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While Judaism does not proselytize<ref>Part of the reason for our hesitancy to accept converts is rooted in a statement of the Gemara Kiddushin 70b: "converts are bad like sapachat (a form of Tzara'at) for the Jewish people". Gemara Yevamot 47b says that this is the reason why we discourage converts when they first appear before us, as we challenge their motivations for converting and attempt to dissuade them from doing so. Rashi Kiddushin 70b s.v. kashin explains that since they aren't meticulous in their observance of Mitzvot, naturally born Jews will inevitably be negatively influenced by them. Rashi Niddah 13b s.v. k'sapachat adds that because they aren't experts in Mitzvot, they'll bring about punishment (similar to when the King of Assyria exiled the people of Kutha to the Shomron, they converted to Judaism, and then Hashem punished them for their lack of observance by sending lions to ravage them. See Melachim II 17:25). | While Judaism does not proselytize<ref>Part of the reason for our hesitancy to accept converts is rooted in a statement of the Gemara Kiddushin 70b: "converts are bad like sapachat (a form of Tzara'at) for the Jewish people". Gemara Yevamot 47b says that this is the reason why we discourage converts when they first appear before us, as we challenge their motivations for converting and attempt to dissuade them from doing so. Rashi Kiddushin 70b s.v. kashin explains that since they aren't meticulous in their observance of Mitzvot, naturally born Jews will inevitably be negatively influenced by them. Rashi Niddah 13b s.v. k'sapachat adds that because they aren't experts in Mitzvot, they'll bring about punishment (similar to when the King of Assyria exiled the people of Kutha to the Shomron, they converted to Judaism, and then Hashem punished them for their lack of observance by sending lions to ravage them. See Melachim II 17:25). | ||
(As an aside, Rashi Niddah also has an interesting opinion that the concept of "kol yisrael arevim zeh b'zeh" (Shevuot 39a), that all Jews are guarantors for one another, doesn't apply to converts. This is not the accepted practice, as we usually allow a convert to be yotzaih (fulfill his obligation) Kiddush by hearing it from a naturally born Jew, and vice versa as well). | (As an aside, Rashi Niddah also has an interesting opinion that the concept of "kol yisrael arevim zeh b'zeh" (Shevuot 39a), that all Jews are guarantors for one another, doesn't apply to converts. This is not the accepted practice, as we usually allow a convert to be yotzaih (fulfill his obligation) Kiddush by hearing it from a naturally born Jew, and vice versa as well. However, Beit Yitzchak 2:100:11 seems to adopt this Rashi, that Jews aren't punished for the sins of converts.). | ||
Tosfot Kiddushin 70b s.v. kashim quotes an interesting explanation from a figure who lived in the days of the Baalai HaTosfot | Tosfot Kiddushin 70b s.v. kashim quotes an interesting explanation of this Gemara from R' Avraham HaGer (a figure who lived in the days of the Baalai HaTosfot). He argues that converts are in fact more meticulous in their observance of mitzvot than naturally born Jews, and when Hashem sees their dedication, He recalls the shortcomings of the Jewish people and grows angry with them. He draws a parallel to a story in Navi (Melachim I:17) that the woman of Tzarfat accused Eliyahu as being the reason for her son's death, that his piety highlighted her lower spiritual state and incurred Hashem's wrath. Tosfot posits that another way of understanding why converts are bad for the Jewish people is because the Torah warns in twenty four places about oppressing them, and it is very difficult to be properly sensitive towards them and not violate this prohibition. </ref>, it does welcome converts who come on their own initiative<ref>Gm Yevamot 47a (and paskened in Shulchan Aruch Yoreh De'ah 268:2) states that when an individual comes to convert, we discourage him by mentioning the fact that the Jews are a downtrodden and oppressed nation. If the person acknowledges this and nonetheless expresses his desire to convert, then we accept him as a convert. | ||
There is also a discussion as to whether or not there's a Mitzvah to perform conversions. Gemara Yevamot 47b says that once a prospective convert dedicates himself to keep the Mitzvot, we do Milah right away, because "we don't delay a Mitzvah". The simple understanding of this Gemara is that there is a Mitzvah element to converting people. Furthermore, the fact that Gemara Shabbat 137b records that when performing a Milah on a convert, the text of the beracha includes "who has commanded us to give a Milah to converts", indicates that there is a Mitzvah to convert people. Tashbetz (Zohar HaRakia, assin 40) thinks that accepting converts is a Mitzvah, but is unsure under which Mitzvah it would be included. Interestingly, he also thinks that the fact that Beit Din converts a Katan al da'at Beit Din (Ketubot 11a), indicates that there's a Mitzvah to accept converts. | There is also a discussion as to whether or not there's a Mitzvah to perform conversions. Gemara Yevamot 47b says that once a prospective convert dedicates himself to keep the Mitzvot, we do Milah right away, because "we don't delay a Mitzvah". The simple understanding of this Gemara is that there is a Mitzvah element to converting people. Furthermore, the fact that Gemara Shabbat 137b records that when performing a Milah on a convert, the text of the beracha includes "who has commanded us to give a Milah to converts", indicates that there is a Mitzvah to convert people. Tashbetz (Zohar HaRakia, assin 40) thinks that accepting converts is a Mitzvah, but is unsure under which Mitzvah it would be included. Interestingly, he also thinks that the fact that Beit Din converts a Katan al da'at Beit Din (Ketubot 11a), indicates that there's a Mitzvah to accept converts. | ||
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#If the convert said that he accepted mitzvot, but in his heart did not intend on keeping the mitzvot, that is an invalid conversion.<ref>Bet Yitzchak YD 2:100:9, Achiezer 3:26, Igrot Moshe YD 1:157 and 3:108, Minchat Yitzchak 6:107. Bet Yitzchak explains that the concept that intentions can't invalidate a statement (''dvarim shebelev einam dvarim''), is limited to interpersonal matters between two different people. However, conversion is between a person and Hashem, and one's intentions certainly do count. Therefore, if the convert says that he plans to keep Torah but his intentions are otherwise, then the conversion is invalid. Another salient point is the fact that Tosfot Kiddushin 49b s.v. devarim says that if something is so clear, even though it's not explictily stated, then in such a situation we'd consider it meaningful and significant (devarim shebelev havaih devarim). So too over here, if it's clear as day that someone doesn't intend to dedicate himself to Mitzvot, then we'd take that into account and invalidate the conversion. | #If the convert said that he accepted mitzvot, but in his heart did not intend on keeping the mitzvot, that is an invalid conversion.<ref>Bet Yitzchak YD 2:100:9, Achiezer 3:26, Igrot Moshe YD 1:157 and 3:108, Minchat Yitzchak 6:107. Bet Yitzchak explains that the concept that intentions can't invalidate a statement (''dvarim shebelev einam dvarim''), is limited to interpersonal matters between two different people. However, conversion is between a person and Hashem, and one's intentions certainly do count. Therefore, if the convert says that he plans to keep Torah but his intentions are otherwise, then the conversion is invalid. Another salient point is the fact that Tosfot Kiddushin 49b s.v. devarim says that if something is so clear, even though it's not explictily stated, then in such a situation we'd consider it meaningful and significant (devarim shebelev havaih devarim). So too over here, if it's clear as day that someone doesn't intend to dedicate himself to Mitzvot, then we'd take that into account and invalidate the conversion. | ||
*In a specific case of a woman who said that she accepted the mitzvot but had in mind to violate some halachot, Igrot Moshe 3:108 writes that it is a valid conversion. His reasons are (1) since her children are practicing Judaism, she isn't trusted about them to say that they're not Jewish. (2) dvar shebelev einam dvarim, unless there is a clear circumstance that everyone knew that contradicts her words. (3) If she accepts the mitzvot, but because of financial pressures she won't be able to practically keep all the mitzvot, then that is considered an acceptance of mitzvot. R' Moshe isn't certain about this last reason. However, regarding (1) Achiezer 3:26:2 argues that for the actual acceptance of mitzvot, dvarim shebelev ainam devarim isn't relevant, since it is a matter between him and Heaven, regarding which intentions are critical. </ref> If it isn't clear if he accepted the mitzvot, some say that it is a questionable conversion.<ref>Igrot Moshe YD 3:106 writes that although the convert said that he accepts mitzvot, if the circumstances make it clear that this statement is dubious, the validity of the conversion is questionable. Kger Kezrach ch. 32 discusses this opinion and supports it.</ref> | *In a specific case of a woman who said that she accepted the mitzvot but had in mind to violate some halachot, Igrot Moshe 3:108 writes that it is a valid conversion. His reasons are (1) since her children are practicing Judaism, she isn't trusted about them to say that they're not Jewish. (2) dvar shebelev einam dvarim, unless there is a clear circumstance that everyone knew that contradicts her words. (3) If she accepts the mitzvot, but because of financial pressures she won't be able to practically keep all the mitzvot, then that is considered an acceptance of mitzvot. R' Moshe isn't certain about this last reason. However, regarding (1) Achiezer 3:26:2 argues that for the actual acceptance of mitzvot, dvarim shebelev ainam devarim isn't relevant, since it is a matter between him and Heaven, regarding which intentions are critical. </ref> If it isn't clear if he accepted the mitzvot, some say that it is a questionable conversion.<ref>Igrot Moshe YD 3:106 writes that although the convert said that he accepts mitzvot, if the circumstances make it clear that this statement is dubious, the validity of the conversion is questionable. Kger Kezrach ch. 32 discusses this opinion and supports it.</ref> | ||
#If the convert accepted all the mitzvot aside from one of them, the Bet Din should not accept him as a convert. After the fact, some say that it is a valid conversion,<ref>Igrot Moshe YD 3:106 | #If the convert accepted all the mitzvot aside from one of them, the Bet Din should not accept him as a convert.<ref>Bechorot 30b. The Gemara says that even if he only rejects a Rabbinic law, we don't accept him as a convert. See below if the rejection of a Rabbinic law would invalidate a conversion after the fact. </ref> After the fact, some say that it is a valid conversion,<ref>Igrot Moshe YD 3:106 | ||
*Gemara Shabbat 31a describes a case in which Hillel converted someone, even though that individual didn't accept the legitimacy of the Oral Torah. Rashi 31a s.v. gayrey says that Hillel converted him because this fellow didn't deny the Oral Torah, but simply had a hard time believing that it was from Hashem. Hillel was confident that after he taught him, that he'd trust him that it came from Hashem. Igrot Moshe 3:106 learns from Rashi that not accepting one mitzvah doesn't invalidate the conversion, but you shouldn't perform such a conversion unless you know that he will end accepting all of the mitzvot. Minchat Asher Shabbat 34:1 understands this Rashi differently. The convert under question did accept the fact that the Oral Torah is binding, but wasn't necessarily convinced that it's Divine. Hillel was confident that he could correct this error later, and that's why he accepted him.</ref> while most poskim hold that the conversion is invalid.<ref>Bet Yitzchak, Biur Halacha 304. Achiezer 3:26 is uncertain. It seems that Rav Moshe retracted because both in Igrot Moshe YD 3:107 and 3:108 which are written after 3:106 he says that it isn’t a valid conversion. Igrot Moshe 3:106 holds that chutz mdvar echad is only lechatchila but in 3:107 and 3:108 he says that isn't the case.</ref> | *Gemara Shabbat 31a describes a case in which Hillel converted someone, even though that individual didn't accept the legitimacy of the Oral Torah. Rashi 31a s.v. gayrey says that Hillel converted him because this fellow didn't deny the Oral Torah, but simply had a hard time believing that it was from Hashem. Hillel was confident that after he taught him, that he'd trust him that it came from Hashem. Igrot Moshe 3:106 learns from Rashi that not accepting one mitzvah doesn't invalidate the conversion, but you shouldn't perform such a conversion unless you know that he will end accepting all of the mitzvot. Minchat Asher Shabbat 34:1 understands this Rashi differently. The convert under question did accept the fact that the Oral Torah is binding, but wasn't necessarily convinced that it's Divine. Hillel was confident that he could correct this error later, and that's why he accepted him.</ref> while most poskim hold that the conversion is invalid.<ref>Bet Yitzchak, Biur Halacha 304. Achiezer 3:26 is uncertain. It seems that Rav Moshe retracted his position, because both in Igrot Moshe YD 3:107 and 3:108, which are written after 3:106, he says that it isn’t a valid conversion. Igrot Moshe 3:106 holds that chutz mdvar echad is only lechatchila, but in 3:107 and 3:108 he says that isn't the case, and that it even invalidates the conversion after the fact.</ref> | ||
#If the convert intends to keep the mitzvot as he | #If the convert intends to keep the mitzvot as he sees other "religious" Jews observing them , even though they don't properly keep all of the mitzvot, there is a discussion if this is a valid acceptance of mitzvot.<ref>Igrot Moshe 3:106 suggests that perhaps it is an acceptance of mitzvot if she plans on doing mitzvot like other "religious" Jews, even though they violate certain halachot such as tzeniyut. R' Moshe compares this to someone who converts and lives amongst gentiles, which the Gemara (Shabbat 68a) considers to be a legitimate convert. Such a person is committed to mitzvot, even though he hasn't been properly educated in how to keep them. Similarly, this woman is committed to mitzvot, even though she hasn't been properly educated and is erroneously following a certain community's mistaken practices. Nonetheless, R' Moshe isn't ready to be lenient based on that logic.</ref> | ||
#If the convert accepted all the mitzvot | #If the convert accepted all the mitzvot except for a Rabbinic one, then after the fact the conversion is valid.<ref>Bet Meir, Biur Halacha. Achiezer 3:26 isn’t certain if it's a valid conversion on a Biblical level, or if it isn't a valid conversion at all. </ref> | ||
#If the convert is converting for marriage after the fact the conversion is valid as long as they completely accepted all of the mitzvot.<ref>Yevamot 24b, Igrot Moshe, Achiezer, Dvar Avraham</ref> | #If the convert is converting for the sake of marriage, then after the fact the conversion is valid, as long as they completely accepted all of the mitzvot.<ref>Yevamot 24b, Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Deah 268:12. Igrot Moshe, Achiezer, Dvar Avraham. Interestingly, there's an opinion in the Tannaim (cited on Yevamot 24b) who holds that it isn't a valid conversion after the fact, but this isn't how we pasken. Either way, we ideally try to avoid accepting converts who are only doing so for the sake of marriage (see Shulchan Aruch ibid). </ref> | ||
#If | #If someone didn’t accept the mitzvot at the time of the tevilah, but planned on accepting them later, then we don't view him as having accepted the mitzvot until he actually accepts them. Additionally, accepting mitzvot is a prerequisite for tevila, and the tevila needs to be repeated in this case.<ref>Igrot Moshe 3:108</ref> | ||
# | # If a Bet Din converts people who don't intent to fulfill the mitzvot, then it's causing a major obstacle to other Jews, as they will think that these people are completely acceptable Jews.<ref>The Achronim discuss if Bet Din violates Lifnai Ivair (placing a stumbling block before a blind person) if they convert someone who doesn't intend to keep the Mitzvot, as they are causing him to inevitably commit sins. R' Yitzchak Shmelkes in Bet Yitzchak YD 2:100:11 offers a few arguments for why there would no issue of Lifnai Ivair. First, if he intends to keep the Mitzvot, then we can assume that he will follow through on his commitment. If he doesn't intend to keep the Mitzvot, then he's not Jewish, and he doesn't have to observe the Mitzvot. Second, it's better for him to be Jewish rather than non-Jewish, even if he will violate prohibitions, as all of Yisrael has a portion in Olam Habah (Sanhedrin 90a). However, he adds that converting people who don't intend to keep the mitzvot is a stumbling block to others who will think that they're Jewish, when they're actually non-Jewish. He therefore concludes that it isn't proper to accept convert who doesn't intend to keep mitzvot. Minchat Shlomo 1:35:3 disagrees with R' Yitzchak Shmelkes and thinks that it's lifnei iver to cause someone who doesn't intend to keep halacha to become Jewish and then subsequently be punished for his sins. Igrot Moshe YD 1:157 writes that there is no reason to accept a convert who isn't going to practice mitzvot.</ref> | ||
==A Person Who Claims to be Jewish== | ==A Person Who Claims to be Jewish== | ||
