable since the kabbalat mitzvot was in bet din. (d) If a convert had a milah without a bet din they don’t need to do hatafat dam brit according to the Rabbenu Chananel.

* Igrot Moshe 2:126 is lenient not to require hatafat dam brit because likely the mohel knew that the baby was non-Jewish and there were another two religious people in attendance.

Igrot Moshe YD 3:105 writes that in an extenuating circumstance it is permissible to rely on the opinion that hatafat dam brit isn't necessary if there was a milah done for a mitzvah and it could be assumed that there were 3 religious men at the brit or at least publicized to 3 religious men that there was going to be a brit.

[65] In terms of having the presence of a Bet Din, Igrot Moshe YD 1:158 writes that there is room to be lenient for several reasons: (a) According to the Bach 268:7 a bet din isn’t necessary for milah. (b) According to the Bet Yosef a bet din is necessary for milah but perhaps that’s only if the milah is done second. (c) Even if a milah was done without a bet din according to Tosfot that is acceptable since the kabbalat mitzvot was in bet din. (d) If a convert had a milah without a bet din they don’t need to do hatafat dam brit according to the Rabbenu Chananel.

[66] * Igrot Moshe 2:126 is lenient not to require hatafat dam brit because likely the mohel knew that the baby was non-Jewish and there were another two religious people in attendance.

[67] Igrot Moshe YD 3:105 writes that in an extenuating circumstance it is permissible to rely on the opinion that hatafat dam brit isn't necessary if there was a milah done for a mitzvah and it could be assumed that there were 3 religious men at the brit or at least publicized to 3 religious men that there was going to be a brit.

[56] Nemukei Yosef (Yevamot 16a s.v. tanu), Bet Yosef YD 268:2, Shach 268:3, Chemdat Shlomo 1:29, Igrot Moshe YD 1:159

[57] Rav Elyashiv (Kovetz Teshuvot 4:136) writes that the principle that a mamzer that got mixed into a family does not need to be revealed and is permitted when it is in later generations unknown (Kiddushin 71a) does not apply to non-Jews. Rav Chaim Kanievsky (Ktzaruf Kesef p. 11 cited by R’ Yitzchaki cited below) agreed. See Rav Yoel Amital’s article in Hamaayan where he argues that the Dvar Yehoshua and Chazon Ish EH 1:18 think that it is applicable to non-Jews. Also see Rav Dovid Yitzchaki who argues that the Chazon Ish does not mean that.

[58] Shulchan Aruch Y.D. 268:1, Shach 268:2

[59] Achiezer 3:27 unlike Yam Shel Shlomo

[60] Teshuvot Vehanhagot 2:510

[61] Achiezer 3:27 writes that the hatafat dam brit is sufficient with a prick to make it only bleed a drop.

[62] 
Bet Yitzchak EH 1:29:8 suggests that for a child conversion with non-religious parents, the mother non-Jewish and father Jewish, it is possibly a benefit to the child since will merit a portion in olam haba, even if he will sin. Nonetheless, he says that since it isn't a clear benefit he would be able to protest later even according to the Chatom Sofer. Bet Yitzchak YD 2:100:11 reiterates this point.

Igrot Moshe YD 1:158 implies that it isn't clear if it is a benefit to the child if he is going to be raised by non-religious parents, since he can have olam haba. Therefore, he thinks it would be proper for him to do another tevilah when he becomes bar or bat mitzvah and accept mitzvot. He raises this possibility again in Igrot Moshe EH 4:26:3. There he writes that if the children are going to a Jewish day school and the parents are intermarried they should convert the children and it will be a benefit to them since they go to a Jewish day school, even though it isn't a clear benefit.

Minchat Yitzchak 3:99 writes that the conversion of a child for a non-religious couple would be invalid since it isn't a favor for the child since he could be non-Jewish and not be culpable for any Torah prohibitions, but now that he is Jewish he is obligated to follow the Torah and will be punished for not doing so. Since he isn't going to be brought up in a religious environment he is likely not going to be religious when he grows up. Even if it turns out that he is religious later it is still invalid since at the time of the conversion it didn't seem like a benefit to the child. Secondly, we couldn't assume he's Jewish until he is bar or bat mitzvah and accepted mitzvot because until then it won't be clear that he'll accept Judaism. Thirdly, in order to be Jewish later he must accept mitzvot when he becomes bar or bat mitzvah (Tosfot Sanhedrin 68b). Minchat Yitzchak 6:105 reiterates this position. He notes the opinion of the Bach 268 and Ritva Ketubot 11a in understanding Rashi that the conversion is only for rabbinic purposes and wonders how he could marry a Jewish woman on that basis. Tosfot Ketubot 11a also assumes that the conversion is only rabbinic but nonetheless concludes that he is treated like a Jew in all respects even for biblical laws. The Rashba and Ritva Ketubot 11a though hold that the conversion is completely and unquestionably biblically valid.

Seridei Esh 1:46 says it is ineffective even after the fact, but in 2:63 (written earlier) he says that initially you shouldn't convert a child for non-religious parents. Rav Elyashiv (Kovetz Teshuvot 1:29) argues with Rav Moshe that it is not a zechut since even if he isn't aware of the sins he still needs atonement for them. Seemingly it would be ineffective even after the fact. Similarly, Rav Kook (Daat Kohen YD 147) writes 3 reasons why they can't accept a child convert for a non-religious couple: a) Every convert needs kabbalat mitzvot and the parents can express that their intention to accept mitzvot and raise him in that spirit. b) If the child himself want the conversion he needs to have his parents request the conversion (based on Ravyah) but if the parents don't plan to raise him to mitzvot it is like they're not asking for conversion. c) There is no mechanism of sheliychutahu for the bet din to perform the conversion since it isn't such an important spiritual loss for them to covert in such a case. Seemingly it should be ineffective even after the fact.

However, Rav Herzog (Heichal Yitzchak EH 1:21) writes that the bet din shouldn't initially accept such a convert if the parents aren't religious. Also, Piskei Din of Batei Din HaRabbanim v. 1 pp. 375-379 records the ruling of Rav Elyashiv, Rav Jolty, and Rav Yakov Ades that they shouldn't do such a conversion but after the fact the conversion is subject to doubt whether it is valid.

Klalei Hagiyur of Rav Yitzchak Yosef pp. 53-64 collects many who hold that the conversion is only valid if the parents are religious and supports this from Rav Kook in Daat Kohen YD 147, Zecher Yitzchak 2, Rav Elyashiv (Kovetz Teshuvot 1:103), Shevet Halevi 6:202, Chelkat Yakov 1:128:4, Rav Yitzchak Elchanan quoted by Mateh Levi 2:55, and Seridei Esh 2:61:3. He also says that he heard it from his father Rav Ovadia Yosef. However, he notes that this is in opposition to the Bet Yitzchak and Rav Moshe Feinstein (Igrot Moshe 1:158, EH 4:26:3) and Dibrot Moshe (Shabbat 64:11) where he is inclined to this possibility but not certain.

[75] Bet Yitzchak EH 1:29:8 suggests that for a child conversion with non-religious parents, the mother non-Jewish and father Jewish, it is possibly a benefit to the child since will merit a portion in olam haba, even if he will sin. Nonetheless, he says that since it isn't a clear benefit he would be able to protest later even according to the Chatom Sofer. Bet Yitzchak YD 2:100:11 reiterates this point.

[76] Igrot Moshe YD 1:158 implies that it isn't clear if it is a benefit to the child if he is going to be raised by non-religious parents, since he can have olam haba. Therefore, he thinks it would be proper for him to do another tevilah when he becomes bar or bat mitzvah and accept mitzvot. He raises this possibility again in Igrot Moshe EH 4:26:3. There he writes that if the children are going to a Jewish day school and the parents are intermarried they should convert the children and it will be a benefit to them since they go to a Jewish day school, even though it isn't a clear benefit.

[77] Minchat Yitzchak 3:99 writes that the conversion of a child for a non-religious couple would be invalid since it isn't a favor for the child since he could be non-Jewish and not be culpable for any Torah prohibitions, but now that he is Jewish he is obligated to follow the Torah and will be punished for not doing so. Since he isn't going to be brought up in a religious environment he is likely not going to be religious when he grows up. Even if it turns out that he is religious later it is still invalid since at the time of the conversion it didn't seem like a benefit to the child. Secondly, we couldn't assume he's Jewish until he is bar or bat mitzvah and accepted mitzvot because until then it won't be clear that he'll accept Judaism. Thirdly, in order to be Jewish later he must accept mitzvot when he becomes bar or bat mitzvah (Tosfot Sanhedrin 68b). Minchat Yitzchak 6:105 reiterates this position. He notes the opinion of the Bach 268 and Ritva Ketubot 11a in understanding Rashi that the conversion is only for rabbinic purposes and wonders how he could marry a Jewish woman on that basis. Tosfot Ketubot 11a also assumes that the conversion is only rabbinic but nonetheless concludes that he is treated like a Jew in all respects even for biblical laws. The Rashba and Ritva Ketubot 11a though hold that the conversion is completely and unquestionably biblically valid.

[78] Seridei Esh 1:46 says it is ineffective even after the fact, but in 2:63 (written earlier) he says that initially you shouldn't convert a child for non-religious parents. Rav Elyashiv (Kovetz Teshuvot 1:29) argues with Rav Moshe that it is not a zechut since even if he isn't aware of the sins he still needs atonement for them. Seemingly it would be ineffective even after the fact. Similarly, Rav Kook (Daat Kohen YD 147) writes 3 reasons why they can't accept a child convert for a non-religious couple: a) Every convert needs kabbalat mitzvot and the parents can express that their intention to accept mitzvot and raise him in that spirit. b) If the child himself want the conversion he needs to have his parents request the conversion (based on Ravyah) but if the parents don't plan to raise him to mitzvot it is like they're not asking for conversion. c) There is no mechanism of sheliychutahu for the bet din to perform the conversion since it isn't such an important spiritual loss for them to covert in such a case. Seemingly it should be ineffective even after the fact.

[79] However, Rav Herzog (Heichal Yitzchak EH 1:21) writes that the bet din shouldn't initially accept such a convert if the parents aren't religious. Also, Piskei Din of Batei Din HaRabbanim v. 1 pp. 375-379 records the ruling of Rav Elyashiv, Rav Jolty, and Rav Yakov Ades that they shouldn't do such a conversion but after the fact the conversion is subject to doubt whether it is valid.

[80] Klalei Hagiyur of Rav Yitzchak Yosef pp. 53-64 collects many who hold that the conversion is only valid if the parents are religious and supports this from Rav Kook in Daat Kohen YD 147, Zecher Yitzchak 2, Rav Elyashiv (Kovetz Teshuvot 1:103), Shevet Halevi 6:202, Chelkat Yakov 1:128:4, Rav Yitzchak Elchanan quoted by Mateh Levi 2:55, and Seridei Esh 2:61:3. He also says that he heard it from his father Rav Ovadia Yosef. However, he notes that this is in opposition to the Bet Yitzchak and Rav Moshe Feinstein (Igrot Moshe 1:158, EH 4:26:3) and Dibrot Moshe (Shabbat 64:11) where he is inclined to this possibility but not certain.

[63] Yalkut Yosef concludes not to convert a child with non-religious parents. He adds that this was also the position of Rav Herzog (Heichal Yitzchak EH 1:21), Rav Shaul Yisraeli (Mishpatei Shaul 38), and Rav Massas (Shemesh Umagen 3:62).

[64] Yalkut Yosef cites Piskei Din Harabbanim v. 1 pp. 375-379 by Rav Yakov Ades, Rav Elyashiv, and Rav Jolty that after the fact it isn't clear that it is ineffective.

[65] Igrot Moshe YD 1:162 writes that the child can protest even according to the Chatom Sofer since it could be that he would have preferred non-Jewish adopted parents. Yalkut Yosef (Klalei Hagiyur p. 53) agrees that we would accept an adopted child for conversion if the parents are religious. Minchat Yitzchak 3:99 doesn't recommend it and only would allow it after the fact if they already did the adoption. Igrot Moshe concludes that he doesn't recommend adopting non-Jewish children and converting them since there is no mitzvah to do so.
Issues with adoption: the parents need to be religious for the conversion to be valid, they need to tell the child before he becomes a bar or bat mitzvah and have him accept mitzvot. If he doesn't know his practicing Judaism isn't an implicit acceptance. Also, the entire concept of accepting a child convert when he is too young to choose to covert is a major question. The Ravyah cited by Mordechai (Yevamot 4:40) writes that would can't convert a child unless he explicit requests it. (This is also the opinion of the Raah cited by Shitah Mikubeset Ketubot 11a.) Minchat Yitzchak isn't certain if the Ravyah would allow the conversion after the fact if it wasn't against the child's will but the child didn't say anything, as is the case with a baby. He also notes that the Bach and Darkei Moshe understand that the Ran disagrees with this Ravyah. Additionally, the Rambam disagrees with the Ravyah. Nonetheless, the Shach cites the Ravyah and together with Shulchan Aruch would hold that it is only possible to convert a child if the parents agreed or the child requests it. Therefore, Minchat Yitzchak says that even for a religious couple it isn't advised to adopt and convert, though after the fact he thinks it is possible to rely on the Ran and Rambam and perhaps his understanding of the Ravyah. Similarly, Shevet Halevi 6:202 rules that even according to the Ravyah it is permitted in cases of adoption because it isn't against the will of the child.

[84] Issues with adoption: the parents need to be religious for the conversion to be valid, they need to tell the child before he becomes a bar or bat mitzvah and have him accept mitzvot. If he doesn't know his practicing Judaism isn't an implicit acceptance. Also, the entire concept of accepting a child convert when he is too young to choose to covert is a major question. The Ravyah cited by Mordechai (Yevamot 4:40) writes that would can't convert a child unless he explicit requests it. (This is also the opinion of the Raah cited by Shitah Mikubeset Ketubot 11a.) Minchat Yitzchak isn't certain if the Ravyah would allow the conversion after the fact if it wasn't against the child's will but the child didn't say anything, as is the case with a baby. He also notes that the Bach and Darkei Moshe understand that the Ran disagrees with this Ravyah. Additionally, the Rambam disagrees with the Ravyah. Nonetheless, the Shach cites the Ravyah and together with Shulchan Aruch would hold that it is only possible to convert a child if the parents agreed or the child requests it. Therefore, Minchat Yitzchak says that even for a religious couple it isn't advised to adopt and convert, though after the fact he thinks it is possible to rely on the Ran and Rambam and perhaps his understanding of the Ravyah. Similarly, Shevet Halevi 6:202 rules that even according to the Ravyah it is permitted in cases of adoption because it isn't against the will of the child.

[66] Meged Yehuda YD 28 writes that he needs to know he's Jewish otherwise he could protest later in life, but he doesn't not need to know that he can protest. Rav Soloveitchik in Mpeninei Harav p. 243 wasn't sure about this.

[67] Igrot Moshe YD 1:162 s.v. ub'esem implies that even if the child never found out his entire life it is a valid conversion, however, it is ill-advised because he will likely find out and you wouldn't want him to protest the conversion at a later age. Minchat Yitzchak 3:99:13 disagrees on the grounds that not protesting is accepting the mitzvot and if a child never did that he did not accept the mitzvot and is not Jewish. This position is evident in Tosfot Sanhedrin 68b.
Kaneh Bosem YD 1:115 considers that according to the strict halacha it isn't necessary to tell the convert that he is a convert but after he asked Dayan Weiss he concludes that you must tell the convert. His reasoning was that according to Tosfot Sanhedrin 68b without telling the convert it isn't considered a valid acceptance of mitzvot and according to Tosfot Ketubot 11a without telling them it remains a rabbinic conversion instead of a biblical one. However, according to the Rashba and Ritva Ketubot 11a it might not be necessary ever to tell them. Also, according to the Chatom Sofer YD 253 since the child converted with the parents the child can't reject Judaism and accordingly wouldn't be necessary to tell them.

[87] Kaneh Bosem YD 1:115 considers that according to the strict halacha it isn't necessary to tell the convert that he is a convert but after he asked Dayan Weiss he concludes that you must tell the convert. His reasoning was that according to Tosfot Sanhedrin 68b without telling the convert it isn't considered a valid acceptance of mitzvot and according to Tosfot Ketubot 11a without telling them it remains a rabbinic conversion instead of a biblical one. However, according to the Rashba and Ritva Ketubot 11a it might not be necessary ever to tell them. Also, according to the Chatom Sofer YD 253 since the child converted with the parents the child can't reject Judaism and accordingly wouldn't be necessary to tell them.

[68] Igrot Moshe YD 1:162 thinks that since the only reason we can assume he is Jewish until he protests is because there is an assumption that when growing up in a Jewish family he is going to accept the mitzvot when he becomes bar or bat mitzvah. However, if they weren't told until they were teenagers or after it isn't such a clear presumption. Once he is independent and also has a greater temptation to sin there is no assumption he will accept mitzvot. Therefore it would even be questionable to allow him to marry a Jewish girl because of the concern that he will later find out that he was converted and protest it and become a non-Jew married to a Jewish woman. Minchat Yitzchak 3:99:13 agrees. Shevet Halevi 5:250 also concludes that it is necessary to tell the convert that he was converted as a child otherwise we can't assume that they're Jewish because they might later find out and protest it. Even in an extenuating circumstance it is necessary to tell the child.

[69] Chatom Sofer YD 253 writes that a child who converted with his parents can't later protest the conversion. This is premised on the opinion of the Rif, who doesn't allow a child convert to protest later, and Bahag, who wouldn't allow a child conversion without parent's consent. He also believes this is the opinion of the Rambam that it is only possible for a child convert to protest the conversion if it wasn't done by the request of his parents. Pitchei Teshuva 268:8 cites this teshuva. Bet Yitzchak 1:29:8 notes that this position is against Shulchan Aruch and although the Chatom Sofer's view should be noted we don't accept it.

[70] Minchat Yitzchak 3:99:1 quoting Rashba Ketubot 11a, Tosfot Ketubot 44a s.v. hagiyoret, and Ran Ketubot 44a. Igrot Moshe YD 1:162 agrees.

[71] Gerut Kehilchata 6:12. See Shevet Halevi 6:194. Derech Pikudecha (Mitzvah Aseh 2, Dibbur 31) isn't sure if the bet din can recite a bracha at the conversion of a child because he might later decide not to accept Judaism. See Rashba Ketubot 11a.

[72] Shevet Halevi 5:205:8 and 6:196 writes that there is no valid permit to violate yichud when adopting children. He says that just because they are brought by parents and feel close to them emotionally it isn't the same as natural parents. He clarifies that he isn't against adoption but it should be done in a way that avoid any question of yichud. Tzitz Eliezer 6:40:21 writes as a way of justifying the practice (limmud zechut) but doesn't actually endorse it. The main reason to be lenient is that since they're brought up by their adopted parent they don't feel any attraction to them.

[73] Sanhedrin 58b. According to Rashi Sanhedrin 58b s.v. amar writes that it is forbidden even if one doesn't intend to abstain from melacha for religious purposes and it is just to rest. The Rambam (Melachim 10:9) holds that it is only forbidden if they intend to do so for a religious purpose since it is like creating a new religion. Yad Ramah Sanhedrin 58b s.v. v'amar identifies this dispute. Meiri 59a s.v. ben writes that a non-Jew can't observe another day of the week as Shabbat because Jews might mistakenly learn from him.
The Rambam (Melachim 10:9) implies that it is forbidden for a non-Jew to keep Shabbat or even another day during the week as a day of rest but only if it is for religious reasons. If it is for leisure it is permitted. This is further implied by Yad Ramah 58b s.v. vamar who contrasts the opinion of the Rambam with another opinion (either Rashi or one similar to Rashi) that holds keeping Shabbat purely for leisure is also forbidden. Meiri 59a s.v. ben seems to follow the approach of the Rambam in this respect. Rashi Sanhedrin 58b is of the opinion that for leisure is also forbidden. Igrot Moshe YD 2:7 writes that the Rambam agrees with Rashi.

[94] The Rambam (Melachim 10:9) implies that it is forbidden for a non-Jew to keep Shabbat or even another day during the week as a day of rest but only if it is for religious reasons. If it is for leisure it is permitted. This is further implied by Yad Ramah 58b s.v. vamar who contrasts the opinion of the Rambam with another opinion (either Rashi or one similar to Rashi) that holds keeping Shabbat purely for leisure is also forbidden. Meiri 59a s.v. ben seems to follow the approach of the Rambam in this respect. Rashi Sanhedrin 58b is of the opinion that for leisure is also forbidden. Igrot Moshe YD 2:7 writes that the Rambam agrees with Rashi.

[74] Avnei Nezer YD 351:4-5 writes that according to the Zohar the Jews kept Shabbat after Marah because that's when they completed their milah with priya, even though they didn't complete their conversion at matan torah. Though, he thinks that the rishonim (Tosfot Yevamot 46b, Rashba Yevamot 71a, Ran a"z 26b) sound like this is incorrect and a convert with milah without tevilah is still a complete non-Jew. Rav Zevulun Charlop cites Pachad Yitzchak (Igrot 56) who distinguishes between Shabbat at marah and Shabbat today for someone who has milah.

[75] In April 1848, a non-Jew from Morocco came to Yerushalayim to convert. While recovering from the milah before the tevilah, on Shabbat Rav Asher Lemel was asked whether or not this perspective convert should keep Shabbat. Rav Lamel told him not to keep Shabbat. Afterwards the rabbis of Yerushalayim all disagreed with Rav Lamel on the grounds that the minhag previously was not to be concerned about this and let the perspective convert keep Shabbat. The Binyan Tzion 91 writes that according to his investigations the minhag in Germany was like it was in Yerushalayim. Also, he held that a non-Jew who did milah and not yet tevila should keep Shabbat. 1) Brit milah is a covenant and Shabbat is a covenant; once one forged one covenant with Hashem it isn't reasonable that one needs to break the other. 2) Tosfot Keritut 9a implies that brit milah causes a person to become separated from the other nations even before completing the conversion. He concludes that he is obligated to keep Shabbat.
Lhorot Natan 1:38:15 writes that there is a great proof from Tosfot Yeshanim Yevamot 48b and Midrash Rabba (Devarim 1:27) that it is permitted for a convert who do milah to keep Shabbat even though he didn't finish converting.

[97] Lhorot Natan 1:38:15 writes that there is a great proof from Tosfot Yeshanim Yevamot 48b and Midrash Rabba (Devarim 1:27) that it is permitted for a convert who do milah to keep Shabbat even though he didn't finish converting.

[76] Chashukei Chemed Sanhedrin 58b writes about someone from Russian extraction and isn't sure if he is Jewish. Between when he became aware of this and his conversion, can he keep Shabbat? If he is non-Jewish he can't keep Shabbat, but if he's Jewish he should keep Shabbat? Solutions that Chashukei Chemed quotes include: wearing tzitzit in the public domain (Maharam Shik OC 145 quoting the Chatom Sofer), asking a non-Jew to work for him (Maharam Shik), or working on Saturday night (Panim Yafot Beresheet 8:22).

[77] The Rambam Melachim 10:10 writes that a non-Jew who wants to fulfill mitzvot and receive reward we shouldn't stop him. On the other hand, in 10:9 he writes that we shouldn't let him do a mitzvah that he isn't obligated in because he is creating a non-religion in doing so. He should either convert or only keep the 7 mitzvot of bnei noach. The Radvaz explains that the distinction is whether he intends to create a new religion. If he just does a mitzvah voluntarily not intending that it is an obligationi that is acceptable, while if he is does it with the intention of being a commandment he should be stopped. While it seems from the Rambam and Radvaz that the non-Jew is rewarded for doing a mitzvah voluntarily it isn’t absolutely clear. It is possible that the non-Jew is doing the mitzvah voluntarily to get rewarded but isn’t actually going to be rewarded. That is the position of Rav Moshe Feinstein in Igrot Moshe YD 2:7.
However, in light of the Rambam responsa 148 (Blau, Pear Hadur 60) it seems clear that the Rambam holds that a non-Jew who does a mitzvah voluntarily is indeed rewarded. He seems to apply it to all the mitzvot. The Meiri Sanhedrin 59a s.v. ben also says this, but Igrot Moshe YD 2:7 writes that it is a scribal error. The other proofs against Igrot Moshe like Pirush Mishnayot of Rambam Trumot 3:9 are dealt with in that teshuva.

[100] However, in light of the Rambam responsa 148 (Blau, Pear Hadur 60) it seems clear that the Rambam holds that a non-Jew who does a mitzvah voluntarily is indeed rewarded. He seems to apply it to all the mitzvot. The Meiri Sanhedrin 59a s.v. ben also says this, but Igrot Moshe YD 2:7 writes that it is a scribal error. The other proofs against Igrot Moshe like Pirush Mishnayot of Rambam Trumot 3:9 are dealt with in that teshuva.

[78] Igrot Moshe YD 3:77:2. Minchat Yitzchak 6:108 writes that you shouldn't let Conservative rabbis use your mikveh for a conversion.

[79] Rama 268:12. The Gra cites the source for the Tevilah in Avot D'Rabbi Natan 8:8.

[80] Igrot Moshe EH 1:8 has a fascinating nuance in some rishonim that if the father wasn't Jewish and the mother was completely not religious the child is considered not Jewish. However, Rashbash cited by Bedek Habayit YD 268:12 disagrees that Jewishness is decided by the mother even if she is not religious and the father was non-Jewish.

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-While Judaism does not proselytize it does welcome converts who come on their own initiative. The process is complex and briefly described below. The purpose of the summaries below are for educational purposes only.
+While Judaism does not proselytize<ref>Part of the reason for our hesitancy to accept converts is rooted in a statement of the Gemara Kiddushin 70b: "converts are bad like sapachat (a form of Tzara'at) for the Jewish people". Gemara Yevamot 47b says that this is the reason why we discourage converts when they first appear before us, as we challenge their motivations for converting and attempt to dissuade them from doing so. Rashi Kiddushin 70b s.v. kashin explains that since they aren't meticulous in their observance of Mitzvot, naturally born Jews will inevitably be negatively influenced by them. Rashi Niddah 13b s.v. k'sapachat adds that because they aren't experts in Mitzvot, they'll bring about punishment (similar to when the King of Assyria exiled the people of Kutha to the Shomron, they converted to Judaism, and then Hashem punished them for their lack of observance by sending lions to ravage them.  See Melachim II 17:25).
+(As an aside, Rashi Niddah also has an interesting opinion that the concept of "kol yisrael arevim zeh b'zeh" (Shevuot 39a), that all Jews are guarantors for one another, doesn't apply to converts. This is not the accepted practice, as we usually allow a convert to be yotzaih (fulfill his obligation) Kiddush by hearing it from a naturally born Jew, and vice versa as well.  However, Beit Yitzchak 2:100:11 seems to adopt this Rashi, that Jews aren't punished for the sins of converts.).
+Tosfot Kiddushin 70b s.v. kashim quotes an interesting explanation of this Gemara from R' Avraham HaGer (a figure who lived in the days of the Baalai HaTosfot). He argues that converts are in fact more meticulous in their observance of mitzvot than naturally born Jews, and when Hashem sees their dedication, He recalls the shortcomings of the Jewish people and grows angry with them. He draws a parallel to a story in Navi (Melachim I:17) that the woman of Tzarfat accused Eliyahu as being the reason for her son's death, that his piety highlighted her lower spiritual state and incurred Hashem's wrath. Tosfot posits that another way of understanding why converts are bad for the Jewish people is because the Torah warns in twenty four places about oppressing them, and it is very difficult to be properly sensitive towards them and not violate this prohibition.   </ref>, it does welcome converts who come on their own initiative<ref>Gm Yevamot 47a (and paskened in Shulchan Aruch Yoreh De'ah 268:2) states that when an individual comes to convert, we discourage him by mentioning the fact that the Jews are a downtrodden and oppressed nation. If the person acknowledges this and nonetheless expresses his desire to convert, then we accept him as a convert.
+There is also a discussion as to whether or not there's a Mitzvah to perform conversions. Gemara Yevamot 47b says that once a prospective convert dedicates himself to keep the Mitzvot, we do Milah right away, because "we don't delay a Mitzvah". The simple understanding of this Gemara is that there is a Mitzvah element to converting people. Furthermore, the fact that Gemara Shabbat 137b records that when performing a Milah on a convert, the text of the beracha includes "who has commanded us to give a Milah to converts", indicates that there is a Mitzvah to convert people. Tashbetz (Zohar HaRakia, assin 40) thinks that accepting converts is a Mitzvah, but is unsure under which Mitzvah it would be included. Interestingly, he also thinks that the fact that Beit Din converts a Katan al da'at Beit Din (Ketubot 11a), indicates that there's a Mitzvah to accept converts.
+Tosfot HaRosh (Shabbat 137b) suggests that accepting converts is included in the Mitzvah of loving the convert, as it's impossible to love him if he doesn't receive a Milah and is converted. Raavad in Sefer Baalai HaNefesh (end of Shaar HaTevilah) learns that the Mitzvah is derived from the fact that Avraham converted people (see Rashi Bereshit 12:5 s.v. asher asu). Another possibility is that it's included in the Mitzvah of loving Hashem, which according to Rambam (Sefer HaMitzvot Asseh 3) includes making Hashem beloved unto others and drawing them to His service.   </ref>. There are three basic components to conversion:  the acceptance of mitzvot, milah and tevilah. The process is complex and briefly described below. The purpose of the summaries below are for educational purposes only.
 ==Bet Din for Conversion==
-#All aspects of conversion need the presence of bet din.<ref>The Gemara Yevamot 46b establishes that conversion requires the supervision of a bet din of three members. Tosfot s.v. mishpat explains that everyone agrees to this halacha even those who say a bet din can sometimes consist of one member agree here. This is accepted by the Rambam (Isurei Biyah 13:6) and Shulchan Aruch YD 268:3. Shulchan Aruch YD 268:3 writes that after the fact the bet din is only necessary for the acceptance of mitzvot, while the Rambam and Rif hold it is necessary for the milah and tevilah as well.
+#All aspects of conversion need the presence of bet din.<ref>The Gemara Yevamot 46b establishes that conversion requires the supervision of a Bet Din of three judges based on the fact that the phrase "misphat" is used in the context of conversion. Tosfot s.v. mishpat offers two possibilities as to which passuk the Gemara is alluding to. Tosfot further explains that everyone agrees that three judges are required by conversion, even those who say that a Bet Din for hoda'ot v'hal'vaot, admissions and loans, only needs one judge, because we compare conversion to gzelot v'chavalot, theft and injury, regarding which everyone agrees that you need three judges. This is accepted by the Rambam (Isurei Biyah 13:6) and Shulchan Aruch YD 268:3. Shulchan Aruch YD 268:3 writes that after the fact, the Bet Din is only necessary for the acceptance of mitzvot, while the Rambam and Rif hold it is necessary for the milah and tevilah as well.
-* Tosfot s.v. mishpat writes that even though we don’t have semicha we can still perform semicha based on the principle of shelichutyahu. </ref> After the fact, according to some opinions the conversion is valid as long as the kabbalat mitzvot was done in the presence of bet din. In such a case we'd be strict to require another conversion.<ref>What is the presence of Bet Din necessary for?
-* Tosfot Yevamot 45b s.v. mi holds it is necessary for kabbalat mitzvot and not other aspects of the conversion except initially.
+Tosfot s.v. mishpat raises the issue that if conversion is compared to cases of theft and injury (see earlier in this footnote), then we should require the judges to have bona fide Semicha in an unbroken chain from Moshe Rabbeinu, something which we lack today. Tosfot answers that that even though we don’t have semicha, we can still perform Gerut nowadays, based on the principle of shelichutyahu (Gittin 88b), that the judges nowadays serve as the agents of the judges of old who possessed real Semicha.
-* Rambam Isurei Biya 13:9 holds the fact that he is acting Jewish is only a proof that he did a valid conversion earlier.
-* Ramban, Rashba, and Nemukei Yosef in understanding the Rif hold that kabbalat mitzvot is the only thing that is necessary before Bet Din in order to have some conversion not to invalidate the children. However, unless entire conversion is in front of Bet Din the convert can’t marry a Jewish woman.
+Tosfot Kiddushin 62b s.v. ger quotes another answer from Rabbeinu Netanel.  He notes that Gemara Keritut 9a says that although a Ger must offer a Korban HaGer when converting, we can nevertheless accept converts nowadays that we don't have a Beit HaMikdash, as the Torah says that a Ger can live in "any of your generations", implying even after the destruction of the Beit HaMikdash. Similarly, reasons Rabbeinu Netanel, based on the passuk of "any of your generations", we should be able to accept converts nowadays, even though the chain of Semicha has been broken.
-* Ritva 45b writes that Bet Din is necessary for everything even after the fact. The gemara means that even if you don’t intend for conversion it is still valid.
+</ref> After the fact, according to some opinions, the conversion is valid as long as the kabbalat mitzvot was performed in the presence of bet din. In such a case we'd be strict to require another conversion.<ref>What is the presence of Bet Din necessary for?
-* Hagahot Mordechai Yevamot 4:111 says that if a convert converted without a bet din some say that the conversion is invalid while others say it is acceptable. Darkei Moshe 268:3 understands that this corresponds to the opinions of Tosfot and Rambam. Mordechai Yevamot 4:36 quotes Rabbenu Simcha and Rabbi Yehuda Bar Yom Tov who hold that a conversion only needs one judge.
+*Tosfot Yevamot 45b s.v. mi holds it is necessary for kabbalat mitzvot and not other aspects of the conversion. Nevertheless, three judges are lechatchila (ideally) required even for the Milah and Tevilah.  This is also the view of Tosfot Kiddushin 62b s.v. ger. Tosfot's proof is the fact that the Gemara Yevamot 45b tells a story in which people used to refer to a certain person as "the son of a non-Jew".  Rav Assi commented:  "she certainly was Tovel for Niddah!". Tosfot understands that the Gemara is saying that her Tevilah which she did because she was a Niddah, even though there were no judges present, bdiavad (after the fact) counts for Gerut.
-* Shulchan Aruch YD 268:3 writes the opinion of Tosfot and Rosh as the anonymous opinion and then notes the opinion of the Rif and Rambam by name. Yabia Omer YD 1:19 is strict even though it seems to be an explain of stam vyesh. Achiezer 3:27 implies that even after the fact not having bet din for milah or tevila is an issue like the Rif and Rambam.</ref>
+*Rambam Isurei Biya 13:9 hold that three judges are needed for all aspects of the conversion process, and if you don't have this, then the conversion is invalid. The challenge is how he deals with Tosfot's proof. One possibility is that they adopted Tosfot's second approach to the Gemara, that if everyone knows that a certain person did Tevilah, then it's as if they were present and witnessed it. Alternatively, the Gemara is saying that the fact that the woman is acting like she's Jewish by observing the laws of Niddah, is proof that she performed a valid conversion earlier.
-#The Bet Din for conversions do not need to have three torah scholars.<ref>Igrot Moshe YD 1:159 clarifies that the three people who serve as a bet din don't all need to be torah scholars.</ref>
+*Ramban, Rashba, and Nemukei Yosef (his understanding of the Rif) hold that in order to assume that the children of the convert are the children of a Jewish man, kabbalat mitzvot is the only thing necessary to have in the presence of Bet Din. However, a convert can only marry a Jewish woman if all parts of the conversion process were performed in the presence of a Bet Din.
+*Ritva 45b writes that Bet Din is necessary for everything, even after the fact. The Gemara (Tosfot's proof) means that even if you don’t intend for conversion, it is still valid.
+*Hagahot Mordechai Yevamot 4:111 says that if a convert converted without a Bet Din, some say that the conversion is invalid, while others say that it's acceptable. Darkei Moshe 268:3 understands that this corresponds to the opinions of Tosfot and Rambam. Mordechai Yevamot 4:36 quotes Rabbenu Simcha and Rabbi Yehuda Bar Yom Tov who hold that a conversion only needs one judge.
+*Shulchan Aruch YD 268:3 writes the opinion of Tosfot and Rosh as the anonymous opinion, and then notes the opinion of the Rif and Rambam by name. Yabia Omer YD 1:19 is strict, even though this is against the anonymous opinion cited by Shulchan Aruch. Achiezer 3:27 implies that even after the fact, not having Bet Din for milah or tevila is an issue, like the Rif and Rambam. Similarly, [https://www.hebrewbooks.org/pdfpager.aspx?req=57989&pgnum=181 Perach Mateh Aharon 2:51] writes that we’re strict for Rif and Rambam.  </ref>
+#The Bet Din for conversions does not need to be comprised of three Torah scholars.<ref>Igrot Moshe YD 1:159 clarifies that the three people who serve as a bet din don't all need to be torah scholars.</ref>
 ==Order of Procedure==
-# The milah is done before the tevilah. If they did the tevilah before the milah there is a major dispute if the conversion is effective and therefore, they should repeat the tevilah.<ref>Rama YD 268:1 quotes a dispute between the Ramban and Raah whether the order is essential after the fact, the Ramban positing that it doesn't and the Raah holding it does. The Shach 268:2 adds that they should do the tevilah again because of this dispute.</ref>
+# The milah is done before the tevilah. If they did the tevilah before the milah, there is a major dispute if the conversion is effective.  Therefore, if the tevilah was performed before the milah, they should repeat the tevilah.<ref>Rama YD 268:1 quotes a dispute between the Ramban and Raah whether bdiavad (after the fact) the order of milah and tevilah would invalidate the conversion. The Ramban posits that it wouldn't, while Raah believes that it would invalidate the conversion. The Shach 268:2 therefore says that they should do the tevilah again because of this dispute.</ref>
 ==Time==
-#A conversion should only be done during the day. After the fact, it is necessary for accepting mitvzot and it is a dispute if it is necessary only for accepting mitzvot or all parts of conversion.<ref>Bach CM 5:6 we should be strict about a din at night because of the Rashbam and Smag that a din at night is effective.</ref>
+#A conversion should only be performed during the day.<ref>Yevamot 46b</ref> If the acceptance of Mitzvot is performed at night, then this would bdiavad (after the fact) invalidate the conversion. If the milah or tevilah is performed at night, it's disputed if this would bdiavad invalidate the conversion.<ref>Shulchan Aruch 268:3. The anonymous view in Shulchan Aruch is that only if the acceptance of mitzvot is done at night does it invalidate the conversion.  He also cites by name the view of Rambam, that if any stage of the conversion is done at night, then it invalidates the conversion.
-==Tevilah of Women==
+Bach CM 5:6 writes that we should be strict about a din at night because of the Rashbam and Smag that a din at night is effective.</ref>
-#Many poskim hold that tevilah needs to be done in the presence of bet din. For a woman they can wear a loosely fitted robe that covers her whole body while entering the mikveh in the presence of bet din.<ref>Rambam and Shulchan Aruch hold that the tevila of both men and women need to be in front of bet din. Minchat Yitzchak 4:34:3 writes that it is possible that after the fact it is an effective conversion since according to Tosfot a bet din isn't necessary for tevila and also according to others it might be effective since the bet din knows that she went into the mikveh. Yabia Omer YD 1:19 says that they need to do the gerut again because it might not have been a valid gerut at all. He would allow her to wear a loosely fitted robe or a sheet above the water to make it more modest. Igrot Moshe YD 2:127 agrees that it is an unresolved machloket. Teshuvot Vehanhagot 1:621 also says that it needs to be redone if the tevila was done without the bet din watching in the room.</ref>
+#The tevilah of a convert may not be performed on Shabbat nor on Yom Tov.<ref>Rambam Issurei Biah 13:6 and Shulchan Aruch 268:4.  They give the reason that since conversion is compared to Din (as Yevamot 46b notes that the word "mishpat" is used in association with conversion), it cannot be performed on Shabbat nor on Yom Tov. (Mishnah Beitzah 36b notes that the Rabbis forbade having Din on Shabbat and Yom Tov, and the Gemara explains that we're concerned that a person will come to write things down).
+Taz 268:11 raises the issue that the Gemara Yevamot 46b gives a different reason for this Halacha, namely that we don't "fix a person on Shabbat". (This a Rabbinic form of "fixing a vessel", similar to the prohibition mentioned in Beitzah 36b that one cannot separate Terumot and Maasarot on Shabbat and Yom Tov, as one is fixing the remainder of the produce). He suggests that since the Gemara Beitzah 18a permits a person who is impure (tameh) to immerse on Shabbat and Yom Tov, because it appears like he's cooling off and isn't trying to fix his impure state, the same logic should allow a convert to immerse as well. Thus, the Rambam paskens like the sugya in Beitzah over Yevamot 46b. Kesef Mishneh on Rambam offers the same approach.
+Interestingly, Tosfot Yeshanim Yevamot 46b s.v. lefi'kach, suggests an answer to resolve the contradiction between Yevamot 46b and Beitzah 18a. He posits that the "fix" of a person going from impure to pure, is much less than the "fix" of a non-Jew becoming Jewish, and that's why the latter is forbidden.
+</ref>
+==Tevilah==
+# Some say that shehechiyanu is recited after the tevilah and completion of conversion.<ref>Radvaz 1:434 holds that a shehechiyanu is recited at the completion of conversion (and not at the milah) since he is now joyous that he is now able to fulfill mitzvot.</ref>
+# Even though brachot on mitzvot are usually recited before the mitzvah is performed, the convert recites the beracha of "al ha'tevilah" after immersing<ref>Pesachim 7b. There is an interesting discussion regarding when the Beit Din recites the bracha of "al ha'tevilah" when they convert a baby (Ketubot 11a). According to the Gemara Pesachim's reasoning, they should do so beforehand, as the only reason why a convert typically says it afterwards, is because he cannot recite a bracha while he is still non-Jewish. This is the view of Raavad in Baalai HaNefesh (at the end of Shaar HaTevilah). Rav Schachter (Eretz HaTzvi p. 32) argues that the Bet Din should recite a bracha after the Tevilah in this case, as the bracha goes on the chalot (onset) of the conversion.   </ref>.
+===Tevilah of Women===
+#Many poskim hold that tevilah needs to be done in the presence of Bet Din.<ref>Regarding whether or not the lack of Bet Din bdiavad (after the fact) invalidates the conversion: the anonymous opinion in Shulchan Aruch 268:3 is that it doesn't (in accordance with the view of Tosfot Kiddushin 62b s.v. ger and Tosfos Yevamot 45b s.v. mi), and the yesh omrim cites Rambam who thinks that it would invalidate the conversion.  </ref> For purposes of modesty, women can wear a loosely fitted robe that covers her whole body while entering the mikveh in the presence of bet din.<ref>Rambam and Shulchan Aruch hold that the tevila of both men and women need to be in front of bet din. Minchat Yitzchak 4:34:3 writes that it is possible that after the fact it is an effective conversion, since according to Tosfot a bet din isn't necessary for tevila. Furthermore, according to others it might be effective since the Bet Din knows that she went into the mikveh. Yabia Omer YD 1:19 says that they need to do the gerut again because it might not have been a valid gerut at all. He would allow her to wear a loosely fitted robe or a sheet above the water to make it more modest.
+*Igrot Moshe YD 2:127 agrees that it is an unresolved machloket and needs to be redone. However, in Igrot Moshe 3:112 (11 years after previous one) he says that even if only one of the judges saw the woman go into the mikvah, and others were there and heard it, it is valid. There he explains that even according to the Rambam and Rif it is valid since the judges know she went to the mikveh properly even though they didn't see it. It seems to be  a contradiction to his earlier teshuva. Teshuvot Vehanhagot 1:621 also says that it needs to be redone if the tevila was done without the bet din watching in the room.</ref>
 ==Pregnant Woman Conversion==
-#If a pregnant woman converts she should notify the bet din that she is pregnant otherwise it could be that the conversion for the baby is ineffective.<ref>Dagul Mirvava 268:6 notes that the presence of bet din is necessary for the tevila of the baby (since the baby doesn't have kabbalat mitzvot). If the bet din wasn't aware of the fetus it is like the bet din isn't present. Aruch Hashulchan 268:11 is lenient since we hold like the opinion that the fetus is part of the mother and the conversion of the mother works for the baby. Igrot Moshe YD 1:158 says that it is proper to be strict for the dagul mirvava.</ref>
+#If a pregnant woman converts, she should notify the bet din that she is pregnant, otherwise it could be that the conversion for the baby is ineffective.<ref>Dagul Mirvava 268:6 notes that the presence of bet din is necessary for the tevila of the baby (since the baby doesn't have kabbalat mitzvot). If the bet din wasn't aware of the fetus it is like the bet din isn't present. Aruch Hashulchan 268:11 is lenient since we hold like the opinion that the fetus is part of the mother and the conversion of the mother works for the baby. Igrot Moshe YD 1:158 says that it is proper to be strict for the dagul mirvava.</ref>
-#If the fetus was a boy and is born on Shabbat there is a discussion if the milah can be done on the subsequent Shabbat or should be delayed to Sunday.<ref>[https://www.hebrewbooks.org/pdfpager.aspx?req=9137&pgnum=17 Rav Dovid Karliner (Piskei Halachot p. 7 fnt. 5)] writes that if a pregnant woman converted with her fetus and the fetus is a boy, it can have the milah on Shabbat. He argues with the Ramban that the milah is part of the gerut. Rav Chaim Ozer in Achiezer 4:44 agreed.</ref>
+#If the fetus was a boy and is born on Shabbat, there is a discussion if the milah can be done on the subsequent Shabbat or should be delayed to the following Sunday.<ref>[https://www.hebrewbooks.org/pdfpager.aspx?req=9137&pgnum=17 Rav Dovid Karliner (Piskei Halachot p. 7 fnt. 5)] writes that if a pregnant woman converted with her fetus and the fetus is a boy, it can have the milah on Shabbat. He argues with the Ramban that the milah is part of the gerut. Rav Chaim Ozer in Achiezer 4:44 agreed.</ref>
 ==Acceptance of Mitzvot==
-#A prospective ger must accept all of the mitzvot in front of a Bet Din of three men during the day.<ref>Tosfot Yevamot 45b s.v. mi clarifies that accepting mitzvot is a critical part of conversion and is invalid without it. Shulchan Aruch Y.D. 268:3 codifies Tosfot. Chemdat Shlomo 1:29, Bet Meir, Achiezer, and Igrot Moshe all hold that acceptance of mitzvot is critical and without it the conversion isn’t valid.</ref> If the convert accepted the mitzvot but not in front of a Bet Din the conversion is invalid.<ref>Tosfot Yevamot 45b s.v. mi, Ramban Yevamot 45b, Shulchan Aruch Y.D. 268:3</ref>
+#A prospective ger must accept all of the mitzvot and tenants of emunah<ref>Rambam Isurei Biyah 14:2, Maggid Mishna 14:1, Orchot Chaim (Hilchot Isurei Biya 9), Shulchan Aruch Y.D. 268:2, Levush 268:2. Lhorot Natan 14:59 holds that if they converted with a warped idea of emunah, such as believing that the  Christian New Testament is true, the conversion is invalid. Piskei Din Yerushalayim (Dinei Mamonot v. 14 p. 422 n. 4) agrees that if someone believes both in Christianity and Judaism, then his conversion is invalid. Gerut Kehilchata 2:15 writes that he needs to accept mitzvot with the understanding that we keep mitzvot because they were commanded by Hashem through Moshe.</ref> in front of a Bet Din of three men during the day.<ref>Tosfot Yevamot 45b s.v. mi clarifies that accepting mitzvot is a critical part of conversion and is invalid without it. Shulchan Aruch Y.D. 268:3 codifies Tosfot. Chemdat Shlomo 1:29, Bet Meir, Achiezer, and Igrot Moshe all hold that acceptance of mitzvot is critical and without it the conversion isn’t valid. There is a minority view held by Rav Ben Zion Uziel (Shut Piskei Uziel Siman 65), that the acceptance of mitzvot is not something that would bdiavad (after the fact) invalidate the conversion.  This view is not accepted by the Poskim. </ref> If the convert accepted the mitzvot, but didn't do so in front of a Bet Din, the conversion is invalid.<ref>Tosfot Yevamot 45b s.v. mi, Ramban Yevamot 45b, Shulchan Aruch Y.D. 268:3</ref>
-#If the convert accepted mitzvot but knows or even intends that due to certain desires he won’t be able to fulfill a certain mitzvah it is nonetheless absolutely considered acceptance of mitzvot.<ref>Achiezer 3:26:4 explains that accepting to keep the mitzvot doesn’t mean that he must accept to actually practice all of them. Accepting mitzvot means accepting that they’re all true and binding. If he says that he doesn’t want to accept one mitzvah it isn’t an acceptance of mitzvot. But he says he accepts all mitzvot but because of a certain desire intends not to keep one mitzvah it is nonetheless a valid conversion. Minchat Asher (Shabbat 34:1) writes that if he isn’t intending to violate a mitzvah because of a desire but rather just knows that likely because of the difficulty of mitzvot that he will be overcome with desire and not fulfill a mitzvah that is certainly considered a valid conversion. </ref> Others argue if he intends not to keep a mitzvah because of a desire that is an invalid conversion.<ref>Dvar Avraham argues that it shouldn’t be a valid conversion but isn’t completely convinced that after the fact it is invalid. Lhorot Natan is convinced that the Achiezer is incorrect. Accepting mitzvot means accepting actually practicing all the mitzvot. </ref>
+#If the convert accepted mitzvot, but knows or even intends that due to certain desires he won’t be able to fulfill a certain mitzvah, it is nonetheless absolutely considered acceptance of mitzvot.<ref>Achiezer 3:26:4 explains that accepting mitzvot means that a person accepts that they’re all true and binding. If he says that he doesn’t want to accept one mitzvah, it isn’t an acceptance of mitzvot. However, if he says that he accepts all mitzvot, yet knows that because of a certain desire, he won't be able to keep one mitzvah, it is nonetheless a valid conversion. Minchat Asher (Shabbat 34:1) writes that if he doesn't intend to violate a mitzvah because of a desire, but rather just knows that likely because of the difficulty of mitzvot that he will be overcome with desire and not fulfill a mitzvah, that is certainly considered a valid conversion. </ref> Others argue that if he doesn't intend to keep a mitzvah because of his desires, that is an invalid conversion.<ref>Dvar Avraham argues that it shouldn’t be a valid conversion, but isn’t completely convinced that after the fact it is invalid. Lhorot Natan is convinced that the Achiezer is incorrect. Accepting mitzvot means accepting actually practicing all the mitzvot. </ref>
-#If the convert said that he accepted mitzvot but in his heart did not intend on keeping the mitzvot that is an invalid conversion.<ref>Bet Yitzchak, Achiezer 3:26, Igrot Moshe 3:108
+#If the convert said that he accepted mitzvot, but in his heart did not intend on keeping the mitzvot, that is an invalid conversion.<ref>Bet Yitzchak YD 2:100:9, Achiezer 3:26, Igrot Moshe YD 1:157 and 3:108, Minchat Yitzchak 6:107. Bet Yitzchak explains that the concept that intentions can't invalidate a statement (''dvarim shebelev einam dvarim''), is limited to interpersonal matters between two different people. However, conversion is between a person and Hashem, and one's intentions certainly do count. Therefore, if the convert says that he plans to keep Torah but his intentions are otherwise, then the conversion is invalid. Another salient point is the fact that Tosfot Kiddushin 49b s.v. devarim says that if something is so clear, even though it's not explictily stated, then in such a situation we'd consider it meaningful and significant (devarim shebelev havaih devarim). So too over here, if it's clear as day that someone doesn't intend to dedicate himself to Mitzvot, then we'd take that into account and invalidate the conversion.
-* In a specific case of a woman who said she accepted mitzvot but had in mind to violate some halachot, Igrot Moshe 3:108 writes that it is a valid conversion. His reasons are (1) since her children are practicing Judaism she isn't trusted about them to say that they're not Jewish. (2) dvar shebelev einam dvarim unless there is a clear circumstance that everyone knew that contradicts her words. (3) If she accepts the mitzvot but because of financial pressures she won't be able to keep all the mitzvot under pressure that is an acceptance. The last reason he isn't certain about. However, regarding (1) Achiezer 3:26:2 argues that for the actual acceptance of mitzvot dvarim shebelev isn't relevant since it is a matter between him and heaven. If he doesn't accept mitvzot it is invalid.</ref>
+*In a specific case of a woman who said that she accepted the mitzvot but had in mind to violate some halachot, Igrot Moshe 3:108 writes that it is a valid conversion. His reasons are (1) since her children are practicing Judaism, she isn't trusted about them to say that they're not Jewish. (2) dvar shebelev einam dvarim, unless there is a clear circumstance that everyone knew that contradicts her words. (3) If she accepts the mitzvot, but because of financial pressures she won't be able to practically keep all the mitzvot, then that is considered an acceptance of mitzvot. R' Moshe isn't certain about this last reason. However, regarding (1) Achiezer 3:26:2 argues that for the actual acceptance of mitzvot, dvarim shebelev ainam devarim isn't relevant, since it is a matter between him and Heaven, regarding which intentions are critical. </ref> If it isn't clear if he accepted the mitzvot, some say that it is a questionable conversion.<ref>Igrot Moshe YD 3:106 writes that although the convert said that he accepts mitzvot, if the circumstances make it clear that this statement is dubious, the validity of the conversion is questionable. Kger Kezrach ch. 32 discusses this opinion and supports it.</ref>
-#If the convert accepted all the mitzvot besides one mitzvah the Bet Din should not accept such a convert. After the fact, some say that it is a valid conversion,<ref>Igrot Moshe YD 3:106
+#If the convert accepted all the mitzvot aside from one of them, the Bet Din should not accept him as a convert.<ref>Bechorot 30b. The Gemara says that even if he only rejects a Rabbinic law, we don't accept him as a convert. See below if the rejection of a Rabbinic law would invalidate a conversion after the fact. </ref> After the fact, some say that it is a valid conversion,<ref>Igrot Moshe YD 3:106
-* Rashi 31a s.v. gayrey says that Hillel did a conversion even though the convert said he didn't intend to accept one thing because he didn't deny the oral Torah but didn't believe it was from Hashem and Hillel knew he would convince him otherwise. Igrot Moshe 3:106 learns from Rashi that excluding one thing doesn't invalidate the conversion but you shouldn't do such a conversion unless you know afterwards he will accept it. Minchat Asher Shabbat 34:1 understands this Rashi differently. He did accept the oral Torah but wasn't convinced it was divine. That is considered like he accepted the Torah because he believed in the oral Torah and just didn't believe in the divine source of the oral Torah and for that Hillel knew he'd correct him later.</ref> while most poskim hold that the conversion is invalid.<ref>Bet Yitzchak, Biur Halacha 304. Achiezer 3:26 is uncertain. It seems that Rav Moshe retracted because both in Igrot Moshe YD 3:107 and 3:108 which are written after 3:106 he says that it isn’t a valid conversion. Igrot Moshe 3:106 holds that chutz mdvar echad is only lechatchila but in 3:107 and 3:108 he says that isn't the case.</ref>
+*Gemara Shabbat 31a describes a case in which Hillel converted someone, even though that individual didn't accept the legitimacy of the Oral Torah. Rashi 31a s.v. gayrey says that Hillel converted him because this fellow didn't deny the Oral Torah, but simply had a hard time believing that it was from Hashem. Hillel was confident that after he taught him, that he'd trust him that it came from Hashem. Igrot Moshe 3:106 learns from Rashi that not accepting one mitzvah doesn't invalidate the conversion, but you shouldn't perform such a conversion unless you know that he will end accepting all of the mitzvot. Minchat Asher Shabbat 34:1 understands this Rashi differently. The convert under question did accept the fact that the Oral Torah is binding, but wasn't necessarily convinced that it's Divine. Hillel was confident that he could correct this error later, and that's why he accepted him.</ref> while most poskim hold that the conversion is invalid.<ref>Bet Yitzchak, Biur Halacha 304. Achiezer 3:26 is uncertain. It seems that Rav Moshe retracted his position, because both in Igrot Moshe YD 3:107 and 3:108, which are written after 3:106, he says that it isn’t a valid conversion. Igrot Moshe 3:106 holds that chutz mdvar echad is only lechatchila, but in 3:107 and 3:108 he says that isn't the case, and that it even invalidates the conversion after the fact.</ref>
-#If the convert intends to keep the mitzvot as he observes other "religious" Jews observing even though it isn't in fact all the mitzvot properly there is a discussion if that is a valid acceptance of mitzvot.<ref>Igrot Moshe 3:106 suggests that perhaps it is an acceptance of mitzvot if she plans on doing mitzvot like other "religious" Jews even though they violate certain halachot such as tzeniyut. Though he isn't ready to be lenient based on that logic.</ref>
+#If the convert intends to keep the mitzvot as he sees other "religious" Jews observing them , even though they don't properly keep all of the mitzvot, there is a discussion if this is a valid acceptance of mitzvot.<ref>Igrot Moshe 3:106 suggests that perhaps it is an acceptance of mitzvot if she plans on doing mitzvot like other "religious" Jews, even though they violate certain halachot such as tzeniyut. R' Moshe compares this to someone who converts and lives amongst gentiles, which the Gemara (Shabbat 68a) considers to be a legitimate convert. Such a person is committed to mitzvot, even though he hasn't been properly educated in how to keep them.  Similarly, this woman is committed to mitzvot, even though she hasn't been properly educated and is erroneously following a certain community's mistaken practices. Nonetheless, R' Moshe isn't ready to be lenient based on that logic.</ref>
-#If the convert accepted all the mitzvot besides a rabbinic mitzvah after the fact the conversion is valid.<ref>Bet Meir, Biur Halacha. Achiezer 3:26 isn’t certain if it is a valid conversion on a biblical level or not at all.</ref>
+#If the convert accepted all the mitzvot except for a Rabbinic one, then after the fact the conversion is valid.<ref>Bet Meir, Biur Halacha. Achiezer 3:26 isn’t certain if it's a valid conversion on a Biblical level, or if it isn't a valid conversion at all.  </ref>
-#If the convert is converting for marriage after the fact the conversion is valid as long as they completely accepted all of the mitzvot.<ref>Yevamot 24b, Igrot Moshe, Achiezer, Dvar Avraham</ref>
+#If the convert is converting for the sake of marriage, then after the fact the conversion is valid, as long as they completely accepted all of the mitzvot.<ref>Yevamot 24b, Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Deah 268:12. Igrot Moshe, Achiezer, Dvar Avraham. Interestingly, there's an opinion in the Tannaim (cited on Yevamot 24b) who holds that it isn't a valid conversion after the fact, but this isn't how we pasken. Either way, we ideally try to avoid accepting converts who are only doing so for the sake of marriage (see Shulchan Aruch ibid).   </ref>
-#If she didn’t accept mitzvot at the time of the tevilah but planned on accepting mitzvot later that isn’t considered an acceptance of mitzvot until the later time. However, accepting mitzvot is a prerequisite for tevila and the tevila needs to be repeated.<ref>Igrot Moshe 3:108</ref>
+#If someone didn’t accept the mitzvot at the time of the tevilah, but planned on accepting them later, then we don't view him as having accepted the mitzvot until he actually accepts them. Additionally, accepting mitzvot is a prerequisite for tevila, and the tevila needs to be repeated in this case.<ref>Igrot Moshe 3:108</ref>
+# If a Bet Din converts people who don't intent to fulfill the mitzvot, then it's causing a major obstacle to other Jews, as they will think that these people are completely acceptable Jews.<ref>The Achronim discuss if Bet Din violates Lifnai Ivair (placing a stumbling block before a blind person) if they convert someone who doesn't intend to keep the Mitzvot, as they are causing him to inevitably commit sins. R' Yitzchak Shmelkes in Bet Yitzchak YD 2:100:11 offers a few arguments for why there would no issue of Lifnai Ivair. First, if he intends to keep the Mitzvot, then we can assume that he will follow through on his commitment. If he doesn't intend to keep the Mitzvot, then he's not Jewish, and he doesn't have to observe the Mitzvot. Second, it's better for him to be Jewish rather than non-Jewish, even if he will violate prohibitions, as all of Yisrael has a portion in Olam Habah (Sanhedrin 90a).  However, he adds that converting people who don't intend to keep the mitzvot is a stumbling block to others who will think that they're Jewish, when they're actually non-Jewish. He therefore concludes that it isn't proper to accept convert who doesn't intend to keep mitzvot. Minchat Shlomo 1:35:3 disagrees with R' Yitzchak Shmelkes and thinks that it's lifnei iver to cause someone who doesn't intend to keep halacha to become Jewish and then subsequently be punished for his sins. Igrot Moshe YD 1:157 writes that there is no reason to accept a convert who isn't going to practice mitzvot.</ref>
-==Claiming Oneself is Jewish==
+==A Person Who Claims to be Jewish==
-#If a person was assumed to be a non-Jew and wasn't acting Jewish and now he claims that his mother was Jewish he is not trusted.<ref>Achiezer 3:27</ref>
+#A person who is assumed to be a non-Jew (as he hasn't been behaving like a Jew), who now claims that his mother was Jewish, is not trusted.<ref>Achiezer 3:27</ref>
 ==Milah==
+# If a convert previously had a medical circumcision or was born circumcised, then he needs hatafat dam brit, and no bracha is recited.<ref>Tosfot Yevamot 46b s.v. drabbi yosi quotes a dispute between the Bahag and Rabbenu Chananel whether a convert who already has a milah needs hatafat dam brit. Bahag holds that he does, while Rabbeinu Chananel thinks that he does not. The Tur 268:1 cites the Itur who says that a non-Jew born without a foreskin doesn't need a hatafat dam brit, while a convert who already had a medical circumcision needs a hatafat dam brit. Bet Yosef cites the Rif Shabbat 55b, Rosh Shabbat 19:5, and Rambam Shabbat 1:7 as holding like the Bahag. Shulchan Aruch Y.D. 268:1 paskens that hatafat dam brit should be performed, but no bracha should be recited. Shach 268:1 explains that there is no bracha because it is a dispute in the rishonim (based on the general rule of safek berachot l'hakel, that whenever a doubt arises regarding brachot, the bracha is omitted).  </ref>
+# A non-Jew who is unable to have a milah for medical reasons cannot convert.<ref>Tosfot Yevamot 46b s.v. drabbi yosi writes that if a male's reproductive organ was cut off, then he can still convert, as he becomes Jewish with tevilah alone, like women. Shulchan Aruch Y.D. 268:1 codifies this position. Although someone who can't have a milah for medical reasons seems to be similar to that case, the Achiezer 4:45 and 4:46 rejects that comparison and holds that he can't convert. This is also the opinion of Zecher Yitzchak 3, Derech Pikudecha (Mitzchak Aseh 2, Dibbur 30), Rav Kook (Daat Kohen 150), and Rav Tzvi Pesach Frank YD 220.
+Rav Kook distinguishes between from the case of Tosfot since the medical situation could be temporary, it could be possible if they want to put themselves in danger, or that we don’t have shiluchutayhu for an uncommon situation.</ref>
 ===Milah by Non-Jew===
-# The milah of gerut certainly needs to be lishma and if done by a non-Jew is invalid and needs hatafat dam brit.<ref>Achiezer 3:27</ref>
+# The milah of gerut certainly needs to be lishma. If the milah is performed by a non-Jew, then it's invalid and the convert needs hatafat dam brit.<ref>Achiezer 3:27</ref>
 ===Milah with Anesthesia===
-#Doing local anesthesia is permitted for an adult milah. Some permit even general anesthesia.<ref>Teshuvot Vehanhagot 1:590 and 2:510 only allows local anthesia and writes that this is the minhag. Though they shouldn't do general anesthesia because it is like one is doing the mitzvah thoughtlessly (mitasek). He says that the milah is part of the process of gerut and must be done with intent to accept the torah at that time and being under anesthesia disables a person from accepting the torah then. Yabia Omer YD 5:22 disagrees and allows local or general anesthesia when discussing an adult's milah. Imrei Yosher 2:140 writes that the reason that one shouldn't use any anesthesia is because milah should involve pain and the minhag was never to use anesthesia even though it was available.
+#Using local anesthesia is permitted for an adult milah. Some even permit general anesthesia.<ref>R' Shternbuch in Teshuvot Vehanhagot 1:590 and 2:510 permits local anthesia. However, he forbids using general anesthesia, because it's as if one is doing the mitzvah thoughtlessly (mitasek). He argues that the milah is part of the process of gerut, and must therefore be done with intent to accept the Torah. When a person is under general anesthesia, he is unable to accept the mitzvot with the proper intent. Yabia Omer YD 5:22 disagrees and allows local as well as general anesthesia for an adult milah. Imrei Yosher 2:140 forbids even local anesthesia, because milah should involve pain. Also, the minhag was to never use anesthesia, even though it was readily available.
-* Yabia Omer YD 5:22 proves that being asleep is still able to fulfill mitzvot through his agency as the gemara Gittin 70b indicates and is codified by Bet Shmuel EH 121:2. Seridei Esh 3:96 only allowed local. Chelkat Yoav (Ohel Moed 1:7 cited by Yabia Omer) lenient. According to Maharach Or Zaruah 11 the purpose of the milah is the result and isn't an action that you need to appoint someone with shelichut. He disagrees with the Koret Habrit (261:4) who holds that the milah shouldn't have anesthesia because it should involve pain. </ref>
+Yabia Omer YD 5:22 proves from the Gemara that one is able to fulfill mitzvot via a shliach (an agent) even when he's asleep.
+Gemara Gittin 70b indicates that if a person appoints a shliach to divorce his wife, the shliach can go ahead and do so, even though the person who sent him is now asleep. This Gemara is codified by Bet Shmuel Even HaEzer 121:2.
+Seridei Esh 3:96 only permitted local anesthesia. Chelkat Yoav (Ohel Moed 1:7 cited by Yabia Omer) was lenient and even permitted general anesthesia. He bases himself on the view of Maharach Or Zaruah 11, who holds that the Mitzvah of Milah is fulfilled when a person is in a state of being circumcised (chalot milah), as opposed to the act of circumcision (maaseh milah). Chelkat Yaakov therefore argues that there's no need for someone to be conscious while the milah takes place, as the mitzvah is fulfilled afterwards when he wakes up and is circumcised. Chelkat Yaakov doesn't think that pain is a necessary component of Milah, disagreeing with the Koret Habrit (261:4), who believes that pain is an essential ingredient of Milah.
+With regards to the above Maharch Ohr Zarua, he argues his point based on a story cited in the Gemara Menachot 43b. When King David entered the bathhouse, he was upset that he didn't have any Mitzvot with him, until he remembered that he still had his Milah with him. Maharach Ohr Zarua argues that if the mitzvah of milah is limited to the act of circumcision, then David didn't have any mitzvot with him. Rather, it must be that the mitzvah of milah is fulfilled when a person is in a state of being circumcised, and this is why David was happy.
+</ref>
 ==Adoption==
-#An adopted child should be converted.<ref>Igrot Moshe YD 2:126 writes that you can't trust the adoption agency that the baby is Jewish. If you did then it would be a problem of asufi. However, we assume he's non-Jewish and can convert.</ref>
+#An adopted child should be converted.<ref>Igrot Moshe YD 2:126 writes that you can't trust the adoption agency that the baby is Jewish. If you did, then it would be a problem of asufi. (An asufi a child who is found in the street, and we don't know the identity of its parents. We assume that it's a safek mamzer. See Mishna Kiddushin 69a and 74a). R' Moshe writes that we assume that he's non-Jewish and can convert.</ref>
 ==Conversion for Marriage==
-#Initially a bet din may not convert for marriage but after the fact it is acceptable.<ref>Yevamot 24b</ref>
+#Ideally (lechatchila), a person should not convert for the sake of marriage, but after the fact (bdiavad) it's acceptable.<ref>Yevamot 24b. The Ritva writes that the reason it's acceptable after the fact, is because we assume that they authentically committed themselves to mitzvot, even though their marriage is what pressured them into doing so. Hagahot Mordechai (Yevamot 4:101 s.v. katuv) seems to write that it's only valid if afterwards we see that they keep halacha properly.</ref>
-#Even in a circumstance where it is permitted to convert for marriage, the Bet Din should be vigilant in checking and ensuring that the convert for marriage accepts the mitzvot completely.<ref>Igrot Moshe YD 1:159 notes that since many who convert for marriage don't really accept mitzvot one should be very weary of accepting such a convert. He says that the majority of converts for marriage in the 1950s in America are invalid because they didn't actually accept mitzvot.</ref>
+#Even in a circumstance where it is permitted to convert for marriage, the Bet Din should be vigilant in checking and ensuring that the person who converts for marriage accepts the mitzvot completely.<ref>Igrot Moshe YD 1:159 notes that since many people who convert for marriage don't really accept the mitzvot, one should be very wary of accepting such a convert. He says that the majority of people who converted for marriage in America during the 1950s are not valid converts, because they didn't actually accept the mitzvot. Bet Yitzchak YD 2:100:9 echoes this sentiment with regards to Ashkenazic countries in the 1800s.</ref>
-#The din should investigate why the convert is converting and only accept him if his intentions are pure or bet din can assess that they will become pure.<ref>Achiezer 3:27 explains that the halacha that we check for the intentions didn't stop applying. The bet din has to decide if he's doing it for pure intent or for marriage or any other reason in which case they shouldn't accept him. If they can assess the situation and think that he will eventually accept Torah for pure intent it is acceptable to accept him even if his original intentions aren't pure. Achiezer 3:26:2 suggests that if it is evident to the bet din that his intent isn't pure then they can't accept the convert initially. However, if it isn't clear even after investigation then they can.</ref>
+#The bet din should investigate why the convert is converting, and only accept him if he has pure intentions, or if they can assess that his intentions will eventually become pure.<ref>Achiezer 3:27. Shach 268-23 paskens like Tosfot 24b s.v. lo, who understands that the reason Hillel converted someone who wanted to become the Kohen Gadol (Shabbat 31a), even though we don't accept people who convert for ulterior motives, is because Hillel was confident that he would eventually be committed for the right reasons. Shach notes that this is the source that we follow Bet Din's evaluation, and that if they think the situation will turn out well, then we go by that. Achiezer 3:26:2 suggests that if it's evident to the bet din that his intent isn't pure, then they can't lechatchila accept him as a convert . However, if his intentions aren't clear, even after their investigation, then they can accept him as a convert. </ref>
-#Some poskim hold that it isn't considered for marriage if either way they're going to continue to stay married even though she remains non-Jewish.<ref>Achiezer 3:26:7</ref>
+#Some poskim hold that if a couple intends on remaining married, irrespective of whether or not the non-Jewish spouse converts, then such a conversion is not considered for the sake of marriage .<ref>Achiezer 3:26:7</ref>
-#Also, according to the decision of the bet din it is possible to accept a convert for marriage if the consequences are that potentially the husband might be turned away if his "wife" can't convert.<ref>Achiezer 3:26:7 based on Rav Shlomo Kluger</ref>
+#Also, according to the decision of the bet din, it's possible to accept a convert for marriage, if the husband might be turned away from religion altogether if his "wife" can't convert.<ref>Achiezer 3:26:7 based on Rav Shlomo Kluger. See Minchat Yitzchak 6:107 s.v. vheneh who writes that if a Jew married a non-Jew, it is better to leave her as a non-Jew than have her convert and not keep the laws of niddah, which is worse.</ref>
+==Marriage after Conversion==
+#A husband and wife who converted together need to wait 3 months before remarrying each other, in order to differentiate between a child that was conceived when she was non-Jewish, and one conceived when she was Jewish. They do not need to wait 3 months if there’s no doubt about whether she’s pregnant, such as if she’s already pregnant,<ref>Rav Shlomo Amar in Shma Shlomo 5:9-12 following the Dagul Mirvava</ref> she’s too old to have children,<ref>Dagul Mirvava 13:5</ref> or just had her period.<ref>Igrot Moshe EH 2:5</ref> Regarding a pregnancy test see footnote.<ref>[https://www.hebrewbooks.org/pdfpager.aspx?req=21253&st=&pgnum=101 Shemesh Umagen 2:41:5] writes that a blood test that checks if she's pregnant is not sufficient evidence to exempt from havchana, because it isn't always accurate. [https://www.yutorah.org/lectures/lecture.cfm/878591/rabbi-hershel-schachter/highlights-of-hilchos-meuberes-meinekes-chaveiro-and-havchana-even-haezer-siman-13/ Rav Schachter] quotes his father that a pregnancy test is reliable, and there's no need to wait three months. </ref>
+#A woman who was previously “married” to a Jew and then converts is required to wait 3 months before getting remarried to her previous husband.<ref>Shulchan Aruch E.H. 13:5</ref> However, they do not need to wait 3 months if it's clear that she’s pregnant or not pregnant, such as if she’s too old to have children.<ref>Rav Elyashiv (Kovetz Teshuvot 3:150) writes that a non-Jewish woman married to a Jew who converted does not need havchana if it is clear that she’s not pregnant such as if she’s too old to have children. He writes that this is included in the leniency of the Dagul Mirvava since regarding two Jews this case is impossible. The only case that is comparable to two Jews who were married and got divorced is two non-Jews who were married and now she converted and married another Jew. In that case, there is no leniency even if it is known that she’s pregnant or not pregnant. Yabia Omer EH 9:12:1-2 quotes Isa Bracha who was lenient about a even case of a woman who was married to a Jew and wants to convert since it is similar to a woman who became pregnant out of wedlock (Shulchan Aruch E.H. 13:6). However, he quotes that Rav Uziel and Melamed Lhoil who rejected that concept since she wants to be married to him and become pregnant from him. Nonetheless, he's lenient with a pregnancy test and doesn't explain further.</ref>
+#A woman who was previously married to a non-Jew and then converts by herself, must wait 3 months before getting married to a Jewish man.<ref>Shulchan Aruch E.H. 13:5</ref> There’s no room for leniency, even if it's clear that she’s not pregnant, such as if she’s too old to have children.<ref>Chelkat Mechokek 13:4 isn’t sure about this. Dagul Mirvava isn’t lenient against Chelkat Mechokek. Igrot Moshe YD 3:110 and EH 2:5 follows Dagul Mirvava, but isn’t more lenient than that.</ref>
+# A single woman who converts does not have to wait 3 months before getting married.<Ref>Shulchan Aruch E.H. 13:5, Bet Shmuel 13:7, Yabia Omer EH 9:17:1-2</ref> Some hold she has to wait,<ref>Radvaz cited by Pitchei Teshuva 13:5</ref> but to satisfy this opinion, some hold that a pregnancy test is sufficient.<ref>Dibrot Eliyahu 7:119 only relies on a pregnancy test for a single woman who converts, which according to Shulchan Aruch doesn't need havchana. He doesn't rely on it for a married woman who converts since according to Shulchan Aruch she needs havchana.</ref>
 ==Milah for Baby Mistakenly Assumed to Be Jewish==
@@ Line 62: / Line 106: @@
 #If the Bet Din doesn’t tell the prospective convert about the mitzvot, the conversion is nonetheless valid if he accepted to keep the mitzvot when he’ll learn about them.<ref>Nemukei Yosef (Yevamot 16a s.v. tanu), Bet Yosef YD 268:2, Shach 268:3, Chemdat Shlomo 1:29, Igrot Moshe YD 1:159</ref>
 ==Non-Jew Mixed into Family==
-#Many poskim hold that if an invalid conversion was done and the non-Jew married into a Jewish family and generations later it is unknown, nonetheless, that is a serious issue and needs to be investigated and revealed.<ref>Rav Elyashiv (Kovetz Teshuvot 4:136) writes that the principle of a mamzer that got mixed into a family does not need to be revealed and is permitted when it is in later generations unknown does not apply to non-Jews. A non-Jew women who married a Jew all the children are non-Jewish and can impact later generations. Rav Chaim Kanievsky (Ktzaruf Kesef p. 11 cited by R’ Yitzchaki cited below)  agreed. See [https://www.machonso.org/hamaayan/?gilayon=20&id=815 Rav Yoel Amital]’s article in Hamaayan where he argues that the Dvar Yehoshua and Chazon Ish EH 1:18 think that it is applicable to non-Jews and [https://www.machonso.org/hamaayan/?gilayon=21&id=851 Rav Dovid Yitzchaki] who argues that the Chazon Ish does not mean that.</ref>
+#Many poskim hold that if an invalid conversion was performed, and the non-Jew married into a Jewish family and generations later it's unknown, that is a serious issue needs to be investigated and revealed.<ref>Rav Elyashiv (Kovetz Teshuvot 4:136) writes that the principle that a mamzer that got mixed into a family does not need to be revealed and is permitted when it is in later generations unknown (Kiddushin 71a) does not apply to non-Jews. Rav Chaim Kanievsky (Ktzaruf Kesef p. 11 cited by R’ Yitzchaki cited below)  agreed. See [https://www.machonso.org/hamaayan/?gilayon=20&id=815 Rav Yoel Amital]’s article in Hamaayan where he argues that the Dvar Yehoshua and Chazon Ish EH 1:18 think that it is applicable to non-Jews.  Also see [https://www.machonso.org/hamaayan/?gilayon=21&id=851 Rav Dovid Yitzchaki] who argues that the Chazon Ish does not mean that.</ref>
 ==Hatafat Dam Brit==
 # A non-Jew who had a medical circumcision and know wants to become Jewish needs hatafat dam brit without a bracha.<ref>Shulchan Aruch Y.D. 268:1, Shach 268:2</ref>
@@ Line 81: / Line 125: @@
 # If a child is converted by bet din when he is bar or bat mitzvah he could protest the conversion or accept Torah and mitzvot. A child who converts with his parents might not to be able to protest the conversion when he becomes bar or bat mitzvah.<ref>Chatom Sofer YD 253 writes that a child who converted with his parents can't later protest the conversion. This is premised on the opinion of the Rif, who doesn't allow a child convert to protest later, and Bahag, who wouldn't allow a child conversion without parent's consent. He also believes this is the opinion of the Rambam that it is only possible for a child convert to protest the conversion if it wasn't done by the request of his parents. Pitchei Teshuva 268:8 cites this teshuva. Bet Yitzchak 1:29:8 notes that this position is against Shulchan Aruch and although the Chatom Sofer's view should be noted we don't accept it.</ref>
 #There is no mitzvah to adopt and convert a non-Jewish child.<ref>Minchat Yitzchak 3:99:1 quoting Rashba Ketubot 11a, Tosfot Ketubot 44a s.v. hagiyoret, and Ran Ketubot 44a. Igrot Moshe YD 1:162 agrees.</ref>
+# There is a discussion whether the bracha for the tevila of a child convert is recited by the bet din or child.<ref>Gerut Kehilchata 6:12. See Shevet Halevi 6:194. Derech Pikudecha (Mitzvah Aseh 2, Dibbur 31) isn't sure if the bet din can recite a bracha at the conversion of a child because he might later decide not to accept Judaism. See Rashba Ketubot 11a.</ref>
+# Yichud with children who are adopted is a serious halachic issue and should be dealt with a Rav in advance.<ref>Shevet Halevi 5:205:8 and 6:196 writes that there is no valid permit to violate yichud when adopting children. He says that just because they are brought by parents and feel close to them emotionally it isn't the same as natural parents. He clarifies that he isn't against adoption but it should be done in a way that avoid any question of yichud. Tzitz Eliezer 6:40:21 writes as a way of justifying the practice (limmud zechut) but doesn't actually endorse it. The main reason to be lenient is that since they're brought up by their adopted parent they don't feel any attraction to them.</ref>
 ==Russian and Ethiopian Jews==
 # Regarding Ethiopians, Igrot Moshe EH 9:1, Tzitz Eliezer 12:66, 17:48, Yabia Omer EH 8:11, Minchat Avraham 1:16
-# Radvaz 4:19 and in [https://www.hebrewbooks.org/pdfpager.aspx?req=146&pgnum=12 Divrei Dovid 5] and [https://www.hebrewbooks.org/pdfpager.aspx?req=146&st=&pgnum=15&hilite= 9] writes that the Jews of Ethiopia are certainly Jewish and from the tribe of Dan. The Maharikash his student reiterated this point. Yabia Omer EH 8:11 thinks that on this basis we should not question the authenticity of the Jews from Ethiopia as being Jewish. He concludes that they should be accepted without conversion and there is no issue with mamzerut. His reasons that there is no issue of mamzerut are like the Radvaz described that it could be that both their kiddushin and gittin were invalid. Also, Rav Ovadia adds that according to their current tradition their kiddushin didn't involve any giving of money to effectuate the kiddushin which is certainly invalid. Rav Moshe Feinstein, however, in Igrot Moshe EH 5:1 questions the Radvaz that it isn't clear how the Radvaz knew that they were certainly Jewish since they didn't observe the Torah. He therefore treats them as questionably Jewish but says that there is no concern of mamzerut if they do convert. Either way they should be saved from trouble because they might be Jewish. Also, they should be accepted with open arms either as Jews from birth or converts. Tzitz Eliezer 12:66 also questions the authenticity of the Jewishness of the Ethiopian Jews. He thinks that they need to convert but also they would be questionably mamzerim if they want to marry into the Jewish people. His opinion is further clarified in 17:48. Rav Avraham Shapira in Minchat Avraham 1:16 and Barkay v. 3 writes that the chief rabbinate accepted the proof from the Radvaz but because there are some concerns that they aren't Jewish they should convert as a chumra. Yalkut Yosef (Klalei Giyur p. 105-6) writes that his father, Rav Ovadia Yosef, accepted this ruling in practice so that there wouldn't be any disputes. [https://www.yutorah.org/sidebar/lecture.cfm/735695/rabbi-hershel-schachter/determining-jewish-identity-ethiopian-jewry/ Rav Hershel Schachter] describes the analytical background of this discussion.
+# Radvaz 4:19 and in [https://www.hebrewbooks.org/pdfpager.aspx?req=146&pgnum=12 Divrei Dovid 5] and [https://www.hebrewbooks.org/pdfpager.aspx?req=146&st=&pgnum=15&hilite= 9] writes that the Jews of Ethiopia are certainly Jewish and from the tribe of Dan. The Maharikash his student reiterated this point. Yabia Omer EH 8:11 thinks that on this basis we should not question the authenticity of the Jews from Ethiopia as being Jewish. He concludes that they should be accepted without conversion and there is no issue with mamzerut. His reasons that there is no issue of mamzerut are like the Radvaz described that it could be that both their kiddushin and gittin were invalid. Also, Rav Ovadia adds that according to their current tradition their kiddushin didn't involve any giving of money to effectuate the kiddushin which is certainly invalid. Rav Moshe Feinstein, however, in Igrot Moshe EH 5:1 questions the Radvaz that it isn't clear how the Radvaz knew that they were certainly Jewish since they didn't observe the Torah. He therefore treats them as questionably Jewish but says that there is no concern of mamzerut if they do convert. Either way they should be saved from trouble because they might be Jewish. Also, they should be accepted with open arms either as Jews from birth or converts. Tzitz Eliezer 12:66 also questions the authenticity of the Jewishness of the Ethiopian Jews. He thinks that they need to convert but also they would be questionably mamzerim if they want to marry into the Jewish people. His opinion is further clarified in 17:48. There he cites Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, Rav Elyashiv, and Minchat Yitzchak as agreeing that the Ethiopians would need to convert to be accepted as Jews. Rav Avraham Shapira in Minchat Avraham 1:16 and Barkay v. 3 writes that the chief rabbinate accepted the proof from the Radvaz but because there are some concerns that they aren't Jewish they should convert as a chumra. Yalkut Yosef (Klalei Giyur p. 105-6) writes that his father, Rav Ovadia Yosef, accepted this ruling in practice so that there wouldn't be any disputes. [https://www.yutorah.org/sidebar/lecture.cfm/735695/rabbi-hershel-schachter/determining-jewish-identity-ethiopian-jewry/ Rav Hershel Schachter] describes the analytical background of this discussion.
-# Yabia Omer EH 7:1 ruled that the Russian Jews who say that they're Jewish are believed, however, it is important that they clarify their definition of Jewish. If they know that Judaism depends on the mother then they can be believed. His primary source is that we trust someone who says he's Jewish since the majority of those who claim that they're Jewish are in fact Jewish as long as there wasn't any presumption that they are non-Jewish. He says that this majority applies whether or not they are observant of halacha when they make this claim. This principle that we can rely on majority even if the person currently isn't religious is the subject of debate of rishonim and achronim. Piskei Din Shel Batei Hadin Harabanim v. 9 p. 357 describes this at length. The case they're discussing is about a son who claims he's Jewish but his mother claims she and by extension he are not. In summary, most rishonim (Tosfot Yevamot 47a, Rabbenu Tam in Sefer Hayashar, Ramban, Rashba, etc) hold that claiming that you're Jewish is enough to presume that you're Jewish even if there is no other evidence to support that claim unless there is a presumption that previously he was assumed to be a non-Jew. However, the Meiri and Maggid Mishna hold that further proof is necessary in order to get married. The Bach YD 268 and Shach sides with the lenient rishonim, while the Bet Hillel EH 2 sides with the strict rishonim. Rav Chaim Ozer 3:27 does seem to support the strict approach. Rav Ovadia sided with the Bach who is lenient unlike the Bet Hillel.
+# Yabia Omer EH 7:1 ruled that the Russian Jews who say that they're Jewish are believed, however, it is important that they clarify their definition of Jewish. If they know that Judaism depends on the mother then they can be believed. His primary source is that we trust someone who says he's Jewish since the majority of those who claim that they're Jewish are in fact Jewish as long as there wasn't any presumption that they are non-Jewish. He says that this majority applies whether or not they are observant of halacha when they make this claim. This principle that we can rely on majority even if the person currently isn't religious is the subject of debate of rishonim and achronim. Piskei Din Shel Batei Hadin Harabanim v. 9 p. 357 describes this at length. The case they're discussing is about a son who claims he's Jewish but his mother claims she and by extension he are not. In summary, most rishonim (Tosfot Yevamot 47a, Rabbenu Tam in Sefer Hayashar, Ramban, Rashba, etc) hold that claiming that you're Jewish is enough to presume that you're Jewish even if there is no other evidence to support that claim unless there is a presumption that previously he was assumed to be a non-Jew. However, the Meiri and Maggid Mishna hold that further proof is necessary in order to get married. The Bach YD 268 and Shach sides with the lenient rishonim, while the Bet Hillel EH 2 sides with the strict rishonim. Rav Chaim Ozer 3:27 does seem to support the strict approach. Rav Ovadia sided with the Bach who is lenient unlike the Bet Hillel. Rav Moshe in Igrot Moshe EH 1:8 also seems to be strict.
+==Shabbat==
+# A non-Jew should not observe Shabbat.<ref>Sanhedrin 58b. According to Rashi Sanhedrin 58b s.v. amar writes that it is forbidden even if one doesn't intend to abstain from melacha for religious purposes and it is just to rest. The Rambam (Melachim 10:9) holds that it is only forbidden if they intend to do so for a religious purpose since it is like creating a new religion. Yad Ramah Sanhedrin 58b s.v. v'amar identifies this dispute. Meiri 59a s.v. ben writes that a non-Jew can't observe another day of the week as Shabbat because Jews might mistakenly learn from him.
+* The Rambam (Melachim 10:9) implies that it is forbidden for a non-Jew to keep Shabbat or even another day during the week as a day of rest but only if it is for religious reasons. If it is for leisure it is permitted. This is further implied by Yad Ramah 58b s.v. vamar who contrasts the opinion of the Rambam with another opinion (either Rashi or one similar to Rashi) that holds keeping Shabbat purely for leisure is also forbidden. Meiri 59a s.v. ben seems to follow the approach of the Rambam in this respect. Rashi Sanhedrin 58b is of the opinion that for leisure is also forbidden. Igrot Moshe YD 2:7 writes that the Rambam agrees with Rashi. </ref>
+# A convert who did milah and didn't do tevilah, according to some poskim should specifically do melacha on Shabbat.<ref>Avnei Nezer YD 351:4-5 writes that according to the Zohar the Jews kept Shabbat after Marah because that's when they completed their milah with priya, even though they didn't complete their conversion at matan torah. Though, he thinks that the rishonim (Tosfot Yevamot 46b, Rashba Yevamot 71a, Ran a"z 26b) sound like this is incorrect and a convert with milah without tevilah is still a complete non-Jew. [http://download.yutorah.org/2008/1053/727378.pdf Rav Zevulun Charlop] cites Pachad Yitzchak (Igrot 56) who distinguishes between Shabbat at marah and Shabbat today for someone who has milah. </ref> However, most poskim hold that it isn't necessary and shouldn't do melacha.<ref>In April 1848, a non-Jew from Morocco came to Yerushalayim to convert. While recovering from the milah before the tevilah, on Shabbat Rav Asher Lemel was asked whether or not this perspective convert should keep Shabbat. Rav Lamel told him not to keep Shabbat. Afterwards the rabbis of Yerushalayim all disagreed with Rav Lamel on the grounds that the minhag previously was not to be concerned about this and let the perspective convert keep Shabbat.  The Binyan Tzion 91 writes that according to his investigations the minhag in Germany was like it was in Yerushalayim. Also, he held that a non-Jew who did milah and not yet tevila should keep Shabbat. 1) Brit milah is a covenant and Shabbat is a covenant; once one forged one covenant with Hashem it isn't reasonable that one needs to break the other. 2) Tosfot Keritut 9a implies that brit milah causes a person to become separated from the other nations even before completing the conversion. He concludes that he is obligated to keep Shabbat.
+* Lhorot Natan 1:38:15 writes that there is a great proof from Tosfot Yeshanim Yevamot 48b and Midrash Rabba (Devarim 1:27) that it is permitted for a convert who do milah to keep Shabbat even though he didn't finish converting.</ref>
+# A Jew who isn't certain that he is going to convert to be strict, between when he is aware of this doubt and when he converts, he has a dillema whether he should keep Shabbat. If he's non-Jewish he can't keep Shabbat, but if he's Jewish he can. See note for some solutions.<ref>Chashukei Chemed Sanhedrin 58b writes about someone from Russian extraction and isn't sure if he is Jewish. Between when he became aware of this and his conversion, can he keep Shabbat? If he is non-Jewish he can't keep Shabbat, but if he's Jewish he should keep Shabbat? Solutions that Chashukei Chemed quotes include: wearing tzitzit in the public domain (Maharam Shik OC 145 quoting the Chatom Sofer), asking a non-Jew to work for him (Maharam Shik), or working on Saturday night (Panim Yafot Beresheet 8:22).</ref>
+==Teaching Torah==
+#Meiri Sanhedrin 59a s.v. ben writes that a non-Jew who is interested in converting can learn Torah.
+==Volunteering Mitzvot as a Non-Jew==
+# A non-Jew who volunteers to do mitzvot according to many opinions is rewarded. However, they may not observe mitzvot as an obligation because doing so is considered creating a new religion.<ref>The Rambam Melachim 10:10 writes that a non-Jew who wants to fulfill mitzvot and receive reward we shouldn't stop him. On the other hand, in 10:9 he writes that we shouldn't let him do a mitzvah that he isn't obligated in because he is creating a non-religion in doing so. He should either convert or only keep the 7 mitzvot of bnei noach. The Radvaz explains that the distinction is whether he intends to create a new religion. If he just does a mitzvah voluntarily not intending that it is an obligationi that is acceptable, while if he is does it with the intention of being a commandment he should be stopped. While it seems from the Rambam and Radvaz that the non-Jew is rewarded for doing a mitzvah voluntarily it isn’t absolutely clear. It is possible that the non-Jew is doing the mitzvah voluntarily to get rewarded but isn’t actually going to be rewarded. That is the position of Rav Moshe Feinstein in Igrot Moshe YD 2:7.
+* However, in light of the Rambam responsa 148 (Blau, Pear Hadur 60) it seems clear that the Rambam holds that a non-Jew who does a mitzvah voluntarily is indeed rewarded. He seems to apply it to all the mitzvot. The Meiri Sanhedrin 59a s.v. ben also says this, but Igrot Moshe YD 2:7 writes that it is a scribal error. The other proofs against Igrot Moshe like Pirush Mishnayot of Rambam Trumot 3:9 are dealt with in that teshuva.</ref>
 ==Conservative Conversions==
 #Conservative conversions are generally considered invalid by Orthodox halacha.<ref>Igrot Moshe YD 3:77:2. Minchat Yitzchak 6:108 writes that you shouldn't let Conservative rabbis use your mikveh for a conversion.</ref>
 ==Baal Teshuva==
 #There is a rabbinic tevilah for someone who completely left Jewish practice and wants to do teshuva.<ref>Rama 268:12. The Gra cites the source for the Tevilah in [https://he.wikisource.org/wiki/%D7%90%D7%91%D7%95%D7%AA_%D7%93%D7%A8%D7%91%D7%99_%D7%A0%D7%AA%D7%9F_%D7%97#%D7%97 Avot D'Rabbi Natan 8:8].</ref>
+# The general halacha is that if the mother is Jewish the child is Jewish.<ref>Igrot Moshe EH 1:8 has a fascinating nuance in some rishonim that if the father wasn't Jewish and the mother was completely not religious the child is considered not Jewish. However, Rashbash cited by Bedek Habayit YD 268:12 disagrees that Jewishness is decided by the mother even if she is not religious and the father was non-Jewish.</ref>
 ==Sources==

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Latest revision as of 21:37, 21 August 2024

Contents

Bet Din for Conversion

Order of Procedure

Time

Tevilah

Tevilah of Women

Pregnant Woman Conversion

Acceptance of Mitzvot

A Person Who Claims to be Jewish

Milah

Milah by Non-Jew

Milah with Anesthesia

Adoption

Conversion for Marriage

Marriage after Conversion

Milah for Baby Mistakenly Assumed to Be Jewish

Disclosure of Mitzvot

Non-Jew Mixed into Family

Hatafat Dam Brit

Adoption and Child Conversions

Russian and Ethiopian Jews

Shabbat

Teaching Torah

Volunteering Mitzvot as a Non-Jew

Conservative Conversions

Baal Teshuva

Sources

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Halachic Topics

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Conversion: Difference between revisions

Latest revision as of 21:37, 21 August 2024

Bet Din for Conversion

Order of Procedure

Time

Tevilah

Tevilah of Women

Pregnant Woman Conversion

Acceptance of Mitzvot

A Person Who Claims to be Jewish

Milah

Milah by Non-Jew

Milah with Anesthesia

Adoption

Conversion for Marriage

Marriage after Conversion

Milah for Baby Mistakenly Assumed to Be Jewish

Disclosure of Mitzvot

Non-Jew Mixed into Family

Hatafat Dam Brit

Adoption and Child Conversions

Russian and Ethiopian Jews

Shabbat

Teaching Torah

Volunteering Mitzvot as a Non-Jew

Conservative Conversions

Baal Teshuva

Sources

Navigation

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